CHAPTER 1

Perspectives on Hate and Violence

HATE, PREJUDICE, AND DISCRIMINATION

Language becomes modified over time in response to changing events and situations. Until recently, the term “hate” referred to any intense dislike or hostility, whatever its object. In everyday conversation, for example, an individual might be said to “hate” his teacher, the taste of liver, communism, or even himself. Thus, in this generic sense of the term, hate could be directed at almost anything—a person, a group, an idea, some other abstraction, or an inanimate object (Levin & Paulsen, 1999).

Transforming the Terms

Beginning in the mid-1980s, in response to a series of racially inspired murders in New York City, the term “hate” became used in a much more restricted sense to characterize an individual’s negative beliefs and feelings about the members of some other group of people because of their race, religious identity, ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability status (Jacobs & Potter, 1998; Jenness & Broad, 1997; Jenness & Grattet, 2004; Lawrence, 1999; Levin, 1992–1993; Levin & McDevitt, 1993). As incorporated into the concept of hate crime, this more limited usage overlaps terms such as “prejudice,” “bias,” “bigotry,” “ethnocentrism,” and “ethnoviolence” (as in such more specific forms as racism, sexism, ageism, homophobia, and xenophobia—Perry, 2003).

“Hate” is not the only concept in the lexicon of bigotry to have undergone a major shift in meaning. Very much the same sort of transition occurred decades earlier in the original definition of the kindred term “prejudice”—from “any pre-judgment” to “a hostile attitude directed specifically toward the members of an outgroup” (Ehrlich, 1972, 2009; Levin & Levin, 1982; Levin & Rabrenovic, 2009).
In its original usage, the term “prejudice” was used in a legal context to refer to a prejudgment about the guilt or innocence of a defendant, that is, an evaluation made before all the facts of a case could be properly determined and weighed. This usage was subsequently broadened to include “any unreasonable attitude that is unusually resistant to rational influence” (Rosnow, 1972, p. 53). Thus, a person who was stubbornly committed to a position in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary could be characterized as prejudiced, whether about her politics, her religious convictions, her friends, or her children.

After the publication of Gordon Allport’s classic work, *The Nature of Prejudice*, in 1954, the term “prejudice” was no longer reserved for characterizing people who jump to conclusions or make dogmatic judgments and instead became associated more narrowly with bigotry, bias, and racism. Thus, a prejudiced individual was someone who stereotyped the members of a particular race as, for example, dirty, lazy, and stupid; despised the people in a particular group for being uncivilized and inferior; or felt sickened by the very thought of those who had a different skin color or religious orientation. The original irrationality was retained in Allport’s definition, but he applied it much more narrowly to refer to a negative attitude toward other people because they are in a different race, religion, or ethnic group.

Decades later, the same concept was applied to a wider range of differences including sexual orientation, disability status, gender, and age (see Levin, 2009; Levin & Levin, 1982; Levin & McDevitt, 1995a). At this point, the phenomena of hate and prejudice were, for most purposes, treated as interchangeable.¹

**Prejudice Versus Discrimination**

By the same token, Allport considered discrimination prejudice’s behavioral counterpart—as hurtful, harmful, destructive behavior toward others because they are perceived to be members of a particular group. Violence represents an extreme version of discrimination; but other examples include name-calling, vandalizing, threatening, firing, or refusing to have contact with individuals who are different.

¹Although overlapping and used interchangeably in this work, “hate” and “prejudice” also have differences that are important to emphasize. “Hate” tends to focus less on cognition (i.e., stereotyping) and more on the emotional or affective component of bigotry. Indeed, until hate became recently associated with intergroup hostility, researchers focused almost exclusively on the cognitive dimension of prejudice. As a result, sociologists and psychologists have offered many more insights into the nature of stereotypes and other cognitive processes related to prejudice than they have into its affective basis (Pettigrew, 1997).
The relationship between hate or prejudice, on the one hand, and discrimination, on the other, has been well documented. There is reason to believe that certain hate offenses result from some personal bias or hatred. Perpetrators may act out of prejudicial beliefs (i.e., stereotypes) and/or emotions (e.g., envy, fear, or revulsion) concerning people who are different. In the extreme case, a hatemonger may join an organized group in order to devote his entire life to destroying a group of people he considers “inferior.”

It is not, however, always necessary for hate to precede the bigoted behavior. In fact, from the literature of social psychology, we know that prejudices often develop or at least become strengthened to justify previous discriminatory behavior, including violence (see Blee, 2003; Levin & Levin, 1988).

This is probably true of hate crimes as well as other forms of discrimination. For example, a White teenager may assault someone who is Latino because his friends expect him to comply, not because initially he harbors intense hatred toward his victim. If he views the target of his attack as a flesh-and-blood human being with feelings, friends, and a family, the offender may feel guilty. By accepting a dehumanized image of the victim, however, the perpetrator may actually come to believe that his crime is justified. After all, the rules of civilized society apply only to human beings, not to demons or animals. Similarly, an individual may commit an act of violence against an individual for economic reasons (e.g., because he believes that the presence of Blacks in his neighborhood reduces property values) and subsequently become totally convinced that all Blacks are rapists and murderers. Who would want a rapist living next door?

Part of the way that we come to understand ourselves is not very different from the way that others come to know us. We observe the manner in which we act over a period of time. If we repeatedly participate in hate crimes or other discriminatory behavior, we might very well gradually modify our self-image and our thinking about the groups we attack so as to be consistent with how we behave. Once again, we see the impact of discriminatory behavior on hate and prejudice (Bem, 1970, 1992).

Most surprisingly, perhaps, individuals who find comfort in joining an organized hate group may not always be so hate-filled as we might believe, at least not at first. In her research into what motivates women who join White supremacist groups, sociologist Kathleen Blee (2003) discovered that many of her respondents became more hateful after joining the movement. Their decision to take membership in a hate group was apparently inspired less by prejudice or hate and more by a desire for community; that is, to remain in good standing with their comrades.
The Role of the Individual

During the 1940s and 1950s, the term “prejudice” provided the basis for countless studies of intergroup tension and hostility. One of the most important theories ever developed in the social sciences, the authoritarian personality structure (Adorno Theodore, Frankel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), took a psychoanalytic viewpoint that located the roots of bigotry in early childhood. Literally thousands of research projects were initiated to test various aspects of the theory.

Yet during the 1960s and later, ripples from the civil rights movement began to make their way through American society. The concept of prejudice fell out of favor with social scientists as vastly more attention became focused on institutionalized rather than individual racism. To a growing extent, the thinking in social science was that racist attitudes (or at least their public expression) were on the decline and that discrimination was more or less independent of hate (see, for example, Levin & McDevitt, 1995a; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997).

Thus, rather than focus on individual prejudices, researchers during the past few decades understandably turned more of their attention to investigating institutional and structural forms of discrimination: in large businesses, for example, how union seniority rules assure that people of color do not get promoted, even if individual union representatives oppose the prevailing system; in college applications, the manner in which SATs indirectly favor White applicants, whether or not individual admissions officers hold racist attitudes; in real estate transactions, how real estate associations, as a matter of policy, “steer” Black home buyers from White neighborhoods, regardless of the racial biases of particular agents (Pearce, 1979; Turner & Mikelsons, 1992).

Because social scientists have enthusiastically examined such structural issues, they may have been surprised when advocacy groups suggested during the 1980s and 1990s that hate violence was dramatically on the rise. The so-called “new” or “modern” racism had emphasized subtle, sophisticated, symbolic, and institutionalized forms of bigotry; it had all but failed to recognize the possibility that policies and programs directed at tearing down the barriers separating various racial and religious groups might also provoke increasing numbers of hate crimes committed by members of traditionally advantaged groups in society who felt under attack.

It might be surprising that two sociologists—the authors of this book—would argue for bringing back the individual into our theorizing about intergroup conflict, but that is exactly what we think is important to do. Just as Allport (1954) long ago suggested, the individual is a silent partner, an active agent, and a gatekeeper in any process of social change. It is important, of course, to recognize the influence of structural and
cultural sources of bigotry, but it is just as significant to realize that it
takes individual action or lack of action to make hate happen. Individuals
still make the decisions; they conform or refuse to conform to group stan-
dards; and they decide whether to go along with the dictates of legitimate
authority. Individuals internalize the cultural hate, and many of them
also benefit (or they believe that they benefit) from the maintenance of
prejudice and discrimination. Based on both company policy as well as
on personal preconceptions, real estate agents decide who sees which
houses and who doesn’t. Based on both school policy and on personal
preference, admissions officers decide who gets into school and who is
refused admission. Moreover, while depending on institutionalized
practices and policies, the overwhelming majority of hate offenses are
committed not by organizations but by individuals. The hate expressed in
such crimes is far from indirect or sophisticated or abstract; the discrimi-
nation is anything but subtle.

HATE AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR VIOLENCE

Several years ago, when Apartheid was still the reigning system of race
relations in the country of South Africa, the first author happened to
run across an Associated Press story in the Boston Globe concerning an
unfortunate White woman in Johannesburg who was being treated for
cancer. Though no fault of her own, she had suffered not only a loss
of her physical well-being but also a dramatic loss of her social and
economic status.

Under the South African system of Apartheid, there were three
racial categories: White, Colored, and Black. Actually, the racial identity
of South Africans determined almost entirely the range of opportunities
they could expect to enjoy over the course of the life cycle, including
whom they were eligible to date and marry, where they were permitted
to live, what sorts of jobs they were qualified to take, the mode of trans-
portation they were permitted to use, and the quantity and quality of
their formal education. With respect to such advantages, Whites were
always on top, Coloreds were in between, and Blacks were at the very
bottom.

The cancer-stricken South African woman soon learned—on a
deeply personal level—the cold, cruel reality of Apartheid. As an unex-
pected side-effect of the chemotherapy she had taken, her skin color
became progressively darker, so much so that her racial identity appeared
to be Colored, not White, and she was no longer permitted to ride the
Whites’ only bus to work every day. In fact, the bus driver, thinking that
any of the woman’s offspring must share at least some part of their
mother’s racial identity, also refused to permit her teenage daughter to
ride the bus, even though the girl’s skin color was that of a White. But getting to work turned out to be the least of the unfortunate woman’s problems. As soon as her skin darkened, she was also shunned by her friends, fired by her boss, and deserted by her husband.

It should not be shocking that a change that was only skin-deep severely restricted the woman’s social and economic opportunities. Under the South African version of Apartheid, an individual who was identified as Black or Colored was also considered less than a human being. In fact, many South African Whites refused to use the word “people” when referring to those designated as Colored or Black. The dehumanization of South Africans of color was essential to the perpetuation of Apartheid. It permitted both official policy and informal interaction to exclude millions of residents from being treated according to the rules of civilized society. If Blacks are human beings, they must be handled with decency and respect. If they are subhumans or animals, then they can be enslaved, segregated, brutalized, or even killed with impunity.

Social Construction of Differences

One important lesson we learn from the South African example is that we don’t always have 100% control over the way we are racially defined by other people. If those who define us have more power and authority than we do, then their definition may be real in its consequences (Thomas & Thomas, 1928). Under such circumstances, theirs—not ours—is the definition that counts, at least in terms of its impact on our economic and social status. It is the definition that determines what bus we are allowed to ride, where we are permitted to live, and which schools we are allowed to attend. We may very well be convinced that we are $X$; and, psychologically, this may be enough to make us feel very comfortable. Yet, in its ability to influence our status in society, what other people believe us to be may, in a socioeconomic sense, determine that we are $Y$, not $X$.

Yet, as a physical marker of differences between groups, even skin color is not always an important criterion for determining our racial identity. In South Africa, for example, visiting Japanese businessmen were officially classified as White, that is, as honorary Caucasians, as a purely practical matter to spare them the humiliating effects of being categorized as non-Whites. There would have been no Japanese businessmen visiting South Africa at all if they had been forced to live the lives of its Colored citizens.

To the extent that it is socially constructed, racial identity varies over time and place. In the United States until recently, anyone found to possess even one drop of “Black blood” was considered Black. Thus, as late as the 1980s, an individual whose ancestry included even a single
Black relative but who appeared to be White (had blonde hair, fair complexion, and Caucasoid physiognomy [thin lips and nose]) would still be treated, in law and custom, as belonging to the Black race. Under many state laws, even choice of a marriage partner would have been restricted to someone else defined as Black.

In refusing to relinquish its archaic legal racial categories, the state of Louisiana, as late as 1983, became the only remaining state to have a legally sanctioned formula for determining the racial identity of its residents. By this mathematical method, any citizen who had one-thirty-second or less of “Negro blood” was considered to be White under the law (Larson, 2000).

Although such state laws no longer exist, absolute criteria for determining Blackness continue to operate on an informal basis within American culture. Thus, for example, golf great Tiger Woods, who is of mixed ancestry and considers himself multiracial, is often referred to by television and radio commentators as the “great Black golfer.” Interestingly, individuals defined as Black in the United States could travel to Puerto Rico or Brazil, where, depending entirely on physical appearance instead of genetics, they might very well be considered White. Or they could visit South Africa, where they would almost definitely be thought of as Colored instead of either Black or White.

Racial identity can, in addition to its impact on self-esteem, have a profound political effect. The federal government allocates some $200 billion every year for employment, mortgage lending, housing, health care services, and educational opportunities based on the representation of various racial and ethnic groups in the Census Bureau enumeration. The 2000 U.S. Census contained 63 racial options. Yet, many Americans refused to categorize themselves racially and opted instead for “other.” For the first time in 210 years, the Census Bureau no longer required Americans to identify themselves in only one racial category and permitted them to circle more than one category.

In light of the dramatic recent changes in the way that they are seeing themselves and others, the multiracial alternative has become increasingly appealing to Americans. In the 2000 Census, for example, some 6.8 million Americans identified themselves as multiracial. Over the past 30 years, marriages between Blacks and Whites have increased by some 400%, and marriages between Asians and Whites have increased by 1,000%. There are now 1.6 million interracial married couples in the United States, 10 times as many as in 1960 (American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 2005; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2001).

As we have seen in the case of the South African woman whose skin darkened, the implications of being defined as a member of one race over another can be highly significant on a personal level. The same can
be said for an individual’s religious preference, especially if it becomes regarded as an ascribed, racial, and therefore a permanent status. In their own eyes, for example, former Jews living in Nazi Germany during the 1930s who had converted to Christianity were nothing less than devout Christians. In the eyes of the powerful Nazi regime, however, they were Jewish vermin—subhuman enemies of the state who deserved to be singled out, herded off to death camps, and exterminated.

In the same way, the social construction of gayness has often been applied to victims who are bashed because of their presumed sexual orientation. Just as converted German Christians were singled out for discriminatory treatment by anti-Semites, so straight men have been assaulted by homophobic hatemongers. You don’t have to be gay to become a victim of a gay hate bashing. Instead, you only have to look gay, that is, you only have to possess some of the characteristics associated in the minds of perpetrators with being gay. Thus, many straight men on college campuses around the country have been threatened or assaulted essentially because they fit the expectations by being “effeminate” in their gestures or expressions (Levin & McDevitt, 2002).

It has long been recognized that age categories do not exist in nature but are socially determined. Human beings invented the period called childhood and created the stage known as adolescence. In many societies, individuals went straight from infancy to adulthood and to a job working in the fields alongside their older brothers and sisters. Elsewhere, childhood exists but adolescence does not. By a certain age, instead of gradually maturing through a separate and distinct developmental stage, children in such societies go through a rite of passage (e.g., at the age of 12, they are required to kill a lion) that establishes them as adults. Even old age is a construction. In one area of the world, the members of a society are regarded as “old” beginning at 45 or 50; in another, they are regarded as reaching old age at 65 or 70. Aging is a gradual process that begins with birth and ends with death. We divide the life cycle into categories as though they were part of the natural order. But they are not.

In the same way, many group differences are socially constructed rather than fixed in nature. This is not to say that groups are identical to one another in each and every respect. In fact, groups of human beings obviously differ markedly in terms of almost every conceivable attribute, including skin color, physiognomy, language, culture, socioeconomic status, level of education, political clout, and so on. Some of these differences frequently form the basis for conflict between groups (Lee, Jussim, & McCauley, 1995). It’s just that human beings decide which differences are socially significant and which differences deserve to be ignored.
When Stereotypes Turn Nasty

Our images of the people in different groups can be molded to fit the occasion for which they are needed, regardless of the way the people in question behave. When the members of another group become too competitive or threatening, they are seen not as industrious and hardworking, but as obsessed workaholics; not as laid-back and mellow, but as lazy; not as courageous, but as bloodthirsty; not as thrifty, but as stingy; not as family oriented, but as clannish; not as assertive, but as aggressive; not as having exceptional athletic ability, but as having all brawn and no brains; not as excelling in math and science, but as having a narrow intellect.

The particular stereotype seems to depend at least somewhat on the forms of discrimination it is meant to encourage or justify. Outsiders who are expected to be submissive and subordinate to the interests of the dominant group are often infantilized. Their image is that of children. Yet some stereotypes are more life threatening than others. Those outsiders who are regarded as posing a threat to the advantaged position of the dominant group may be treated not like children but animals or demons (Levin & Levin, 1982).

The derivation of this notion can be traced back to widespread stereotypic thinking among White colonists in which Africans were regarded as apelike heathens and savages controlled almost completely by their senses rather than by their intellect. Their savage behavior was reflected in “primitive” non-Christian religious beliefs and rituals and in reports of their “uncivilized” cultural practices, including polygamy, infanticide, and ritualistic murder (Smith, 1995).

Although predating slavery, such dehumanizing ideas about Blacks were quickly rediscovered by European colonists to justify the institution of slavery within the context of an equalitarian ethos. Instead of dealing with the moral consequences of the forced enslavement of an entire group of people based strictly on physiognomy and skin color, the colonists denied the evil of “the peculiar institution” and instead took the moral high ground. Blacks were not people; they were property. From this point of view, they were not victimized or exploited; they were the beneficiaries of a way of life that would ensure their very survival.

Although certainly belittling and degrading, the negative stereotyping of slaves included more infantilization than dehumanization. Blacks who consented to play the role of loyal and lowly slaves were generally regarded as children who needed the wise counsel and guidance of their White masters to survive. The image was that of Little Black Sambo—the musical but ignorant youngster who didn’t have the brains to come in out of the rain.

In the years following the end of the Civil War, the infantilized image of Blacks was transformed into a dehumanized stereotype on the
basis of which murder and mayhem could be justified. No longer seen as valuable property, Blacks had to fend for themselves. They were unable to rely on their masters to protect them from other racist Whites. Rather than viewed as children, Blacks were now regarded as animals, lacking in human intelligence or spirituality, that needed to be tamed or killed (Levin & Levin, 1982).

Such negative images are often seen in warfare. The underlying causes of a conflict may be economic, but stereotyping facilitates bloodshed. In Northern Ireland, for example, civil strife seems to have been reinforced by a set of stereotypes of Catholics and Protestants that might be expected to describe racial differences alone; for example, that Catholics have shorter foreheads, larger genitalia, and less space between their eyes than do their Protestant neighbors (Levin, 1997b).

Only the nastiest images of newcomers seem to spread during hard economic times, as the native-born population perceives that their financial position is being eroded. At times, certain prejudices become narrowly targeted. During the 1800s and early 1900s, when they came to the United States and competed for jobs with native-born citizens, Irish American newcomers were stereotyped by political cartoonists of the day as apes and crocodiles (Keen, 1986). During the same period, as soon as they began to compete with native-born landowners and merchants, Italian immigrants settling in New Orleans were widely depicted as dangerous members of organized crime who needed to be controlled (Gambino, 1977; Smith, 2007).

Chinese immigrants to nineteenth-century America tended to be regarded as “honest,” “industrious,” and “peaceful” so long as jobs remained plentiful. But when the job market tightened and the Chinese began to seek work in mines, farming, domestic service, and factories, a dramatic shift toward anti-Chinese sentiment emerged. They quickly became stereotyped as “dangerous,” “deceitful,” “vicious,” and “clannish.” Whites then accused the Chinese immigrants of undermining the American standard of living (Sung, 1961). In a similar way, the depressions of 1893 and 1907 served to solidify the opposition to immigration from Italy, setting the stage for widespread acceptance of stereotypes depicting Italian Americans as “organ-grinders, paupers, slovenly ignoramuses, and so on” (La Gumina, 1973).

On occasion, racial epithets have been voiced by angry Americans to justify injuring or murdering immigrants. In 1994, in a Massachusetts courtroom, 25-year-old Harold Robert Latour was found guilty of second-degree murder and assault and battery with the intent to intimidate based on race. A year earlier, Latour had beaten to death a 21-year-old Cambodian man, Sam Nang Nhem, his neighbor in a Fall River, Massachusetts, housing project. The murder occurred after a family clambake, as Nhem and his friend were walking over to a trash bin to discard some clam
shells. Latour shouted, “I’m gonna knock that gook out!” Then he kicked his victim to the ground with his steel-toed Doc Martins (Associated Press, 1994).

The first author played a role in Latour’s trial as an expert witness in the area of hate crimes. His task was to inform the jury as to the historical application of the term “gook” as a racial slur. He told the court that the epithet was used by the Allies during World War II to characterize the Japanese enemy, during the Korean conflict to refer to North Koreans, and during the Vietnam war to refer to North Vietnamese and Vietcong. In the mid-1970s, as large numbers of Asian newcomers arrived in the United States, the term “gook” then became a racial slur to discredit all Southeast Asian immigrants. The fact that the defendant had shouted an anti-Asian epithet just prior to beating his Cambodian victim indicated that a hate crime had occurred and may have contributed to lengthening Latour’s sentence—a life sentence in Walpole state penitentiary with parole eligibility after 15 years.

War is only one source of dehumanizing racial slurs. Organized hate groups have offered their members the dehumanizing images they need to feel justified in their efforts to eliminate “the other.” For example, the official Web site of the White supremacist group Aryan Nations recently defined Jews literally as a terminal illness. According to Pastor Jay Faber of Aryan Nations,

In this world, the races are the parts of the body, and the jew is cancer. When you go to the doctor for cancer treatment, if he tells you that you have almost killed off the cancer, you would never tell the doctor to stop, you would tell him to kill it all. Cancer = jews. Let’s join world wide and rid the world of the disease that has inflicted all of us. (http://www.aryan-nations.org/)

**IS HATE ON THE DECLINE?**

Many forms of hate have softened significantly since World War II. As determined by large-scale surveys of White racial attitudes from 1942 to 1968, there was a sizable increase in the proportion of White Americans willing to support integration of the public schools. Over the same period of time, the proportion of White Americans who regarded the intelligence of Blacks as equal to that of Whites rose considerably (Bellsfield, 1972–1973; Hyman and Sheatsley, 1956, 1964). Data from a series of surveys of the American population in 1964, 1968, and 1970 suggested that White and Black attitudes during this period of time moved closer together on questions of principle and policy (Campbell, 1971).
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Into the 1970s, hate and bigotry, although clearly on the decline, nevertheless continued to hold a tight grip on the thinking of many Americans. Selznick and Steinberg (1969), in their interviews with a representative cross section of the national population in 1964, found that 54% of their respondents thought that Jews always like to be at the head of things, 52% agreed that Jews stick together too much, and 42% felt that Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want. Moreover, Petroni (1972) found frequent usage of racial stereotypes among White Midwestern high school students who were highly critical of the prejudices of their parents and yet who failed to recognize they had prejudices of their own.

With reference to stereotypes associated with Blacks, Brink and Harris (1964) reported that a substantial proportion of a nationwide cross section of White Americans taken in 1963—in some cases reaching almost 70% agreement—were willing to agree that Blacks smell different, have looser morals, want to live off the handout, have less native intelligence, breed crime, and are inferior to Whites. In a 1966 survey, Brink and Harris (1967), again conducting a nationwide study of White Americans, found a softening in some of their negativism toward Blacks but still reported about 50% who agreed that Blacks smell different, have looser morals, and want to live off the handout. Campbell’s 1968 survey determined that of the Whites living in the 15 cities studied, 67% said that Blacks push too fast for what they want, 51% opposed laws to prevent racial discrimination in housing, and 33% said that if they had small children, they would prefer that their children have only White friends.

At least on an abstract level, hate based on race and religion seems to have plummeted over the past several decades. In 1998, a national poll conducted for the Anti-Defamation League found that the number of Americans holding strong anti-Jewish attitudes—agreeing that Jews have too much power and are more loyal to Israel than to America—had declined to only 12% from 20% in 1992 and 29% in 1964. In survey after survey, moreover, the majority of Americans now claimed to be accepting of racial integration, at least as a matter of principle. For example, only 7% of all Americans thought that “Blacks and Whites should go to separate schools.” Even stereotyped thinking about race seems to have seriously eroded over time. Merely 4% now characterized Blacks as “lazy.” (In 1967, that figure was 26%; in 1933, it was 75%)—(Anti-Defamation League, 2001).

Not unlike trends in racial and religious bigotry, Americans have grown increasingly more tolerant of homosexuality over the past several decades. According to Gallup pollsters, the percentage of Americans believing that gays should be given equal job opportunities increased from 56% in 1977 to 74% in 1992 and to 88% by 2003. The
percentage believing that homosexuality is an acceptable alternative lifestyle grew from only 34% in 1982 to 38% in 1992 and to 50% by 1999 (Saad, 2005).

**Underestimating Bigotry**

At the same time, there are certain negative beliefs and feelings about various groups in American society that seem, over the decades, to have persisted and even increased substantially. Since 1999, the percentage of Americans seeing the gay lifestyle as an acceptable alternative has remained at about 51%; 45% continue to say it is unacceptable. Moreover, more than half of all Americans consistently tell pollsters that homosexual relationships are morally wrong (Saad, 2005).

Recent scandals involving sexual abuse committed by Catholic priests may have caused some backsliding in the acceptance of gays and lesbians. Between 2003 and 2005, Gallup reported decreases in the percentage of Americans saying that gays should be hired as clergy (from 56 to 49%), as elementary school teachers (from 61 to 54%), and as high school teachers (from 67 to 62%). Moreover, the recent debate concerning the legality of gay marriage has not resulted in overwhelming public support for marriages between homosexuals. According to Gallup, only 39% now say that such marriages should be legally valid. Even support for the legality of gay relations between consenting adults is found in less than a majority of Americans. Little has changed since 1977, when 43% supported gay relations being legal. In 2003, support for the legality of homosexual relationships increased to 60% but then dropped to only 52% by 2005 (Saad, 2005).

In some areas, stereotyped thinking about racial and religious groups has also stalled. In a recent Harris telephone survey of 3,000 people commissioned by the National Conference for Community and Justice (2000), it was determined that certain stereotypes continue to be accepted not only by Whites but also by Americans of color (Asians, Latinos, and Blacks). In response to the statement that Asian Americans are “unscrupulous, crafty, and devious in business,” some 27% of all White Americans registered their agreement, but so did 46% of Latinos and 42% of African Americans. In response to the statement that Latinos “lack ambition and the drive to succeed,” 20% of all White Americans agreed, as well as 35% of Asian Americans and 24% of African Americans. In response to the statement that African Americans “want to live on welfare,” 21% of all White Americans agreed, but so did 31% of Asian Americans and 26% of Latinos.

These results indicate that hate and prejudice have taken on greater complexity as our society has become increasingly multiracial. To the extent that prejudices are indeed cultural, we shouldn’t be surprised that
they are shared not only by members of the dominant group but also by minority members.

Moreover, arguing that hate and bigotry may be much more widespread than revealed in the typical study, some researchers have called into question the validity of the transparent questionnaire approach for measuring changes in the acceptance of racist stereotypes. Very few Americans, they argue, now want to be known as racists. Therefore, they are unlikely to be honest in answering questions that could make them out to be bigots. Moreover, many respondents may not even be aware of their own racism. In response to straightforward questions about their attitudes, those who hold racist attitudes may give what they see as socially acceptable responses instead of revealing a truth that may be unacceptable even to them (Wachtel, 2001).

In addition to blatant racism, many individuals apparently hold unconscious biases about such characteristics as race, religion, gender, and sexual orientation. Even highly educated and humane individuals, people who sincerely believe that they are entirely free of prejudice or hate, may be totally unaware that they operate from bias or bigotry. For example, researchers writing in the New England Journal of Medicine have reported that physicians were 40% less likely to order sophisticated cardiac tests in response to complaints about chest pain when the patients were women rather than men and Black rather than White. Blatant sexism or racism didn’t seem to be at the basis of these differences in doctors’ recommendations. Instead, they made decisions—in this case, life-and-death decisions—on the basis of strongly held yet unconscious biases about gender and race. According to U.S. Surgeon General David Satcher, this could be one factor in explaining why Blacks are 40% more likely than Whites to die from heart disease (White, 1999).

Also in support of the notion that we tend to underestimate the presence of prejudice, social psychologists found that Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks were reported as substantially more negative when the White subjects believed they had been hooked into an apparatus that monitored their real feelings and beliefs with total accuracy. In this “bogus pipeline” situation, respondents apparently were more willing to reveal the truth about their racist attitudes than risk being caught in a lie (Sigall & Page, 1971).

Research designed to measure concealed prejudice has relied on making inferences about the respondents’ attitudes based on their behavior. In one experiment, for example, White Princeton University students who believed they were participating in a study of interviewing techniques were asked to question, on a random basis, either someone Black or someone White. In comparison with students assigned to a White interviewee, their counterparts with a Black interviewee conveyed more negative nonverbal behavior while interacting. More specifically,
they chose to sit farther apart, spent a shorter period of time together, and made a larger number of errors in their speech while talking. Apparently, the White students unwittingly expressed a degree of discomfort based on their unconsciously held feelings and beliefs about Black people (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974); yet, if you had asked them bluntly to express their attitudes toward Blacks, there is every reason to believe that they would have painted a glowing, or at least an unbiased, picture.

Another factor in the underestimate of bigotry is that at least some hate remains unverbalized beneath the surface, even ready to strike. In January 2001, almost 2 years after he was laid to rest at the age of 81, Richard J. Cotter’s racism and anti-Semitism first became publicly apparent. The one-time Massachusetts assistant attorney general and long-time bachelor left $750,000 to organized hate groups—more than $500,000 to a church in Louisiana led by a founding member of the American Nazi Party; $100,000 to Andrew Macdonald, the author of a White supremacist novel entitled The Turner Diaries; $25,000 to the Confederation of Polish Freedom Fighters; and $100,000 to a Holocaust denier from Toronto. One of his acquaintances of more than 23 years referred to Cotter as “a good and decent man,” someone so decent that he couldn’t even bring himself to euthanize his sick horses. Neighbors saw Cotter as an eccentric man who wanted to be left alone in the house in which he had lived for 40 years. But inside the front doors of that home, the Harvard law school graduate exhibited a series of wooden trophies from anti-Semitic organizations naming him as their man of the year and stacks of books discussing the virtues of White pride and right-wing patriotism. Choosing to conceal his racist beliefs from public scrutiny, Cotter had long served as a legal advisor to neo-Nazi groups (Belkin, 2001).

The Difference Between Small and Insignificant

Even if subtle and concealed variations of hate continue to exist, it is heartening that at least it has become somewhat uncomfortable for individuals to express their bigotry openly without fear of reprimand or retaliation. At the cultural level, therefore, some progress toward respect for differences seems to have been made. However, when it comes to concrete government efforts to implement equal treatment by race, there is considerably less support. In fact, public support for government intervention to integrate schools and equal treatment in the use of public accommodations actually declined beginning in the 1980s (Schuman et al., 1997).

For example, support for affirmative action continues to divide along racial lines. In an August 2005 Gallup survey of American adults, 72% of Blacks but only 44% of Whites reported that they favor affirmative action
programs. The explanation for affirmative action support also divides racially. The majority of White Americans (59%) but less than one in four Black Americans (23%) believes that Blacks in this country have equal job opportunities (Jones, 2005).

The continuing weakness of White support for the implementation of racial integration is indicated by variations in the willingness to participate personally in integrated settings. Very few White Americans object to neighborhood or school integration when it involves only a small number of Blacks. When Blacks promise to become anything like a majority, however, White support dwindles (Schuman et al., 1997).

Lack of support for integrating neighborhoods, workplaces, and schools aids in keeping groups separated on a daily basis. Even worse, there are those Americans who feel so threatened by diversity and difference that they translate their anxiety and anger into criminal behavior. Of course, only a relatively small number of Americans ever go this far. There are, for example, many millions of crimes committed every year in the United States, some 9000 of which are officially regarded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to be hate offenses. Considering there are approximately 301 million people in the United States, FBI data suggest that the likelihood is quite small of any given citizen being attacked because of his or her race, religion, or sexual orientation.

**Hate Crimes Are Vastly Under-Reported**

Quite clearly, however, the 9,000 FBI figure vastly underestimates the actual incidence of hate episodes. It is really the tip of the iceberg, representing only those incidents that rise to the level of criminal offenses and only those crimes officially recognized as motivated by hate and reported by local police departments as such. Under a voluntary reporting system, some 13,241 police jurisdictions in 49 states and the District of Columbia representing 86.3% of the total population now report. Still, some states have been more cooperative than others: In 2007, the state of Alabama claimed six hate crimes, Mississippi claimed none (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2008).

Table 1.1 shows the number of law enforcement agencies in each state that participate in the national hate crime reporting program managed by the FBI. It also lists the total population of citizens covered by these agencies. To become a participant in the hate crime program, the law enforcement agency must complete a quarterly report that includes hate crime incident reports—if hate crimes occurred—or a form that is signed by the chief or sheriff that no hate crimes occurred in his or her jurisdiction during the reporting period. For example, Table 1.1 shows that 156 departments in Alabama participated in the hate crime program during 2007. Only five of these agencies (3%) reported hate crimes, totaling six for the
### TABLE 1.1 Hate Crime Reporting by State, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICIPATING STATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING AGENCIES</th>
<th>POPULATION COVERED</th>
<th>AGENCIES SUBMITTING INCIDENT REPORTS</th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS REPORTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
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<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>7,421,793</td>
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(continued)
state that year. The rest reported that no hate crimes occurred (97%). Compare this with New Jersey in which 40% of the participating agencies reported a combined total of 748 hate crimes (FBI, 2008).

Basing an estimate of the prevalence of hate crimes on victims rather than police reports causes a substantial increase in the number of reported cases. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 191,000 hate crime incidents were reported annually by victims in its National Crime Victimization Survey (Harlow, 2005).

But even the reports by victims may under-represent the actual prevalence of hate offenses. It isn’t only law enforcement personnel who are reluctant to report hate attacks. Many victims also prefer not to inform anyone—and especially not law enforcement officials—that they have been victimized. Having grown up where residents were distrustful of the police, some simply do not believe that law enforcement will be on their side. Moreover, immigrants may have come from countries where repressive regimes were as likely as individual hatemongers to commit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICIPATING STATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING AGENCIES</th>
<th>POPULATION COVERED</th>
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<th>TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS REPORTED</th>
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<td>Virginia</td>
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<td>Wisconsin</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>516,189</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,241</strong></td>
<td><strong>260,229,972</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,025</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,624</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: FBI (2008).*
atrocities against them. They see the police as “the enemy of occupation.” For certain groups, American institutions may similarly not be trusted. A recent survey found that almost 80% of Shiite Muslims in the United States who were victims of “post 9-11 discrimination” failed to report the incidents to the police (Religion News Service, 2005).

In 2002, our colleague Jack McDevitt surveyed more than 4,000 students at public high schools across the state of Massachusetts as to how many of them had been victims of hate crimes—vandalism, assault, assault and battery, harassment, or sexual assault. He determined that 30% of the 400 students victimized by a hate offense told no one that they had been attacked. When victims did inform someone, 60% told a friend, 29% told a family member, and 15% told a school employee. Only 3% reported their crime to the police (Rosenwald, 2002).

It Takes Only a Few Bad Apples

Aside from the problem of under-reporting, a second difficulty in assessing the impact of hate crimes involves realistically attempting to determine the level of hate incidents that constitutes a menace. Before writing off the threatening influence of a relatively small number of hate offenses, it would be wise to gain some perspective on the relationship of hate to large-scale ethnic conflict. In Northern Ireland, where ethnic warfare seemed, until recently, always to be just around the corner, most violent crimes (robbery, murder, assault, and rape) had nothing to do with religious differences. Yet, all it took to start a new round of terrorist bombings was one murder of a police officer; all that was necessary to ignite a new round of violence was a single terrorist act. Moreover, middle-class citizens of Northern Ireland who lived in the suburbs and took care not to voice their political views in public may have felt immune from the hate attacks directed against impoverished and working-class residents in cities like Derry and Belfast. A count of the hate incidents in Northern Ireland over the past couple of decades might have led one incorrectly to conclude that ethnic conflict was no longer a problem there, and that Northern Ireland’s Protestants and Catholics were living in peace and tranquility, when they were actually engaged in something approaching civil warfare.

Threatening Situations Can Inspire Hate

Just when you are convinced that stereotyped thinking and hurtful bigotry have substantially declined, you may be forced to recognize that tolerance for differences continues to be an elusive dream. Indeed, hate can remain dormant in a culture, emerging without warning from the darkness in response to some threatening but enlightening episode or
situation. In the week following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing in which 168 people lost their lives, many Americans assumed that Middle-Eastern terrorists had been responsible. Before the real killer, Timothy McVeigh, could be arrested, news commentators and politicians had already implicated Middle-Eastern militants in the deadly attack. In response, there was an outbreak of anti-Muslim incidents—some 216 episodes of harassment, discrimination, and violence. But even when it was clear later on that the Oklahoma City attack was carried out by a White Christian lacking any ties to Muslim extremists, bigotry continued to make life miserable for Muslim Americans. In the workplace, some were fired for refusing to remove their head scarves (“hijabs”) or taking breaks to pray. In schools, Muslim girls reported having their scarves yanked from their heads and being taunted by their classmates. In their neighborhoods, Muslims claimed to have been denied service at gas stations and grocery stores (Goodstein, 1996).

Similarly, during the tense months following the September 11 attack on America in 2001, Muslims and Arabs were the targets of violence perpetrated by angry Americans who looked in vain for the terrorists responsible for orchestrating 3,000 deaths at the World Trade Center in New York City and at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Not surprisingly, 9/11 brought with it an unprecedented number of hate offenses against Muslims. Specifically, in 2001, there was a 1,600% increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes reported to local police departments. In 2000, Americans committed 28 hate offenses against their Muslim neighbors; in 2001, the number of such hate incidents rose to 481. Most (296 incidents) were acts of intimidation, but there were also 185 aggravated and simple assaults (Schevitz, 2002).

At least during the first weeks following 9/11, none of the hate-motivated offenses resulted in the murder of Muslim Americans, though many Muslims were vandalized, intimidated, or assaulted. Ironically, however, Sikh Indians—who are neither Islamic nor Middle Eastern—became mistakenly targeted for death. Days after the attack on America, 49-year-old Balbir Singh Sodhi from Punjab, India, was fatally shot as he did landscaping outside of his Mesa, Arizona, gas station. Sodhi’s turban and long beard apparently reminded the killer of Osama bin Laden. As stated by a friend of the victim, Sikh Indians “are different people from Muslim people. We have different beliefs, a different religion” (CNN, 2001).

For the same reason that the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes soared, stereotyped attitudes toward Muslims also turned especially nasty following September 11, 2001. Opinion polls conducted by The Washington Post and ABC News indicated that some 33% of Americans regarded Islam in a negative light. Fourteen percent reported believing that Islam helps to inspire violence (Deane & Fears, 2006).
But more than 5 years later, in March 2006, the same pollsters found only a hardening in the attitudes of Americans toward Muslims. The unpopularity of the war in Iraq as well as major acts of terrorism against civilians in Spain and England linked to Islamic extremists apparently contributed to a growing distrust of Muslims in general. Forty-six percent of adult Americans told the pollsters that they now viewed Islam negatively; some 33% said that Islam helps to inspire violent behavior (Deane & Fears, 2006).

The September 11 attack on the United States also inspired a growing disdain for immigrants, especially those coming from Latin America. Xenophobia is nothing new. Even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when most newcomers were European, some part of anti-immigrant sentiment reflected widespread fear of job loss. Whenever the jobless rate soared, so did the forces of nativism. But since September 11, 2001, as Americans have become increasingly anxious about the threat of international terrorism, stereotyped images of immigrants have turned decidedly more negative. Myths and misconceptions about newcomers have assumed the status of cultural truisms. Anxious advocates of nativism envision huddled masses of impoverished, uneducated, disease-ridden criminals who sneak across our porous borders to steal jobs and murder our citizens (Levin & Rabrenovic, 2006).

In response, White supremacists and racist skinheads have committed a growing number of hate crimes against Latinos, both illegals and legals, both foreigners and American citizens. Masquerading as immigration reform groups, these fringe elements of the anti-immigrant movement have contributed to a climate of hate and violence (Anti-Defamation League, 2006). Moreover, when asked whether “you, a family member, or a close friend ever experienced discrimination because of your Latino or racial background,” 47% of a national sample of Latinos responded in the affirmative (Time/Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, 2005).

Situations have also affected the level of anti-Semitism in the United States and in nations around the globe. Beginning especially in 2000, as the conflict in the Middle East between Israelis and Palestinians became increasingly more violent and intractable, the character of anti-Semitism in countries around the world was observed to change in ever more destructive and harmful ways. In what has come to be labeled the new anti-Semitism, Jews everywhere—even those who supported the establishment of a Palestinian state and had never even visited the Middle East—were now being held responsible for Israeli military policies (Chesler, 2003; Iganski & Kosman, 2003).

The second intifada or uprising of Palestinians began at the end of September 2000, in response to Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to a disputed area of Jerusalem in which both the Temple Mount and the Al-Aqsa Mosque are located. By October 7, as conflict between
Israelis and Palestinians began to reach a fever pitch, Jews around the world became targets of anger and violence. In the United States alone, the number of anti-Semitic acts reached a peak, with some 259 incidents occurring during a 30-day period (Radler, 2001).

Unlike traditional forms of anti-Jewish bigotry associated with the White power movement and Nazi ideology, the new anti-Semitism was espoused not only by right-wing extremists but by proponents of progressive politics who voiced their opposition to all varieties of colonialism and racism. Many right-wingers in France and Germany regarded Jews, along with immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, as one element of the “foreign” influence in their countries responsible for the demise of European culture and an increase in the national unemployment rate. Many American and British left-wingers saw Palestinians as victims and Israel as an oppressor state. When Middle-Eastern tensions rose—during the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000 and again in the spring of 2002 after the Israeli military occupied West Bank towns—the number of anti-Semitic attacks also increased (Chesler, 2003; Iganski & Kosmin, 2003). By 2003, there were more anti-Jewish hate attacks in European countries than at any time since World War II (Rosenblum, 2003). According to the Israeli government, more than 2,500 French Jews had decided in 2002 to immigrate to Israel—the largest number since the 1967 war, and double the number who left France in 2001 (Frankel, 2003). In the United States, the level of anti-Semitism never escalated to the same degree as in European cities. Still, the Anti-Defamation League (2005) determined anti-Jewish incidents as being at their highest level in 9 years. The League reported a total of 1,821 incidents in 2004, representing a 17% rise over the 1,557 incidents reported for 2003.

While the new anti-Semitism was spreading through both Europe and North America as well as the Islamic world, old-fashioned forms of anti-Semitism also managed to find a niche in the thinking of Americans. In the immediate aftermath of presidential candidate Al Gore’s selection of Senator Joseph Lieberman as his running mate in the 2000 election campaign, anti-Semitic messages appeared in chat rooms and online message boards around the Internet. On racist Web sites there were messages about Zionist occupied government (ZOG), slurs about Lieberman’s religion, and warnings about having a Jew in the White House (FNC, 2000).

Matthew Hale, then the 27-year-old leader of World Church of the Creator, in a press release e-mailed to his protégés, said the following about the selection of Lieberman: “While undoubtedly some will be surprised by this, I am very happy that the Jew Joseph Lieberman has been chosen by Al Gore to be his running mate, for it brings the pervasive Jewish influence of the federal government out in the open so that people can see what we anti-Semites are talking about” (Anti-Defamation League, 2000).
Tom Metzger, who heads the White Aryan Resistance from his home in Falbrook, California, sent the following message to a mailing list of American Nazi Party members:

The lusting for power and total control by the jew (sic) knows no limits and I can only pray that when the Jewish masters find a way to remove gore (if elected) and install the first jew (sic) president of the most powerful and bloodthirsty corporate empire in world history, that Lieberman and his controllers will institute every oppression that their twisted imaginations can invent, and aim them directly and solely at White MEN! (as quoted by Anti-Defamation League, 2000)

White extremists were not the only ones who reacted with anti-Semitism to the choice of a Jewish vice-presidential candidate. Lee Alcorn, president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in Dallas, Texas, told a radio audience that Black voters “need to be suspicious of any kind of partnerships between the Jews at that kind of level because we know that their interest primarily has to do with, you know, money and these kinds of things” (National Journal Group, Inc., 2000). Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan warned that Lieberman’s Jewish identity gives him “dual loyalty” to both the United States and the state of Israel.

Such anti-Semitic remarks about Lieberman are not the first expressions of hate and prejudice articulated by well-known Americans about specific minority Americans. Over the past few decades, beginning especially during the 1980s, Americans have been forced by circumstances to deal with people who are different, whether they liked it or not. During this period, almost unprecedented numbers of newcomers arrived from Asia and Latin America. More people of color began to participate in workplaces, neighborhoods, schools, and college dormitories, where they had been almost totally absent just a few decades earlier. In everyday life, we created more points of contact between groups whose members are different with respect to race, sexual orientation, and religion, forcing more Americans to give some thought to the possibility of retaliation and reprimand when they verbalized hateful remarks. Some might call it being politically correct, but it is really a result of the presence of groups whose members previously hadn’t been around to object.

A Continuing Racial Gap

The continuing influence of hate in the lives of Americans is illustrated by the wide, perhaps widening, gap between Black and White Americans with respect to their worldviews. On both sides of the racial ledger, there are
Americans who tend to be pessimistic about our future as a multicultural nation. Some even predict civil war. Before blowing up the federal building in Oklahoma City, Timothy McVeigh had secured the “blueprint” for his mass murder from a bigoted novel,*The Turner Diaries* (Macdonald, 1978), in which Americans battle the forces of evil represented by Jews, Blacks, and a communist-inspired federal government. White supremacists characterize Jews as “children of Satan” and Blacks and Latinos as “mud people” who exist at the spiritual and intellectual level of animals (Levin & McDevitt, 2002).

The cultural gap between Whites and Blacks can be seen in survey data that examine racial differences in Americans’ explanations for inequality. Respondents from both racial groups tend to reject the idea that Blacks have less innate ability than Whites; both Whites and Blacks stress the need to equalize educational opportunities. But when asked to account for continuing Black disadvantage, the majority of Whites blame lack of motivation. In other words, Blacks don’t make enough of an effort on their own behalf “to crawl out of the gutters of America.” In sharp contrast, the majority of Blacks explain their own economic disadvantage as a result of persistent White discrimination or racism (Schuman et al., 1997), something that many White Americans deny. Indeed, regarding whether opportunities for Blacks exist in their local communities, the gap between Black and White opinions is large and persistent. For example, only 10% of all Whites report that Blacks are treated less fairly than Whites on the job; yet, 47% of all Blacks feel that way. Only 15% of all Whites say that Blacks are treated less fairly in stores downtown or in shopping malls; yet, 46% of all Blacks feel that way. Only 11% of Whites report that Blacks are treated less fairly in restaurants, bars, and theaters; yet, 39% of all Blacks feel that way. Only 30% of all Whites say that Blacks are treated less fairly by the police; yet, 64% of Blacks feel that way (Ludwig, 2000).

According to Patricia Turner (1993), the collective thinking of many Black Americans assumes the status of urban legends in which White Americans are seen as conspiring against them. Whereas most White Americans saw O. J. Simpson as his wife’s murderer, the majority of Black Americans believed Simpson was not a perpetrator but an innocent victim of racist police officers who conspired to plant incriminating evidence against him. When years later Simpson was again tried, this time for perpetrating an armed robbery in Las Vegas, the majority of Whites—59%—but far fewer blacks—only 24%—reported believing that he was guilty as charged. Even more indicative of conspiratorial thinking was the Fox News/Opinion Dynamics survey finding that 45 percent of Black Americans compared with only 13% of their White counterparts believed that Simpson was an innocent man who had been “set up.” Similarly, many Blacks believe that nationwide restaurant chains add a secret...
ingredient to sterilize Black men, that soft drink companies are owned by
the Ku Klux Klan, that the U.S. government’s so-called war against drugs
was actually waged as an excuse to incarcerate large numbers of young
Black men, and that the U.S. military conspired to infect Africans with
AIDS (Blanton, 2007; Turner, 1993).

Unfortunately, the actions of our institutions too often give reason
for Americans to be cynical and provide the evidence they need to
maintain their conspiratorial beliefs. The fiascos at Ruby Ridge and
Waco suggested to members of marginal groups that the FBI was just as
evil as they had suspected. The disproportionately heavy sentences for
possessing and dealing crack cocaine predictably assured that the war
against drugs would bring under the control of the criminal justice
system incredibly large numbers of Black men (Tonry, 1995). The
widely held belief that law enforcement continues to discriminate
against Black men was confirmed by several incidents of police brutal-
ity, profiling, and corruption in police departments around the country.
In Philadelphia, for example, 300 cases were overturned or dismissed
because police officers were thought to have planted evidence on
Black suspects and lied at the trials of Black defendants (Janofsky,
1997). Moreover, Washington, D.C., law enforcement officials were
cought sending hundreds of e-mail messages on their squad car com-
puters that contained vulgar racist and homophobic references
(Santana & Lengel, 2001).

Some of the racial skepticism of Black Americans has been trans-
lated into hate directed toward Whites, especially toward Catholics and
Jews. A recent rally of thousands of Black youngsters in New York City
was organized by Nation of Islam members who repeatedly referred to
Jews as “bloodsuckers” and to the Pope as “a cracker.”

The hostility of Americans of color toward Whites is by no means
restricted to a relatively few radicals or professional discontents. A recent
Harris survey of 3,000 Americans sponsored by the National Conference
for Community and Justice (2000) found that people of color and espe-
cially Black Americans have adopted a largely unflattering view of White
Americans. More than 75% of all Black Americans reported believing that
Whites are bigoted and prejudiced, bossy, and unwilling to share their
inordinate wealth and power. More than 50% of all Latino Americans also
share this view of White Americans.

In 2008, a Harris nationwide survey determined that most Black
Americans—fully 86%—continue to believe that discrimination prevents
them from achieving full equality. A large majority of Black respondents
reported being discriminated against in terms of getting white collar jobs,
decent housing, skilled labor jobs, higher wages, quality education in
public schools, and proper treatment by the federal government as well
as the police.
The Obama Factor

The election of Barack Obama may have reduced the number of Black Americans who felt that the federal government failed to represent their interests as a group, but the impact of the election among White Americans was anything but uniform. It is true that during his first months as president, Barack Obama enjoyed broad public support. According to an Associated Press (2009) poll taken during the first weeks of his administration, 67% of Americans reported feeling “proud” because Obama was elected. On January 24, moreover, the Gallup Organization (2009) reported that 68 percent of Americans approved of his performance in office.

At the same time, the election of the first African American to the highest political office provoked some White Americans to feel as though their racial well-being was being wrested from them. During the first weeks following Obama’s victory, there were hundreds of hate crimes against African Americans committed by individuals who felt profoundly threatened by recent progress in racial equality. Even before his election, moreover, Obama’s life was threatened by alleged White supremacist plots in Colorado, Tennessee, and New Jersey (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2009).

In the early morning of November 5, just a few hours after Obama’s victory, three White men allegedly burned down the predominantly Black Macedonia Church of God in Christ in Springfield, Massachusetts. The defendants were charged with conspiring to deprive the church congregation of their civil rights. As stated in an affidavit by an FBI special agent, the men were angry over Obama’s victory.

On the day after Obama was inaugurated, a 22-year-old man allegedly carried out a racially motivated double-homicide and rape in Brockton, Massachusetts. In order to fight against “the demise of the white race,” Keith Luke had planned to kill as many “non-whites” as possible. He then intended to shoot up Wednesday’s bingo night at a local synagogue.

How was Luke inspired to transform his racist views into murderous behavior? As far as we know, he was not an official member of any White supremacist group, but he told the police that he had been inspired by White supremacist Web sites in which “the demise of the white race” was frequently discussed.

Luke told detectives he spent most of his free time searching the Internet for racist Web sites. He also confessed to engaging in cyber conversations with other people who addressed the issue of “nonwhites” in the United States.

According to the Anti-Defamation League (2009), there are hundreds of hate Web sites in which all of the traditional anti-black, anti-Latino,
anti-Asian, and anti-Jewish stereotypes are dredged up and reinforced. Men and women who feel down and out, who have been victimized by a terrible economy, and who blame minorities for all of their personal miseries can log on and tune in to the chat rooms, bulletin boards, and blogs that comprise the hate movement online. All of a sudden, they find not only exciting propaganda but also vast social support for their hatemongering.

In their own communities, racist youngsters may be outcasts among their peers. But over the Internet, they easily locate hundreds, perhaps thousands, of similarly distraught and stigmatized individuals who hold the same stereotyped beliefs. Rather than being isolated, they now have plenty of company.

Most White supremacist groups have dwindling membership rolls and little money. But the Internet gives them influence far beyond their small numbers and poor economic resources. In response, the Anti-Defamation League has produced a hate filtering software program enabling concerned parents to censor their children’s Internet activities including their access to hate sites.

Of course, Keith Luke was no child. He had a constitutionally protected right to visit as many hate Web sites as he wished. There are many dangers, just as there are many valuable opportunities, on the Internet; but it is highly unlikely that censorship of the Internet will ever pass constitutional muster.

Still, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center (2009), certain hate Web sites go beyond spewing bigotry and hate; they also give instructions for making Molotov cocktails, constructing other explosive devices, and using handguns in combat. In addition, they explicitly encourage and celebrate “lone wolf” terrorism including the murder of non-Whites and Jews, as represented in the alleged crimes of Keith Luke in Brockton. Some inspire the assassination of public figures like Barack Obama.

**IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HATE ON THE DECLINE?**

Social scientists have long sought to increase their understanding of the nature of hate—its origins, maintenance, and consequences. Many have expressed their concern about the debilitating impact of prejudice on the life chances of minority group members; on such attendant factors as confused self-identity, poor self-esteem, and serious sex-role conflicts (Pettigrew, 1964), and on what Smith (1995) has labeled “internal inferiorization.” Others have focused their attention on what influence prejudice has on the quality of moral life for all Americans, majority and minority alike. In his classic work, *An American Dilemma,*
Myrdal (1944) depicts American race relations as posing a major moral struggle for White America that is the result of a deeply rooted cultural conflict between the democratic values of the "American creed" and the social, political, and economic inequities experienced by Black Americans.

Social scientists have traditionally regarded prejudice and hate as destructive to society and to the individual. Directly or indirectly, prejudice causes innocent people to suffer, commits society's resources to antidemocratic if not unproductive ends, and does irreparable harm to the personality of the prejudiced individual. In the American experience alone, prejudice has been linked to a civil war, urban decay, crime and delinquency, and international tension.

The Environmental View

Another conception of prejudice, the benign prejudice viewpoint, has been advanced throughout history to explain the problems experienced by minority members of society. Instead of seeing hate and bigotry as causing poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and related social problems, the benign prejudice viewpoint locates the responsibility for inequality in characteristics of the minority group itself. From this standpoint, hate and prejudice are regarded as relatively harmless, secondary, or entirely irrelevant.

Some historians have suggested, for example, that throughout history, Jews have been at least partially responsible for their own ills. In his early writings, Lazare (1894/1995) argued that throughout history (in ancient Alexandria, Rome, Persia, Turkey, the countries of Europe, or wherever else they settled), Jews remained apart, refusing to give up their beliefs and rituals or to assimilate into the mainstream of society. Instead, in whatever land to which they were deported, they sought to remain Jews by insisting on being able to practice their religion, to receive exemption from the customs of the majority, to remain separated from other inhabitants, and to govern themselves by their own laws. In ancient Rome and Alexandria, Jews were not required to appear in court or to market grain on a Saturday. In ancient Alexandria, they were permitted total self-governance, constituting a state within a state. In some countries, they were even exempted from paying taxes.

Such privileges as well as the bond they shared as a separate religious community combined to give Jewish residents special opportunities for engaging in trade and accumulating wealth. But such opportunities also engendered widespread jealousy and envy that in turn created large-scale animosity toward them among the local inhabitants. Ancient Greeks and Romans were already covetous of the advantages that permitted Jews to carry on trade under favorable economic circumstances. The wealth of the
Jew, it was said, was gained by deception, fraud, and oppression at the expense of the Christians (Lazare, 1894/1995).

Over the course of his career, Lazare’s benign prejudice view of anti-Semitism was gradually modified to take into account the historical impact of victimization on the Jewish experience. For one thing, he came to understand that much of the separateness of Jewish life was not self-imposed but originated in discrimination from the wider society. However they behaved in relation to the dominant inhabitants, Jews were treated as slaves and pariahs. During the Crusades, the presence of Jewish citizens who refused to convert to Catholicism was regarded as a symbolic threat by religious zealots who sought to spread their theology across the continent. Jews who refused to convert were massacred.

During the Middle Ages, Jews were systematically excluded from many respectable ways of making a living such as owning land, farming, or being craftspeople. Because of its importance to society, however, the dreaded role of usurer, a role despised on religious grounds by the Catholic majority, was granted to Jews by default. In Spain, Jews were forced at the threat of death or exile to practice their religion secretly, masquerading in public places as converted Christians. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Germany, Jews were at best second-class citizens who lacked many of the rights afforded to other inhabitants. In Polish cities, Jews were prohibited from living among the Christian population and were forced to live in ghettos. By mid-twentieth century, long after the death of historian Bernard Lazare, German anti-Semitism had turned decidedly racist, so much so that even total conversion to Christianity would not have protected a Jew from paying the ultimate price.

Despite compelling evidence to indicate the malignancy of racism, some social scientists have implied, if not explicitly stated, that prejudice can no longer be held accountable for the poverty, miseducation, or underemployment presently experienced by members of certain groups in our society. Their argument usually runs as follows: Although initially responsible for the problems of a group (e.g., back in the days of slavery), prejudice or racism of the majority is no longer to blame. Current prejudice is regarded as benign. The minority group is viewed as trapped in a self-feeding vicious circle of deprivation that is difficult if not impossible to reverse. Ryan (1971) regarded this view in the most negative sense possible as blaming the victim; others see it as a refreshing change from a viewpoint that has led us nowhere fast in our efforts to reduce various inequalities.

According to Ryan, the most common form of blaming the victim involves the cultural depravations to which a minority group member is presumably exposed. As a case in point, Ryan considers an inner-city child who is blamed for his own miseducation. The focus here is on the alleged defects of the child: his lack of exposure to books and magazines, the absence of encouragement or support from his parents, and his own
impulsiveness. By confining attention to the child and to deficiencies in his home environment, it is possible to overlook the

. . . collapsing buildings and torn textbooks, the frightened, insensitive teachers, the six additional desks in the room, the blustering, frightened principals, the relentless segregation, the callous administrator, the irrelevant curriculum, the bigoted or cowardly members of the school board, the insulting history books, the stingy taxpayers, the fairy-tale readers, or the self-serving faculty of the local teachers' college. (Ryan, 1971, p. 4)

To explain the persistence of socioeconomic inequalities between groups, certain social scientists have concentrated on the individual characteristics of victims to explain the persistence of poverty and inequality (Wright, 2005). Others have posited the existence of a culture of poverty (Lewis, 1968), a way of life that includes shared views about desirable and undesirable behavior as well as adaptational techniques and institutions for coping with the problems of a lower-class existence. But such a conception of a culture of poverty depicts more than just a way of adapting to a set of conditions imposed by the dominant group. Once it becomes widely accepted, the culture of poverty, because of its influence on children, tends to maintain itself from one generation to the next. By the age of 6 or 7, children have usually internalized the values and norms of their subculture, making them incapable of taking full advantage of the opportunities that may become available to them during their lifetime (Lewis, 1968, p. 188).

Since Lewis's analysis in the 1960s, the notion of a vicious circle of cultural deprivation to account for inequalities between dominant and minority groups has gained rather wide acceptance among social scientists and laypersons alike. The late Daniel Patrick Moynihan gave it official recognition when as U.S. assistant secretary of labor (long before he became a senator from New York) he asserted in his so-called Moynihan Report that it was not hate or racism but the deterioration of the Black family that was the fundamental source of the economic weaknesses in the Black community (1965).

More recently, the benign prejudice view has been articulated forcefully by both Blacks and Whites in an attempt to explain the perpetuation of racial inequality into the twenty-first century. During the summer of 2004, comedian Bill Cosby, who himself is Black, told an audience of Black activists in Chicago that Black teenagers are the “dirty laundry” in the Black community because of their “poor grammar, foul language, and rude manners” (Harris & Farhi, 2004, p. A1). Rather than focus on racist practices and policies in the wider society, Cosby pointed the finger squarely at the high rates of teen pregnancy and illiteracy characterizing impoverished Black teenagers.
In 2007, comedian Cosby—in collaboration with psychiatrist Alvin F. Poussaint—repeated his benign prejudice argument. Not that Cosby and Poussaint deny the continuing existence of racism. It is only that they emphasize what they believe Black Americans must do in order to improve their own socioeconomic condition in American society. Some would argue that their book is full of racial stereotypes and that they demoralize impoverished Blacks who are doing the best they can to keep their children out of harm’s way. Moreover, Cosby and Poussaint arguably discourage government and business leaders from providing greater resources and opportunities to assist those Blacks who are in need of aid (see, for example, Hutchinson, 2007).

Larry Elder (2000), an attorney who hosts a courtroom series on National Television and writes a syndicated newspaper column, similarly blamed the continuation of disproportionate poverty in the Black community on the fact that 70% of all Black children are born out of wedlock, a figure that is almost three times larger than the level decried in the Moynihan Report. Elder suggested that scholarships and other forms of financial aid to impoverished students will be wasted if the recipients lack the “discipline” and “character” to work hard when they don’t want to. And these, he said, are values that are instilled in the home, especially in a home in which both mother and father are present and capable of raising their children in an effective manner.

John McWhorter (2000, 2005), professor of linguistics at the University of California, Berkeley, similarly claims to locate the source of Black academic underachievement in certain themes running through Black subculture rather than in White racism. The first theme he calls the cult of victimology, whereby Black Americans focus on their victimhood as an identity to be nurtured and preserved instead of a problem to be solved. The second he refers to as separatism, which encourages Black Americans to see themselves as a distinct and separate group whose members are morally exempt from the rules of behavior governing the lives of others. The third theme McWhorter identifies as anti-intellectualism, whereby Black youngsters associate academic success and learning for learning’s sake as being characteristic of White America and therefore as not appropriate to their lives. According to McWhorter, these three cultural themes represent a form of collective “self-sabotage.” Together, they assure that Black Americans will continue to perform badly both in and out of the classroom, even in the absence of large-scale racial discrimination.

Criminologist James Q. Wilson (1992) takes a benign prejudice viewpoint by blaming racism on the high crime rate among Black Americans and Latinos. In light of the elevated rate of crime committed by Black Americans, he argues, it only makes sense that White Americans would be fearful of Black Americans. According to Wilson, White racism will come down to the extent that Black crime also comes down.
Taking a contrary point of view, Russell (1998) takes Wilson to task for the narrowness of his view of the relationship between Black crime and White racism. Russell suggests that Whites’ fear of Blacks and Latinos has a basis in more than just a high crime rate. Whites are also fearful that Blacks will take their jobs, contaminate White popular culture (its music, dress, and language), overpopulate the country, and exact a measure of revenge for their treatment by White America. Russell also argues that Wilson’s view of the relationship between Black crime and White racism is simplistic and ahistorical, ignoring the interrelationships of crime, poverty, and education, as well as the impact of slavery. In other words, Wilson’s view has reversed the order of cause and effect: Crime does not cause racism; racism causes a high crime rate. This viewpoint—that a disproportionate level of Black crime is a result of economic and social disadvantage and discrimination—is shared by most criminologists, although not those who take a benign prejudice position.

Wilson’s viewpoint fails to receive support in the explanation for hostility toward immigrants from Latin American countries who are widely stereotyped as murderers, terrorists, and rapists. Actually, newcomers to America have a disproportionately low rate of violent crime and incarceration (Sampson, 2008). Cities like El Paso, Laredo, and San Diego, where the majority population consists of immigrants—both legal and illegal—from Latin America, have some of the lowest murder rates in the country. Yet, anti-immigrant sentiment continues unabated, as more and more native-born Americans—especially those who lack job skills—become fearful of being laid off in a bad economy and replaced by cheap labor from Mexico.

Some versions of benign prejudice form the basis of a policy of “benign neglect.” If the responsibility for Black and Latino poverty can be located in the one-parent family or the minority subculture, then why bother enacting policies and programs designed to eradicate poverty? If the blame for White racism can be located in a high crime rate among Blacks, then why enact policies to reduce discrimination and prejudice?

At the same time, the benign prejudice perspective can instead be employed to justify policies of affirmative action and preferential treatment designed to level the playing field for minorities who have suffered from past discrimination. Such policies do not necessarily aim to reduce current racism; they try to make up for previous inequities. For example, court-ordered busing during the 1970s in Boston schools was meant to make up for a history of decisions made by the Boston school committee purposely meant to keep the city’s schools segregated by race. Similarly recognizing the inequalities in the educational experiences of Blacks and Whites (not to mention the educational value of a diverse student body), affirmative action policies in colleges and universities sought to encourage growth in the enrollment of students of color.
It should also be noted that efforts to improve school dropout rates and rates of teen pregnancy do not necessarily preclude efforts to reduce discriminatory policies in the wider society. The most effective response to group inequities, it might be argued, would be to do both.

The Hereditary View

Another version of benign prejudice has developed from the work of those who assume a genetic basis of group differences in intelligence. The idea that heredity plays a major role in determining human intelligence has been around for more than a century. In 1883, Galton, who made a study of family eminence, suggested that “the instincts and faculties of different men differ almost as profoundly as animals in different cages of the zoological gardens.”

During the early part of the twentieth century, psychologists found that immigrants coming from Poland, Russia, Greece, Turkey, and Italy tended to score lower on intelligence tests than immigrants coming from northwestern Europe. Because of group differences, these psychologists argued that “Mediterranean-Latin-Slavic people” must be genetically stupid and that admitting them to the United States in large numbers would pollute the stream of national intelligence. This finding became a basis for the restrictive immigration laws of the 1920s (Kamin, 1973).

The argument that minority group members are genetically inferior is by no means a new one, but over the past few decades there has been renewed interest in it in the United States. For many, the re-emergence of this view in social science is associated with Arthur Jensen, an educational psychologist who revised the hypothesis that “genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average Negro-White intelligence difference” (1969, p. 82). In a subsequent article, Richard Herrnstein (1971) similarly suggested that socioeconomic status may be based on inherited differences in intelligence, permitting the development of an hereditary meritocracy for American society in which intellectually superior individuals will rule.

In a particularly distressing version of the benign prejudice viewpoint, J. Philippe Rushton (2001), an evolutionary psychologist from the University of Western Ontario, has suggested that racial differences in such advantageous traits as family stability, ability to postpone gratification, sexual restraint, and law-abiding behavior are actually a result of differences in brain size and weight. Asians are at the top of the positive trait scale and also have larger and heavier brains, Caucasians are in the middle on advantageous traits and brain size, and Africans are at the bottom on both counts.

Rushton’s viewpoint has never had great impact on popular culture, although abridged versions of his books have been circulated to a wide
range of social scientists. A best-selling book titled *The Bell Curve* by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray (1994) focused the attention of the nation once again on racial differences in intelligence. In particular, these behavioral scientists reported, among other things, that the average Black American has a lower intelligent quotient (IQ) than the average White or Asian American, and that this IQ gap is largely inherited.

The title of Murray and Herrnstein's book, *The Bell Curve*, evokes an image of scientific impartiality and precise neutrality. Yet, given the present stage of our knowledge about human behavior, it remains all but impossible to draw unbiased conclusions about racial differences in intelligence. There is simply no evidence of any significance to support the contention that the members of one race are inherently smarter than the members of another race.

One thing seems certain: Americans need guidance in how to wipe out the really important problems that divide us as a people—lack of opportunity, educational inequality, hopelessness, and bigotry. Only when these vital differences have been held constant will racial differences in intelligence be made clear. In some future society in which equality of opportunity is truly a reality, we may not need social scientists to justify selfishness. In the meantime, we might turn our attention to do what is possible to make our social environment conducive to maximizing the potential of all citizens, regardless of race, religion, sexual orientation, gender, disability status, or ethnic origin.

Common-sense observations highlight the absurdity of claims as to the immutability of IQ. In 1923, psychologist Carl Brigham, using the results of IQ test, concluded that 83% of Jews, 80% of Hungarians, and 70% of Italians were feeble minded and should consequently be excluded from citizenship in the United States. Notwithstanding the current widespread belief that Jews are an intelligent (perhaps too intelligent, according to the stereotype) people overall, Brigham argued then that Jews have the color, stature, mental abilities, and head form of their Alpine neighbors, what he referred to as a “race of peasants” who make perfect slaves and serfs.

Ironically, the Jewish experience in America provides us with one of the most compelling arguments for the environmental instead of the hereditary basis for intelligence. During the 1920s, when Brigham singled out Jews for scoring relatively low on IQ tests, Jews were also concentrated in the lower classes along with other impoverished newcomers to America. By contrast, today's Jewish Americans tend to score among the very highest groups on various tests of intelligence, not coincidentally at the same time that their wealth, power, and status have also seen major improvement. This leaves the unmistakable impression that changes in socioeconomic status are responsible for changes in the way that Jews and, of course, other groups score on IQ tests (Smith, 1995).
Any scientific conclusion, or even hypothesis, concerning genetically determined racial differences in ability or potential is also a political statement with potentially serious political consequences. Scientists who proclaim the inequality of the races have been cited by attorneys in desegregation cases and by legislators with respect to appropriations bills. During economic hard times, such ideas seem to gain in credibility. Members of the dominant group seek to justify cutting back government-spending programs to minority Americans in the areas of education and welfare. If the overrepresentation of inner-city Blacks in poverty can be traced to some problem in their environment or heredity (rather than to centuries of discrimination), there is no reason to throw additional government resources at such programs. As Smith (1995) correctly notes, many policy makers and academics enjoy good reputations although they have adopted this benign prejudice viewpoint. But one must wonder what impact the bell curve crowd has had on the self-concept of Black Americans who repeatedly hear from the so-called scientific community that in relation to Whites and Asians they are stupid, incompetent, and lacking intellectually. Even more insidious, the bell curve debate has had its analogue in the racial images outside the academy where people of color struggle on a daily basis with the unflattering messages they receive from members of the dominant group. Thus, some White cab drivers won’t stop for a Black man and some White women won’t share an elevator ride with a Black woman. When some Black men drive through a White neighborhood, they are prepared to be stopped by a suspicious police officer who uses some sort of racial profile that treats all Blacks as drug dealers and smugglers; when they go shopping downtown, Blacks are followed through stores by security guards who see them as potential shoplifters. According to a recent study, Blacks and Latinos are twice as likely as Whites to report that the police used or threatened force against them. Moreover, Black drivers are more likely to be pulled over and Black and Latino drivers are more likely to be searched, handcuffed, or ticketed (Gullo, 2001). More than 4 of every 10 Black Americans report having been the victims of racial profiling, including almost three-quarters of young Black males (Newport, 1999).

This is one of the reasons why so many Black Americans cringed in horror when in 1995 they saw O. J. Simpson’s courtroom appearances in his murder trial being telecast daily to a national audience. It isn’t only that Blacks mistrust the criminal justice system (in cities like Philadelphia and Los Angeles, police officers have been charged with planting evidence on Black suspects), Blacks were also concerned that the publicity surrounding the Simpson murder trial would reinforce the afrophobic stereotype by which they were being personally judged, on an everyday basis, to be thugs and rapists. Even if the environmental version of benign prejudice has a degree of validity, and it probably does, there is
reason to believe that hate and prejudice continue to feed the vicious circle in which many Black Americans have been trapped.

Stereotyping has more than a material effect on its victims. Especially in situations in which little or nothing is known, on a first-hand basis, about an individual—in shops and stores, elevators, real-estate offices, cabs, college campuses, factories, restaurants, large companies, and the criminal justice system—minority members may be treated stereotypically as a matter of routine (Lee, Jussim, and McCauley, 1995).

Having endured a lifetime as victims of stereotyping, many Black Americans—even those who have achieved inordinate success in economic and prestige terms—become sensitized to slights, indignities, or biases in their dealings with White Americans. When recognized for their individual achievements, certain Black Americans may be treated with dignity and respect. But when anonymous, they may come to feel, rightly or not, as though they are the victims of racial profiling.

On July 16, 2009, shortly after noon, famed African American scholar Henry Louis Gates, Jr., returned to his residence in Cambridge, Massachusetts, from a trip to China only to discover that his front door was stuck, and he could not gain entry. The 59-year-old Harvard professor, along with a companion who also was African American, put their shoulders to the door, forcing it open to get inside.

A 911 call from a passerby who didn’t recognize Gates and suspected a break-in brought police officer James Crowley to the scene. The details of the encounter between officer Crowley and professor Gates were never really made clear. But we do know that they engaged in a heated exchange of words. Moreover, Gates was then arrested for disorderly conduct and handcuffed, even though it was obvious that he was a resident of the house and not an intruder.

Initial reactions to the Cambridge incident were based more on emotion and personal experience than on the evidence. President Obama, Massachusetts governor Patrick, and Cambridge mayor Simmons—all of whom are African American—were critical of the Cambridge police response and not of the professor. It is not outrageous to speculate that all three had experienced countless numbers of racial slights and indignities over their own lifetimes, and that they empathized with Professor Gates, who seemed to have suffered the same experiences.

Whatever the actual circumstances involving Gates and Crowley, the racial gap in evaluating the treatment of Gates was wide and deep. Sadly, few White Americans sided with the Black professor. Few were even willing to acknowledge that he might have been victimized by ugly stereotyping in the past and that his reaction to Officer Crowley might have been colored by such previous experiences.

The size of the racial divide was made clear by the results of a Wall Street Journal/NBC poll (Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2009) taken days after
the Cambridge incident. Among African Americans, just 4% said Professor Gates was more to blame versus 30% who identified Officer Crowley as being at fault. In contrast, 32% of White respondents said Gates was more at fault while only 7% blamed Crowley. It should be noted as well that the majority of Americans, both Black and White, refused to place the blame on either Gates or Crowley.

Though the charges against Gates were quickly dropped, the controversy surrounding the incident in Cambridge continued for some time. Professor Gates argued that his arrest was racially motivated; Officer Crowley claimed that he acted by the book. Days later, both men met with President Obama at the White House to have a beer (and a friendly conversation) together. As for other Americans, it is doubtful that this single experience was capable of modifying their preconceived ideas about race.

Moreover, the fear of confirming negative stereotypes about their own group can seriously erode the ability of minority group members to achieve their potential. In one series of studies, Black students who were given a difficult test of their verbal abilities performed well except when they were asked to report their race and they were made to believe that doing poorly would confirm the stereotypic belief that Blacks are intellectually inferior to Whites (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Not only can the threat of being stereotyped reduce an individual’s performance, but it can also cause an individual to avoid those areas of life in which she is expected to fail (Crocker & Major, 1989; Steele, 1992). Concerned about confirming the stereotype that they are less intelligent than Whites, some Black children over time tend to disconnect academic achievement with self-image. They come to associate learning for learning’s sake and academic achievement as within the province of White America and not within their own. In the long run, the acceptance of this anti-intellectual attitude profoundly reduces Black children’s ability to compete in any arena where the ability to learn is essential (Osborne, 1995).

It should be noted that some psychologists have shown certain stereotypes to have a degree of accuracy (Lee, Jussim, & McCauley, 1995). For example, it is indeed true that 53% of all homicides are committed by Black Americans, who represent only 12% of the population of the United States. Knowing of the overrepresentation of Blacks in violent crime does not, however, answer the important question as to why Black Americans are overrepresented among violent criminals. To explain this phenomenon, one might examine the impact of poverty, discrimination, social disorganization, racism, strain, and other factors that have been demonstrated to serve as direct causes of criminal behavior found disproportionately among Black Americans. For those who are eager to apply a genetic explanation to Black violent crime, it should be emphasized that the rate of serious violence committed by Black Americans has not
remained constant. It has risen and fallen dramatically over many decades. The same is true of other groups in society whose crime rates have varied significantly over the years. In the nineteenth century, impoverished Irish immigrants were overrepresented among street criminals; during the 1920s, it was impoverished Italian and Jewish Americans who became identified with gangland killings.

Some White Americans, concerned about their personal safety, might argue that knowing that 53% of all murders are perpetrated by Blacks is important information in order to avoid their own victimization. From this viewpoint, the argument might be that they should avoid Blacks to reduce their chances of being killed. The problem with this kind of thinking is that it ignores a couple of important points. First, that murder tends to be intraracial—Black perpetrators kill Blacks; Asian perpetrators kill Asians; Latino perpetrators kill Latinos; and White perpetrators kill Whites.

Second, and even more important, although it is true that more than half of all murders are committed by Blacks, this does not mean that more than half of all Blacks commit murder. In fact, only 25 in every 100,000 Black Americans have killed anyone, leaving 99,975 in every 100,000 who have not. Just to put the predictability issue in comparative perspective, we might use the same logic to suggest that any individual would be far safer if he were totally to avoid all men. After all, not 53% but a truly shocking 90% of all murders are committed by men rather than women. Once again, however, the logic of this approach to predictability leads us astray. Only 12 in every 100,000 men ever kill anyone. Like the overwhelming majority of Blacks, most men are law-abiding citizens, not murderers.

Acting on the anti-Black stereotype is therefore not at all an effective predictor and is tantamount to treating most Blacks as murderers for the sins of a few. Most people do not like to be stereotyped; instead, they seek to be treated as unique individuals with their own sets of strengths and weaknesses and of accomplishments and failures. It would make vastly more sense for the purposes of reducing the likelihood of being harmed to avoid any man or woman who has a history of being dangerous and violent, whether they are Black, White, Latino, or Asian.

Not that particular characteristics of groups don’t have some bearing on the way they are treated by members of the dominant group. It’s just that these characteristics may themselves still be a result of their treatment. The vicious circle of deprivation is no closed system. It often begins with discrimination and exploitation and ends with more of the same (Patterson, 1998).

In his role as the president of Harvard University and prior to becoming Obama’s economic advisor, Lawrence Summers inspired a major controversy when he suggested that innate differences between
men and women might explain, in part, why fewer women succeed in math and science. Taking a benign prejudice position, Summers also questioned to what extent discrimination was a factor in the small number of female professors of engineering and science at elite universities.

Some argued that Summers used his benign prejudice position in order to justify substantial declines in the percentage of tenured faculty positions offered to women in Harvard’s College of Arts and Sciences since he took office. Others viewed Summers’s remarks as “hate speech” that would keep larger numbers of young women from entering fields related to science and mathematics in the future.

Trend statistics tell a different story. Rather than demonstrate the influence of innate gender differences, they suggest that women have excelled in fields of science and math when they given an opportunity to do so. For example, the percentage of medical school graduates who are female increased dramatically from less than 7% in 1965–1966 to almost 50% in 2007–2008 (Association of American Medical Colleges, 2007–2008).

Many women teaching at medical schools perceive that they are discriminated against and sexually harassed, according to a study from Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) and Boston University School of Medicine. Men seem to be relatively unaware of the problems and much less affected by them (Carr et al., 2000). This may explain that in 2008, 20% of medical school faculty were men but only 4% were women. (Association of American Medical Colleges, 2007–2008).

During the Middle Ages, Jews were systematically excluded from respectable occupations and restricted to the role of money lending. Their consequent overrepresentation in fields of finance and banking was later used to confirm the stereotype that Jews are money grubbing and mercenary as well as to justify efforts to grant them only second-class citizenship or to expel them from the countries in which they lived since birth. Similarly, when their land was deemed important for White Americans to possess, American Indians were forcibly expelled from their homes to be transplanted to impoverished reservations where their opportunities for economic progress became almost nonexistent. Any armed resistance on their part was then used to prove that Indians were barbaric savages who deserved whatever fate they were given. Black Americans were initially enslaved and subsequently became the recipients of Jim Crow laws that until the 1960s kept them separated from Whites in most areas of public life. The Black subculture that arose out of their legal and de facto segregation over many generations has been thought by some White Americans to be the primary source of Black economic disadvantage. It is easy enough to put blinders on and ignore the historical role of hate and prejudice in determining the life chances of an entire people.
The Situationist View of Hate and Violence

When people act in ways that stray from local norms or cultural standards, their behaviors are generally attributed to dispositional or psychological factors. This is true for groups of people too, such as racial or ethnic groups. Sometimes these odd or repulsive behaviors conform to stereotypes about the group, serving to confirm and reinforce the negative images. From the benign prejudice view, individuals and groups are to blame for their own failings rather than the stresses and strains present in their daily situations or social contexts.

This viewpoint prevents law-abiding citizens from seeing and acknowledging their own culpability for creating and maintaining these negative situations. The victims of hate and prejudice are now regarded as the villains. Zimbardo (2004, p. 25) explains this phenomenon as follows: “Locating evil within selected individuals or groups carries with it the ‘social virtue’ of taking ‘society off the hook’ as blameworthy; societal structures and political decision making are exonerated from bearing any burden of the more fundamental circumstances that create racism, sexism, elitism, poverty, and the marginal existence for some citizens.”

The situationist perspective provides a framework for understanding why certain groups of people are overrepresented in the disadvantaged and disenfranchised margins of society, and why they are likely targets of hate and discrimination. In addition, this viewpoint helps us see why “good people” participate in discriminatory practices, and why otherwise very caring people won’t step in to stop it. The situationist perspective is informed by research in social psychology and sociology some of which are highlighted in the final chapter of this book (Zimbardo, 2004).

In order to demonstrate this perspective to his course in the sociology of deviance, the second author, often begins the class in a way that is, at first, very disorienting to students, and which later produces widespread “bad” behavior. It goes like this: On the very first day of class, he says nothing to the students for about a half an hour or so. Some students become fidgety; others disengage and begin talking on their cell phones or reading the newspaper. At this point he asks students to arrange their desks in a circle. When this task is accomplished he introduces himself as the instructor and informs students that we “will meet weekly for the next several months in order ‘to explore the topic of deviance.’” Then he doesn’t say anything more; he just sits back, looks, and listens.² At first students become anxious then annoyed. Friendly smiles and nervous giggles give way to outbursts of frustration after about an hour. Some

²This exercise is adapted from the training group model known as T groups. See Bradford, L. P., Gibb, J. R., & Benne, K. D. (1964). *T-group theory and laboratory method: Innovation in re-education.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
students have actually warned him that if he didn’t “begin class soon,” they would get up and leave the room. Some have threatened to report him to the university administration. About a year ago a young male student stood by his desk looking down at him in a threatening manner with clenched fists and said “I’d be less pissa off at you if you told me the truth; that you forgot to prepare the f—-ing syllabus.” Other students tried to ease the tension by suggesting that they (the students) introduce themselves to each other. Some have even tried to begin a discussion on the topic of the course—deviant behavior. These attempts by students to return the class to “normal” are rarely accepted by their peers which results in increased conflict between students and rising anxiety within the classroom. By the end of the second hour (of a 3-hr class), students are frazzled. Some have stormed out of class. Others have insulted him openly as being “lazy” and “incompetent.” On some occasions students have even cried out, “please stop this and tell us what we should do.”

The class has never gone the entire 3 hr. He generally ends the session when he sees that students have had enough, before violence erupts, or emotional harm is done. At the end of this exercise he tells students that the next class, the following week, will be the “real first class” and that this class was an exercise in the study of deviance. He then gives them an assignment, to describe in writing exactly how they were feeling and what they were thinking during this exercise. In addition, he asks them to be prepared to discuss this exercise at the next class the following week.

During the debriefing in the following class session, students almost always confirm their feelings of frustration, boredom, anger, and confusion. They often admit that their own behavior in this class was not “typical” for them. Many have said that they were embarrassed by their behavior, while others have defended their actions as being “normal under abnormal conditions.” He often suggests to them that had a sociologist been studying “deviance in the classroom” that day and decided to visit each classroom at the university to count the number of deviant acts that were being committed, our classroom would easily have been the most deviant at the university.

So, then he asks, who is ultimately responsible for the outbursts and disorderly behavior in the classroom? Is it the person or persons who commit the acts? Clearly, not everybody is disorderly, so why do some people act this way and not others? Is the classroom environment to blame? To what extent is the formal authority figure (the second author) to blame? He is simply doing what he is paid to do; teaching students about deviance. But, how do his teaching methods appear to the students? Or is it the combination of factors including the temperament of the students and the anomic classroom environment? These are questions posed for the students to reflect on and discuss, but they are also
questions that have been addressed over the years with great success within the fields of social psychology and sociology.

Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), one of the most influential figures in modern social psychology, claimed that behavior \( B \) is always a function of the person \( P \) and the environment \( E \). He presented this idea mathematically as \( B = f(P, E) \) (Lewin, 1951). Lewin’s conceptual approach is useful to us as we reflect on the classroom experience. We modify Lewin’s equation a bit, separating the environment into two parts, the immediate (most local) situation \( E_{ld} \) and the larger (global) sociocultural environment \( E_{sc} \). (See Figure 1.1.)

In Figure 1.1 we depict person \( P \) in the middle of the figure enveloped by two circles. The inner circle closest to person \( P \) represents the immediate local situation \( E_{ld} \), such as when person \( P \) is “hanging out” with friends in his neighborhood at night or when he is at work on an assembly line or at a meeting with coworkers. The outer circle farthest from person \( P \) represents the larger sociocultural environment \( E_{sc} \) in which the local situation \( E_{ld} \) exists. This area includes the broader social structure, including cultural norms, social institutions, and national ideologies.

\[
B = f(P, E_{ld}, E_{sc})
\]

\( P = \) Dispositional and psychological forces affecting the person’s behavior.  
\( E_{ld} = \) The most local situation, e.g., the neighborhood, workplace, the family home.  
\( E_{sc} = \) The larger sociocultural environment. This includes social institutions, mainstream culture, political and economic ideology, among others.

**FIGURE 1.1 The situationist perspective**

*Source:* This figure presents a modified version of a model used by Kurt Lewin to express the interdependent relationship between the person and his or her environment. See Lewin, K. (1940). Formalization and Progress in Psychology. *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare,* 16, (3), 9–42.
Each of us, including hypothetical person (P), has a disposition or temperament that we carry with us into each local situation ($E_{ld}$). Norms, values, expectations, and environmental conditions in the local situation ($E_{ld}$) may conform to or conflict with the larger environmental conditions ($E_{sc}$). In the classroom experiment the local situation ($E_{ld}$) conflicts with the normative behaviors of teachers at state universities in the United States ($E_{sc}$). This conflict produces an atmosphere of confusion in the local situation ($E_{ld}$). When this happens, students don’t know how to act appropriately because they can’t rely on past experiences or social norms to inform them. They have tried behaviors that they thought would return the classroom to “normal,” such as asking others to “introduce themselves.”

But, when they don’t get the responses they expect, some students become angry and frustrated. This condition produces a high frequency of disorderly behavior from students. However, not everybody participates in antagonistic and disorderly ways. Perhaps it is only those individuals with certain internal dispositions who become angry and visibly aggressive. As shown in Figure 1.1, individual responses to deviance in the classroom may also depend on students’ definitions of the situation. Some may regard their instructor’s unresponsive demeanor as a failure in carrying out his professional role, while others might see the chaotic situation as a welcome break from listening to lectures and taking notes.

During the discussion that follows the class exercise, students easily recognize the many ways the classroom “experiment” paralleled the dynamics of the “real” world. For example, it is often true that individuals who live in neighborhoods with high rates of unemployment have a higher risk for becoming involved with illegal drugs and crime. When this occurs in minority neighborhoods it reinforces negative stereotypes about these groups. From the situationist view, however, crime in disadvantaged neighborhoods can be explained as the result of the frustration and sense of injustice that many residents feel when the “the authorities” funnel resources such as good schools or high-paying jobs to other places. Racist attitudes among the majority and among the most powerful members of the society can serve to create situations of hopelessness, frustration, anger, and helplessness which then can lead good people to do bad things. The criminal acts and other “bad behavior” committed disproportionately by minority group members prove to the majority that these groups have innate criminogenic dispositions or live in a “culture of violence” that mark them for surveillance and state-sponsored control, thus making a bad situation even worse.

The situationist view helps us to think more deeply about the causes and effects of hate, discrimination, and intergroup violence by making us look beyond the actor(s) and toward the situations that give rise to these negative conditions and behaviors. In reality we all share
some blame for creating and maintaining situations, both locally \((E_B)\) and globally \((E_{sc})\), that antagonize people with particular dispositions to behave in counterproductive ways and then to suffer unnecessarily because of it. The situationist perspective enables us to see the real root causes of hate and violence, allowing us to develop more effective ways to respond and prevent them from occurring in the first place.

**CONCLUSION**

Notwithstanding the decline in its public expression since World War II, hate continues to dictate the terms of intergroup conflict in the United States. In certain circles, prejudice has become more subtle and sophisticated. Among some, it may exist only on an unconscious level. In others, it remains dormant until such time that the advantaged status of the dominant group is challenged. At this point, the stereotyped image of the “outsiders” is brought forth to justify doing them harm.

There is a large and apparently growing number of social scientists who believe that hate or prejudice is no longer responsible for racial inequalities. Instead, they blame some characteristic of the victims’ culture or heredity. Although the benign prejudice viewpoint alerts us to the possibility of environmental sources of inequality, there is every reason to believe that hate continues to play an important role in causing cultural changes that contribute to racial disadvantage. As espoused by the bell curve advocates, the hereditary view of racial inferiority may have an impact of its own in sending a message to people of color, especially to Black Americans, suggesting that they cannot possibly improve their ability to achieve educational or economic parity no matter how hard they try. Unfortunately, this seems to be the same message that many Black Americans get every day from ordinary White Americans who sincerely believe that they are not prejudiced. The situationist perspective helps us recognize the conditions in both the local situation and the larger social context that affect our perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors regarding other races and other groups. From this perspective perhaps we can see our own culpability for creating and maintaining situations that give rise to hate violence in our society. It is from this viewpoint that we are also most likely to see solutions to this problem.