

Is There an Enduring Logic of Conflict in World Politics?



Marble relief commemorating Athenians who died in the Peloponnesian War

The world is shrinking. The *Mayflower* took three months to cross the Atlantic. In 1924, Charles Lindbergh's flight took 33 hours. Fifty years later, the Concorde did it in three hours. Ballistic missiles can do it in 30 minutes. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a transatlantic flight cost one-third of what it did in 1950, and a call from New York to London cost only a small percentage of what it did at midcentury. Global Internet communications are nearly instantaneous and transmission costs are negligible. An environmentalist in Asia or a human rights activist in Africa today has a power of communication once enjoyed only by large organizations such as governments or transnational corporations. On a more somber note, nuclear weapons have added a new dimension to war that one writer calls "double death," meaning

that not only could individuals die, but under some circumstances the whole human species could be threatened. And as the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001 (9/11) illustrated, technology is putting into the hands of nonstate actors destructive powers that once were reserved solely for governments. As the effects of distance shrink, conditions in remote, poor countries such as Afghanistan suddenly become highly relevant to America and Europe.

Yet some other things about international politics have remained the same over the ages. Thucydides' account of Sparta and Athens fighting the Peloponnesian War 2,500 years ago reveals eerie resemblances to the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1947. The world today is a strange cocktail of continuity and change. Some aspects of international politics have not changed since Thucydides; there is a certain logic of hostility, a dilemma about security that goes with interstate politics. Alliances, balances of power, and choices in policy between war and compromise have remained similar over the millennia.

On the other hand, Thucydides never had to worry about nuclear weapons, HIV/AIDS, or global warming. The task for international relations students is to build on the past but not be trapped by it—to understand the continuities as well as the changes. We must learn the traditional theories and then adapt them to current circumstances. The early chapters of this book will provide you with a historical and theoretical context in which to place the phenomena of the information revolution, globalization, interdependence, and transnational actors that are discussed in the later chapters. I found in my experience in government that I could ignore neither the age-old nor the brand-new dimensions of world politics.

International politics would be transformed if separate states were abolished, but world government is not around the corner. And while nonstate actors such as transnational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and terrorist groups present new challenges to governments, they do not replace states. The peoples who live in the nearly 200 states on this globe want their independence, separate cultures, and different languages. In fact, rather than vanishing, nationalism and the demand for separate states have increased. Rather than fewer states, this century will probably see more. World government would not automatically solve the problem of war. Most wars today are civil or ethnic wars. In the two decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, 220 armed conflicts have occurred in 75 different locations around the world. Nine were interstate wars, and 24 were intrastate wars with foreign intervention.¹ In fact, the bloodiest wars of the nineteenth century were not among the quarreling states of Europe but the Taiping Rebellion in China and the American Civil War. We will continue to live in a world of rival communities and separate states for quite some time, and it is important to understand what that means for our prospects.

WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL POLITICS?

The world has not always been divided into a system of separate states. Over the centuries there have been three basic forms of world politics. In a *world imperial system*, one government controls most of the world with which it has contact. The

greatest example in the Western world was the Roman Empire. Spain in the sixteenth century and France in the late seventeenth century tried to gain similar supremacy, but they failed. In the nineteenth century, the British Empire spanned the globe, but even the British had to share the world with other strong states. Ancient world empires—the Roman, Sumerian, Persian, and Chinese—were actually regional empires. They thought they ruled the world, but they were protected from conflict with other empires by lack of communication. Their fights with barbarians on the peripheries of their empires were not the same as wars among roughly equal states.

A second basic form of international politics is a *feudal system*, in which human loyalties and political obligations are not fixed primarily by territorial boundaries. Feudalism was common in Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire. An individual had obligations to a local lord, but might also owe duties to some distant noble or bishop, as well as to the pope in Rome. Political obligations were determined to a large extent by what happened to one's superiors. If a ruler married, an area and its people might find their obligations rearranged as part of a wedding dowry. Townspeople born French might suddenly find themselves made Flemish or even English. Cities and leagues of cities sometimes had a special semi-independent status. The crazy quilt of wars that accompanied the feudal situation did not much resemble modern territorial wars. These wars could occur within as well as across territories and were shaped by crosscutting, nonterritorial loyalties and conflicts.

A third form of world politics is an *anarchic system of states*, composed of states that are relatively cohesive but with no higher government above them. Examples include the city-states of ancient Greece or Machiavelli's fifteenth-century Italy. Another example of an anarchic state system is the dynastic territorial state whose coherence comes from control by a ruling family. Examples can be found in India or China in the fifth century BCE. Large territorial dynasties reemerged in Europe about 1500, and other forms of international politics such as city-states or loose leagues of territories began to vanish. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia ended Europe's Thirty Years' War, sometimes called the last of the great wars of religion and the first of the wars of modern states. In retrospect, the Peace of Westphalia enshrined the territorial sovereign state as the dominant political unit.

Thus today when we speak of international politics, we usually mean this territorial system of sovereign states (or simply the "Westphalian system" for short), and we define *international politics* as politics in the absence of a common sovereign, politics among entities with no ruler above them. International politics is a self-help system. Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth-century English philosopher, called such an anarchic system a "state of nature." For some, the words *state of nature* may conjure up images of a herd of cows grazing peacefully on a farm, but that is not what Hobbes meant. Think of a Texas town without a sheriff in the days of the Old West, or Lebanon after its government broke down in the 1970s, or Somalia in the 1990s. Hobbes did not think of a state of nature as benign; he saw it as a war of all against all, because there was no higher ruler to enforce order. As Hobbes famously declared, life in such a world would be nasty, brutish, and short.

Because there is no higher authority above states, there are important legal, political, and social differences between domestic and international politics. Domestic law is relatively clear and consistent and is generally obeyed. If not, the police and courts enforce it. By contrast, international law is patchy, incomplete, and rests on sometimes vague foundations. There is no common enforcement mechanism. The world lacks a global police force, and while there are international courts, they can do little when sovereign states choose to ignore them.

Force plays a different role in domestic and international politics as well. In a well-ordered domestic political system, the government has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In international politics, no one has such a monopoly. Because international politics is the realm of self-help, and some states are stronger than others, there is always a danger that they may resort to force. When force cannot be ruled out, the result is mistrust and suspicion.

Domestic and international politics also differ in their underlying sense of community. In a well-ordered domestic society, a widespread sense of community gives rise to common loyalties, standards of justice, and views of legitimate authority. On a global scale, people have competing loyalties. Any sense of global community is weak. People often disagree about what is just and legitimate. The result is a great gap between two basic political values: order and justice. In such a world, most people place national concerns before international justice. Law and ethics play a role in international politics, but in the absence of a sense of community norms, they are weaker forces than in domestic politics.

Of the three basic systems—*world imperial*, *feudal*, and *anarchic system of states*—some people speculate that the twenty-first century may see the gradual evolution of a new feudalism, or less plausibly, an American world empire. We will look at those questions in the final chapter.

Differing Views of Anarchic Politics

International politics is anarchic in the sense that there is no government above sovereign states. But political philosophy offers different views of how harsh a state of nature need be. Hobbes, who wrote in a seventeenth-century England wracked by civil war, emphasized insecurity, force, and survival. He described humanity as being in a constant state of war. A half century later, John Locke, writing in a more stable England, argued that although a state of nature lacked a common sovereign, people could develop ties and make contracts, and therefore anarchy was less of an obstacle to peace. Those two views of a state of nature are the philosophical precursors of two current views of international politics, one more pessimistic and one more optimistic: the *realist* and *liberal* approaches to international politics.

Realism has been the dominant tradition in thinking about international politics for centuries. For the realist, the central problem of international politics is war and the use of force, and the central actors are states. Among modern Americans, realism is exemplified by the writings and policies of President Richard Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. The realist starts from the assumption of the anarchic system of states. Kissinger and Nixon, for example, sought to maximize the

power of the United States and to minimize the ability of other states to jeopardize U.S. security. According to the realist, the beginning and the end of international politics is the individual state in interaction with other states.

The other tradition, *liberalism*, can be traced back in Western political philosophy to Baron de Montesquieu and Immanuel Kant in eighteenth-century France and Germany respectively, and such nineteenth-century British philosophers as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. A modern American example can be found in the writings and policies of political scientist and president, Woodrow Wilson.

Liberals see a global society that functions alongside states and sets an important part of the context for state action. Trade crosses borders, people have contacts with each other (such as students studying in foreign countries), and international institutions such as the United Nations mitigate some of the harsher aspects of anarchy. Liberals complain that realists portray states as billiard balls careening off one another in an attempt to balance power. They claim that this explanation is not adequate, as people do have contacts across borders and because there is an international society. Realists, claim liberals, overstate the difference between domestic and international politics. Because the realist picture of anarchy as a Hobbesian “state of war” focuses only on extreme situations, in the liberals’ view it misses the growth of economic interdependence and the evolution of a transnational global society.

Realists respond by quoting Hobbes: “Just as stormy weather does not mean perpetual rain, so a state of war does not mean constant war.”² Just as Londoners carry umbrellas on sunny April days, the prospect of war in an anarchic system makes states keep armies even in times of peace. Realists point to previous liberal predictions that went awry. For example, in 1910 the president of Stanford University said future war was no longer possible because it was too costly. Liberal writers proclaimed war obsolete; civilization had grown out of it, they argued. Economic interdependence, ties between labor unions and intellectuals, and the flow of capital all made war impossible. Of course, these predictions failed catastrophically when World War I broke out in 1914, and the realists were vindicated.

Neither history nor the argument between the realists and liberals stopped in 1914. The 1970s saw a resurgence of liberal claims that rising economic and social interdependence was changing the nature of international politics. In the 1980s, Richard Rosecrance wrote that states can increase their power in two ways, either aggressively by territorial conquest or peacefully through trade. He used the experience of Japan as an example: In the 1930s, Japan tried territorial conquest and suffered the disaster of World War II. But since then, Japan has used trade and investment to become the second largest economy in the world (measured by official exchange rates) and a significant power in East Asia. Japan succeeded while spending far less, proportionately to the size of either its population or its economy, than other major powers. Thus Rosecrance and modern liberals argue that the nature of international politics is changing.

Some new liberals look even further to the future and believe that dramatic growth in ecological interdependence will so blur the differences between domestic and international politics that humanity will evolve toward a world without borders. For example, everyone will be affected without regard to boundaries if carbon dioxide

1910: THE “UNSEEN VAMPIRE” OF WAR

If there were no other reason for making an end of war, the financial ruin it involves must sooner or later bring the civilized nations of the world to their senses. As President David Starr Jordan of Leland Stanford University said at Tufts College, “Future war is impossible because the nations cannot afford it.” In Europe, he says, the war debt is \$26 billion, “all owed to the unseen vampire, and which the nations will never pay and which taxes poor people \$95 million a year.” The burdens of militarism in time of peace are exhausting the strength of the leading nations, already overloaded with debts. The certain result of a great war would be overwhelming bankruptcy.

—*The New York World*³

accumulation warms the planet. Problems such as HIV/AIDS and drugs cross borders with such ease that we may be on our way to a different world. Professor Richard Falk of Princeton argues that transnational problems and values will alter the state-centric orientation of the international system that has dominated for the last 400 years. Transnational forces are undoing the Peace of Westphalia, and humanity is evolving toward a new form of international politics.

In 1990, realists replied, “Tell that to Saddam Hussein!” Iraq showed that force and war are ever-present dangers when it invaded its small neighbor Kuwait. Liberals responded by arguing that politics in the Middle East is the exception. Over time, they said, the world is moving beyond the anarchy of the sovereign state system. These divergent views on the nature of international politics and how it is changing will not soon be reconciled. Realists stress continuity; liberals stress change. Both claim to be more “realistic.” Liberals tend to see realists as cynics whose fascination with the past blinds them to change. Realists, in turn, think liberals are utopian dreamers peddling “globaloney.”

Who’s right? Both are right and both are wrong. A clear-cut answer might be nice, but it would also be less accurate and less interesting. The mix of continuity and change that characterizes today’s world makes it impossible to arrive at one simple synthetic explanation.

Because it involves changeable human behaviors, international politics will never be like physics: It has no strong determinist theory. What is more, realism and liberalism are not the only approaches. For much of the past century *Marxism* was a popular alternative for many people. Originally developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and subsequently enhanced and adapted by other theorists, Marxism focuses on the domestic economic structure of capitalist states. Their concentration on economic class, production, and property relations has sometimes been called economic reductionism or historical materialism. Marxists believed that politics was a function of economics and that the greed of capitalists would drive important events in international relations, ultimately proving their own undoing as socialist revolution swept the globe. But Marxists underestimated the forces of nationalism, state power, and geopolitics. Their lack of attention to the importance

of diplomacy and the balance of power led to a flawed understanding of international politics and incorrect predictions. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the failure of Marxist theory to account for peace among major capitalist states, and warfare among various communist states, left it lagging in the competition for explanatory value. For example, it was difficult for Marxists to explain clashes between China and the Soviet Union in 1969, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, or the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979.

In the 1960s and 1970s, *dependency theory*, which builds on Marxism, was popular. It predicted that the wealthy countries in the “center” of the global marketplace would control and hold back poorer countries on the “periphery.” According to dependency theorists, the global economic and political division between the First World (rich, liberal, capitalist countries) and the Third World (developing countries), also known as the North-South divide, is the result of both historical imperialism and the nature of capitalist globalization. Dependency theory enjoyed some explanatory successes, such as accounting for the failure of many poor countries to benefit from global economic liberalization to the extent that orthodox liberal economic theory predicted. It also drew attention to the curious and important phenomenon of the “dual economy” in Third World countries, in which a small, wealthy, educated, urban economic elite interacted with and profited handsomely from globalization, while the vast majority of impoverished, largely rural, farmers, laborers, and miners, did not. But while dependency theory helped illuminate some important structural causes of economic inequality, it had difficulty explaining why, in the 1980s and 1990s, “peripheral” countries in East Asia, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia, grew more rapidly than “central” countries such as the United States and Europe. The first two are now wealthy “developed” countries in their own right, and Malaysia is a rising middle-income country. These weaknesses of dependency theory were underlined when Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a leading dependency theorist in the 1970s, turned to liberal economic policies after being elected president of Brazil in the 1990s.

In the 1980s, analysts on both sides of the realist-liberal divide attempted to emulate microeconomics by developing formal, deductive theories. “*Neorealists*” such as Kenneth Waltz and “*neoliberals*” such as Robert Keohane developed structural models of states as rational actors constrained by the international system. Neorealists and neoliberals increased the simplicity and elegance of theory, but they did so at the cost of discarding much of the rich complexity of classical realist and liberal theories. “By the end of the 1980s, the theoretical contest that might have been reduced to relatively narrow disagreements within one state-centric rationalist model of international relations.”⁴

More recently, a diverse group of theorists labeled *constructivists* has argued that realism and liberalism both fail to explain long-term change in world politics adequately. For example, neither realists nor liberals predicted the end of the Cold War, nor could they explain it satisfactorily after the fact. Constructivists emphasize the importance of ideas and culture in shaping both the reality and the discourse of international politics. They stress the ultimate subjectivity of interests and their links to changing identities. There are many types of constructivists, but they all

tend to agree that the two major theories are far from painting true pictures of the world and that we need not just explanations of how things are, but explanations of how they come to be. Constructivists have focused on important questions about identities, norms, culture, national interests, and international governance.⁵ They believe that leaders and other people are motivated not only by material interests, but also by their sense of identity, morality, and what their society or culture considers appropriate. These norms change over time, partly through interaction with others. Constructivists agree that the international system is anarchic, but they argue that is a spectrum of anarchies ranging from benign, peaceful, even friendly ones to bitterly hostile competitive ones. The nature of anarchy at any given time depends upon prevailing norms, perceptions, and beliefs. As the prominent constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt puts it: anarchy is what states make of it. That is why Americans worry more about one North Korean nuclear weapon than 500 British nuclear weapons and why war between France and Germany, which occurred twice in the last century, seems unthinkable today.⁶

Neorealists and neoliberals take for granted that states seek to promote their “national interest,” but they have little to say about how those interests are shaped or change over time. Constructivists draw on different disciplines to examine the processes by which leaders, peoples, and cultures alter their preferences, shape their identities, and learn new behaviors. For example, both slavery in the nineteenth century, and racial apartheid in South Africa in the twentieth century, were accepted by most states once upon a time. But both came later to be widely condemned. Constructivists ask: Why the change? What role did ideas play? Will the practice of war go the same way someday? What about the concept of the sovereign state? The world is full of political entities such as tribes, nations, and non-governmental organizations. Only in recent centuries has the sovereign state been a dominant concept. Constructivists suggest that concepts such as “state” and “sovereignty” that shape our understandings of world politics and that animate our theories are, in fact, socially constructed; they are not given. Nor are they permanent. Even our understanding of “security” evolves. Traditional international relations theories used to understand security strictly in terms of preventing violence or war among states, but in today’s world “human security”—a relatively new concept—seems at least as problematic. Moreover, a wider range of phenomena have become “securitized,” that is, treated politically as dire threats warranting extraordinary efforts to address them. Scholars and politicians worry today not only about inter-state war, but also about poverty, inequality, and economic or ecological catastrophe, as we will see in Chapters 7 and 8.

Feminist constructivists add that the language and imageries of war as a central instrument of world politics have been heavily influenced by gender. *Feminism* gained strength as a critical approach in the early 1990s when traditional security concerns lost some of their apparent urgency in the wake of the Cold War. By focusing on social processes, non-elite issues, and transnational structures, and by rejecting the established, limited focus on inter-state relations, feminism aims to study world politics more inclusively and reveal “the processes through which identities and interests, not merely of states but of key social constituencies, are shaped at the

global level.”⁷ Feminist scholars highlight disparities between the sexes. For example, out of 192 current members of the UN, only seventeen have female presidents, chancellors, or prime ministers. Feminist critiques also illuminate problematic aspects of globalization, such as the “export” or trafficking of women and children and the use of rape as an instrument of war.

Constructivism is an approach that rejects neorealism’s or neoliberalism’s search for scientific laws. Instead, it seeks contingent generalizations and often offers thick description as a form of explanation. Some of the most important debates in world politics today revolve around the meanings of terms such as sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, human rights, and genocide, and constructivists have much more to say about these issues than do older theories.⁸ Constructivism provides both a useful critique and an important supplement to realism and liberalism. Though sometimes loosely formulated and lacking in predictive power, constructivist approaches remind us of what the two main theories often miss. As we shall see in the next chapter, it is important to look beyond the instrumental rationality of pursuing current goals and to ask how changing identities and interests can sometimes lead to subtle shifts in states’ policies, and sometimes to profound changes in international affairs. Constructivists help us understand how preferences are formed and how knowledge is generated prior to the exercise of instrumental rationality. In that sense, constructivist thought complements rather than opposes the two main theories. We will illustrate the questions of understanding long-term change in the next chapter and return to it in the final chapter.

When I was working in Washington and helping formulate American foreign policies as an assistant secretary in the State Department and the Pentagon, I found myself borrowing elements from all three types of thinking: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. I found all of them helpful, though in different ways and in different circumstances. Sometimes practical men and women wonder why we should bother with theories at all. The answer is that theories are the road maps that allow us to make sense of unfamiliar terrain. We are lost without them. Even when we think we are just using common sense, there is usually an implicit theory guiding our actions. We simply do not know or have forgotten what it is. If we are more conscious of the theories that guide us, we are better able to understand their strengths and weaknesses, and when best to apply them. As the British economist John Maynard Keynes once put it, practical men who consider themselves above theory are usually listening to some dead scribbler from the past whose name they have long forgotten.⁹

Building Blocks

Actors, goals, and instruments are three concepts that are basic to theorizing about international politics, but each is changing. In the traditional realist view of international politics, the only significant “actors” are the states, and only the big states really matter. But this is changing. The number of states has grown enormously in the last half century: In 1945 there were about 50 states in the world; by the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were four times that many with more to come. More important than the number of states is the rise of *nonstate actors*. Today large multinational

TABLE 1.1 Select Sales of Multinational Corporations, 2008 (in US \$)

Walmart Stores	\$379 billion
Royal Dutch Shell (U.K./Netherlands)	319 billion
General Motors (U.S.)	207 billion
Toyota (Japan)	205 billion
DaimlerChrysler (Germany/U.S.)	190 billion
General Electric (U.S.)	168 billion
Total (France)	168 billion
Siemens (Germany)	107 billion
IBM (U.S.)	91 billion
Nestlé (Switzerland)	80 billion
Sony (Japan)	71 billion

Source: "The Fortune Global 500," *Fortune*, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2008/full_list/.

corporations straddle international borders and sometimes command more economic resources than many states do (Table 1.1). At least 177 corporations have annual sales that are larger than the gross domestic product (GDP) of more than half the states in the world.¹⁰ The sales of companies such as Shell, Toyota, and Walmart are larger than the GDP of countries such as Hungary, Ecuador, and Senegal. While these multinational corporations lack some types of power such as military force, they are very relevant to a country's economic goals. In terms of the economy, IBM is more important to Belgium than is Burundi, a former Belgian colony.

A picture of the Middle East without the warring states and the outside powers would be downright silly, but it would also be woefully inadequate if it did not include a variety of nonstate actors. Multinational oil companies such as Shell, British Petroleum, and Exxon Mobil are one type of nonstate actor, but there are others. There are large intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations, and smaller ones such as the Arab League and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). There are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Cross and Amnesty International. There are also a variety of transnational ethnic groups, such as the Kurds who live in Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and the Armenians, all scattered throughout the Middle East and the Caucasus. Terrorist groups, drug cartels, and mafia organizations transcend national borders and often divide their resources among several states. International religious movements, particularly political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa, add a further dimension to the range of nonstate actors.

The question is not whether state or nonstate groups are more important—usually the states are—but how new, complex coalitions affect the politics of a region in a way that the traditional realist views fail to disclose. States are the major actors in current international politics, but they do not have the stage to themselves.

What about goals? Traditionally the dominant goal of states in an anarchic system is military security. Countries today obviously care about their military security, but they often care as much or more about their economic wealth (Table 1.2), about social issues such as stopping drug trafficking or the spread of AIDS, or about ecological changes. Moreover, as I noted above, as threats change, the definition of security changes; military security is not the only goal that states pursue. Looking at the relationship between the United States and Canada, where the prospects of war are exceedingly slim, a Canadian diplomat once said his fear was not that the United States would march into Canada and capture Toronto again as it did in 1813, but that Toronto would be programmed out of relevance by computers in Texas—a rather different dilemma from the traditional one of states in an anarchic system. Economic strength has not replaced military security (as Kuwait discovered when Iraq invaded in August 1990), but the agenda of international politics has become more complex as states pursue a wider range of goals, including human security.

Along with the goals, the *instruments* of international politics are also changing. The realist view is that military force is the only instrument that really matters. Describing the world before 1914, the British historian A. J. P. Taylor defined a great power as one able to prevail in war. States obviously use military force today, but the past half century has seen changes in its role. Many states, particularly large ones, find it more costly to use military force to achieve their goals than was true in earlier

TABLE 1.2 Estimated GDP of Select Countries, 2008
(US \$ in Purchasing Power Parity)

United States	\$14.3 trillion
China	7.8 trillion
Japan	4.3 trillion
India	3.3 trillion
Germany	2.8 trillion
Russia	2.2 trillion
Brazil	2.0 trillion
Indonesia	916 billion
Saudi Arabia	583 billion
Argentina	576 billion
South Africa	490 billion
Vietnam	242 billion
Iraq	113 billion
Guatemala	68 billion
Albania	22 billion
Jamaica	21 billion
Eritrea	4 billion

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2009.

times. As Professor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University has put it, the link between military strength and positive achievement has been loosened.

What are the reasons? One is that the ultimate means of military force, nuclear weaponry, is hopelessly muscle-bound. Although they once numbered more than 50,000, nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945. The disproportion between the vast devastation nuclear weapons can inflict and any reasonable political goal has made leaders understandably loath to employ them. So the ultimate form of military force is for all practical purposes too costly for national leaders to use in war.

Even conventional force has become more costly when used to rule nationalistic populations. In the nineteenth century, European countries conquered other parts of the globe by fielding a handful of soldiers armed with modern weapons and then administered their colonial possessions with relatively modest garrisons. But in an age of socially mobilized populations, it is difficult to rule an occupied country whose people feel strongly about their national identity. Americans found this out in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s; the Soviets discovered it in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Vietnam and Afghanistan had not become more powerful than the nuclear superpowers, but trying to rule these nationalistically aware populations was too expensive for either the United States or the Soviet Union. Foreign rule is very costly in an age of nationalism. In the nineteenth century, Britain was able to rule India with a handful of soldiers and civil servants, which would be impossible in today's world.

A third change in the role of force relates to internal constraints. Over time there has been a growing ethic of antimilitarism, particularly in democracies. Such views do not prevent the use of force, but they make it a politically risky choice for leaders, particularly when it is massive or prolonged. It is sometimes said that democracies will not accept casualties, but that is too simple. The United States, for example, expected some 10,000 casualties when it planned to enter the Gulf War in 1990, but it was loath to accept casualties in Somalia or Kosovo, where its national interests were less deeply involved. And if the use of force is seen as unjust or illegitimate in the eyes of other states, this can make it costly for political leaders in democratic polities. Force is not obsolete, and terrorist nonstate actors are less constrained than states by such moral concerns, but force is more costly and more difficult for most states to use than in the past.

Finally, a number of issues simply do not lend themselves to forceful solutions. Take, for example, economic relations between the United States and Japan. In 1853, Commodore Matthew Perry sailed into the harbor at Uraga and threatened bombardment unless Japan opened its ports to trade. This would not be a very useful or politically acceptable way to solve current U.S.-Japan trade disputes. Thus while force remains a critical instrument in international politics, it is not the only instrument. The use of economic interdependence, communication, international institutions, and transnational actors sometimes plays a larger role than force. Military force is not obsolete as a state instrument—witness the fighting in Afghanistan, where the Taliban government had sheltered the terrorist network that carried out the September 2001 attacks on the United States, or the American and British use

of force to overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003. But it was easier to win the war than to win the peace in Iraq, and military force alone is not sufficient to protect against terrorism. While military force remains the ultimate instrument in international politics, changes in its cost and effectiveness make today's international politics more complex.

The basic game of security goes on. Some political scientists argue that the balance of power is usually determined by a leading, or hegemonic state—such as Spain in the sixteenth century, France under Louis XIV, Britain in most of the nineteenth century, and the United States in most of the twentieth century. Eventually the top country will be challenged, and this challenge will lead to the kind of vast conflagrations we call hegemonic, or world, wars. After world wars, a new treaty sets the new framework of order: the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the League of Nations in 1919, and the United Nations in 1945. If nothing basic has changed in international politics since the struggle for supremacy between Athens and Sparta, will a new challenge lead to another world war, or is the cycle of hegemonic war over? Will a rising China challenge the United States? Has nuclear technology made world war too devastating? Has economic interdependence made it too costly? Will nonstate actors such as terrorists force governments to cooperate? Has global society made war socially and morally unthinkable? We have to hope so, because the next hegemonic war could be the last. But first, it is important to understand the case for continuity.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Thucydides is widely considered the father of realism, the perspective most people use when thinking about international politics even when they do not know they are thinking theoretically. Theories are the indispensable tools we use to organize facts. Many of today's leaders and editorial writers use realist theories even if they have not heard of Thucydides. A member of the Athenian elite who lived during Athens' greatest age, Thucydides participated in some of the events described in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Robert Gilpin, a notable realist, asserted, "In honesty, one must inquire whether or not twentieth-century students of international relations know anything that Thucydides and his fifth-century BCE compatriots did not know about the behavior of states." He then answered his own query: "Ultimately international politics can still be characterized as it was by Thucydides."¹¹ Gilpin's proposition is debatable, but to debate it, we must know what Thucydides said. And what better introduction to realist theory is there than one of history's great stories? However, like many great stories, it has its limits. One of the things we learn from the Peloponnesian War is to avoid too simplistic a reading of history.

A Short Version of a Long Story

Early in the fifth century BCE, Athens and Sparta (Figure 1.1) were allies that had cooperated to defeat the Persian Empire (480 BCE). Sparta was a conservative, land-oriented state that turned inward after the victory over Persia; Athens was a




FIGURE 1.1 Classical Greece

commercial and sea-oriented state that turned outward. In the middle of the century, Athens had 50 years of growth that led to the development of an Athenian empire. Athens formed the Delian League, an alliance of states around the Aegean Sea, for mutual protection against the Persians. Sparta, in turn, organized its neighbors on the Peloponnesian peninsula into a defensive alliance. States that had joined Athens freely for protection against the Persians soon had to pay taxes to the Athenians. Because of the growing strength of Athens and the resistance of some to its growing empire, a war broke out in 461, about 20 years after the Greek defeat of the Persians. By 445, the first Peloponnesian War ended and was followed by a treaty that promised peace for 30 years. Thus Greece enjoyed a period of stable peace before the second, more significant, Peloponnesian War.

In 434, a civil war broke out in the small, peripheral city-state of Epidamnus. Like a pebble that begins an avalanche, this event triggered a series of reactions that led ultimately to the Peloponnesian War. Large conflicts are often precipitated by relatively insignificant crises in out-of-the-way places, as we shall see when we discuss World War I.

In Epidamnus, the democrats fought with oligarchs over how the country would be ruled. The democrats appealed to the city-state of Corcyra, which had helped establish Epidamnus, but were turned down. They then turned to another city-state, Corinth, and the Corinthians decided to help. This angered the Corcyraeans, who sent a fleet to recapture Epidamnus, their former colony. In the process, the Corcyraeans defeated the Corinthian fleet. Corinth was outraged and declared war on Corcyra. Corcyra, fearing the attack from Corinth, turned to Athens for help. Both Corcyra and Corinth sent representatives to Athens.

The Athenians, after listening to both sides, were in a dilemma. They did not want to break the truce that had lasted for a decade, but if the Corinthians (who were close to the Peloponnesians) conquered Corcyra and took control of its large navy, the balance of power among the Greek states would be tipped against Athens. The Athenians felt they could not risk letting the Corcyraean navy fall into the hands of the Corinthians, so they decided to become “a little bit involved.” They launched a small endeavor to scare the Corinthians, sending ten ships with instructions not to fight unless attacked. But deterrence failed; Corinth attacked, and when the Corcyraeans began to lose the battle, the Athenian ships were drawn into the fray more than intended. The Athenian involvement infuriated Corinth, which in turn worried the Athenians. In particular, Athens worried that Corinth would stir



■ ■ Bust of Thucydides

up problems in Potidaea, which, although an Athenian ally, had historic ties to Corinth. Sparta promised to help Corinth if Athens attacked Potidaea. When a revolt did occur in Potidaea, Athens sent forces to put it down.

At that point there was a great debate in Sparta. The Athenians appealed to the Spartans to stay neutral. The Corinthians urged the Spartans to go to war and warned them against failing to check the rising power of Athens. Megara, another important city, agreed with Corinth because contrary to the treaty, the Athenians had banned Megara's trade. Sparta was torn, but the Spartans voted in favor of war, according to Thucydides, because they were afraid that if Athenian power was not checked, Athens might control the whole of Greece. Sparta went to war to maintain the balance of power among the Greek city-states.

Athens rejected Sparta's ultimatum, and war broke out in 431. The Athenian mood was one of imperial greatness, with pride and patriotism about their city and their social system, and optimism that they would prevail in the war. The early phase of the war came to a stalemate. A truce was declared after ten years (421), but the truce was fragile and war broke out again. In 413, Athens undertook a very risky venture. It sent two fleets and infantry to conquer Sicily, the great island off the south of Italy, which had a number of Greek colonies allied to Sparta. The result was a terrible defeat for the Athenians. At the same time Sparta received additional money from the Persians, who were only too happy to see Athens trounced. After the defeat in Sicily, Athens was internally divided. In 411 the oligarchs overthrew the democrats, and 400 of them attempted to rule Athens. These events were not the end, but Athens never really recovered. An Athenian naval victory in 410 was followed five years later by a Spartan naval victory, and by 404 Athens was compelled to sue for peace. Sparta demanded that Athens pull down the long walls that protected it from attack by land-based powers. Athens' power was broken.

Causes and Theories

This is a dramatic and powerful story. What caused the war? Thucydides is very clear. After recounting the various events in Epidamnus, Corcyra, and so forth, he said that those were not the real causes. What made the war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta.

Did Athens have a choice? With better foresight, could Athens have avoided this disaster? Pericles, the Athenian leader in the early days of the war, had an interesting answer for his fellow citizens. "[Y]our country has a right to your services in sustaining the glories of her position . . . You should remember also that what you are fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides, to recede is no longer possible . . . For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it was perhaps wrong, but to let it go is unsafe."¹² In other words, Pericles told Athenians that they had no choice. Perhaps they should not be where they were, but once they had an empire, there was not much they could do about it without even larger risks. Thus Pericles favored war. But there were other voices in Athens, such as those of the Athenian delegates to the debate in Sparta in 432 BCE who urged the

Spartans to “consider the vast influence of accident in war, before you are engaged in it.”¹³ That turned out to be good advice; why didn’t the Athenians heed their own counsel? Perhaps the Athenians were carried away by emotional patriotism or anger that clouded their reason. But there is a more interesting possibility: Perhaps the Athenians acted rationally but were caught in a security dilemma.

Security dilemmas are related to the essential characteristic of international politics: *anarchic organization*, the absence of a higher government. Under anarchy, independent action taken by one state to increase its security may make all states less secure. If one state builds its strength to make sure that another cannot threaten it, the other, seeing the first getting stronger, may build its strength to protect itself against the first. The result is that the independent effort of each to improve its security makes both more insecure. It is an ironic result, yet neither has acted irrationally. Neither has acted from anger or pride, but from fear caused by the threat perceived in the growth of the other. After all, building defenses is a rational response to a perceived threat. States could cooperate to avoid this security dilemma; that is, they could agree that neither should build up its defenses and all would be better off. If it seems obvious that states should cooperate, why don’t they?

An answer can be found in the game called the Prisoner’s Dilemma. (Security dilemmas are a specific type of Prisoner’s Dilemma.) The Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario goes like this: Imagine that somewhere the police arrest two men who have small amounts of drugs in their possession, which would probably result in one-year jail sentences. The police have good reason to believe these two are really drug dealers, but they do not have enough evidence for a conviction. As dealers, the two could easily get 25-year jail sentences. The police know that the testimony of one against the other would be sufficient to convict the other to a full sentence. The police offer to let each man off if he will testify that the other is a drug dealer. They tell them that if both testify, both will receive ten-year sentences. The police figure this way these dealers will be out of commission for ten years; otherwise they are both in jail for only a year and soon will be out selling drugs again.

The suspects are put in separate cells and are not allowed to communicate with each other. Each prisoner has the same dilemma: If the other stays silent, he can secure his own freedom by squealing on the other, sending him to jail for 25 years, and go free himself; or he can stay silent and spend a year in jail. But if both prisoners squeal, they each get ten years in jail. Each prisoner thinks, “No matter what the other guy does, I’m better off if I squeal. If he stays quiet, I go free if I squeal and spend a year in jail if I don’t. If he squeals, I get ten years if I squeal and 25 years if I don’t.” If both think this way, both will squeal and spend ten years in jail each. If they could trust each other not to squeal, however, they would both be much better off, spending only one year in jail.

That is the basic structural dilemma of independent rational action in a situation of this kind. If the two could talk to each other, they might agree to make a deal to stay silent and both spend one year in jail. But even if communication were possible, there would be another problem: trust and credibility. Continuing with the metaphor in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, each suspect could say to himself, “We are both drug dealers. I have seen the way the other acts. How do I know that after

we've made this deal, he won't say, 'Great! I've convinced him to stay quiet. Now I can get my best possible outcome: freedom!'" Similarly, in international politics the absence of communication and trust encourages states to provide for their own security, even though doing so may reduce all states to mutual insecurity. In other words, one state could say to another, "Don't build up your armaments and I will not build up my armaments, and we will both live happily ever after," but the second state may wonder whether it can afford to trust the first state.

The Athenian position in 432 looks very much like the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the middle of the century, the Athenians and Spartans agreed they were both better off having a truce. Even after the events in Epidamnus and the dispute between Corcyra and Corinth, the Athenians were reluctant to break it. The Corcyraeans ultimately convinced the Athenians with the following argument: "[T]here are but three considerable naval powers in Hellas [Greece], Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth, and that if you allow two of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus. But if you receive us, you will have our ships to reinforce you in the struggle."¹⁴

Should Athens have cooperated with the Peloponnesians by turning Corcyra down? If they had, what would have happened if the Peloponnesians had captured the Corcyraean fleet? Then the naval balance would have been two to one against Athens. Should Athens have trusted the Peloponnesians to keep their promises? The Athenians decided to ally with Corcyra, thereby risking the treaty—the equivalent of squealing on the other prisoner. Thucydides explains why: "For it began now to be felt that the coming of the Peloponnesian War was only a question of time, and no one was willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed to Corinth . . ."¹⁵

Inevitability and the Shadow of the Future

Ironically, the belief that war was inevitable played a major role in causing it. Athens felt that if the war was going to come, it was better to have two-to-one naval superiority rather than one-to-two naval inferiority. The belief that war was imminent and inevitable was critical to the decision. Why should that be so? Look again at the Prisoner's Dilemma. At first glance, it is best for each prisoner to cheat and let the other fellow be a sucker, but because each knows the situation, they also know that if they can trust each other, both should go for second best and cooperate by keeping silent. Cooperation is difficult to develop when playing the game only once. Playing a game time after time, people can learn to cooperate, but if it is a one-time game, whoever "defects" can get the reward and whoever trusts is a sucker. Political scientist Robert Axelrod played the Prisoner's Dilemma on a computer with different strategies. He found that after many games, on average the best results were obtained with a strategy he called *tit for tat*—"I will cooperate on my first move, and after that I will do to you what you last did to me. If on the first move you defect, I will defect. If you defect again, I should defect again. If you cooperate, I will cooperate. If you cooperate again, I cooperate again." Eventually, players find that the total benefit from the game is higher by learning to cooperate. But Axelrod

warns that tit for tat is a good strategy only when you have a chance to continue the game for a long period, when there is a “long shadow of the future.” On the last move, it is always rational to defect.

That is why the belief that war is inevitable is so corrosive in international politics. When you believe war is inevitable, you believe that you are very close to the last move, and you worry about whether you can still trust your opponent. If you suspect your opponent will defect, it is better to rely on yourself and take the risk of defecting rather than cooperating. That is what the Athenians did. Faced with the belief that war would occur, they decided they could not afford to trust the Corinthians or the Spartans. It was better to have the Corcyraean navy on their side than against them when it looked like the last move in the game and inevitable war.

Was the Peloponnesian War really inevitable? Thucydides had a pessimistic view of human nature: “I have written my work,” he wrote, “not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.”¹⁶ His history shows human nature caught in the situation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma then and for all time. Thucydides, like all historians, had to emphasize certain things and not others. Thucydides concluded that the cause of the war was the growth of the power of Athens and the fear it caused in Sparta. But the Yale classicist Donald Kagan argues that Athenian power was in fact *not* growing: Before the war broke out in 431 BCE the balance of power had begun to stabilize. And though, says Kagan, the Spartans worried about the rise of Athenian power, he contends they had an even greater fear of a slave revolt. Both Athens and Sparta were slave states and both feared that going to war might provide an opportunity for the slaves to revolt. The difference was that the slaves, or Helots, in Sparta were 90 percent of the population—far greater than Athens slave percentage—and the Spartans had recently experienced a Helot revolt in 464 BCE.

Thus the immediate or precipitating causes of the war, according to Kagan, were more important than Thucydides’ theory of inevitability admits. Corinth, for example, thought Athens would not fight; it misjudged the Athenian response, partly because it was so angry at Corcyra. Pericles overreacted; he made mistakes in giving an ultimatum to Potidaea and in punishing Megara by cutting off its trade. Those policy mistakes made the Spartans think that war might be worth the risk after all. Kagan argues that Athenian growth caused the first Peloponnesian War but that the Thirty-Year Truce doused that flame. So to start the second Peloponnesian War, “the spark of the Epidamnian trouble needed to land on one of the rare bits of flammable stuff that had not been thoroughly drenched. Thereafter it needed to be continually and vigorously fanned by the Corinthians, soon assisted by the Megarians, Potidaeans, Aeginetans, and the Spartan War Party. Even then the spark might have been extinguished had not the Athenians provided some additional fuel at the crucial moment.”¹⁷ In other words, the war was not caused by impersonal forces but by bad decisions in difficult circumstances.

It is perhaps impudent to question Thucydides, a father figure to historians, but very little is ever truly inevitable in history. Human behavior is voluntary, although there are always external constraints. Karl Marx observed that men make history, but not in conditions of their own choosing. The ancient Greeks made flawed

choices because they were caught in the situation well described by Thucydides and by the Prisoner's Dilemma. The security dilemma made war highly probable, but *highly probable* is not the same as *inevitable*. After all, the Joker in *The Dark Knight* constructed a version of the Prisoner's Dilemma for the passengers on the two Gotham City ferries wired with explosives, but they opted to cooperate rather than defect. The 30-year unlimited war that devastated Athens was not inevitable. Human decisions mattered. Accidents and personalities make a difference even if they work within limits set by the larger structure, the situation of insecurity that resembles the Prisoner's Dilemma.

What modern lessons can we learn from this ancient history? We need to be aware of both the continuities and the changes. Some structural features of international politics predispose events in one direction rather than another. That is why it is necessary to understand security dilemmas and the Prisoner's Dilemma. On the other hand, such situations do not prove that war is inevitable. There are degrees of freedom, and human decisions can sometimes prevent the worst outcomes. Cooperation does occur in international affairs, even though the general structure of anarchy often tends to discourage it.

It is also necessary to beware of patently shallow historical analogies. During the Cold War, it was often popular to say that because the United States was a democracy and a sea-based power while the Soviet Union was a land-based power and had slave labor camps, America was Athens and the Soviet Union was Sparta locked into replaying a great historical conflict. But such shallow analogies ignored the fact that ancient Athens was a slave-holding state, wracked with internal turmoil, and that democrats were not always in control. Moreover, unlike in the Cold War, Sparta won.

Another lesson is to be aware of the selectivity of historians. No one can tell the whole story of anything. Imagine trying to tell everything that happened in the last hour, much less the entire story of your life or a whole war. Too many things happened. A second-by-second account in which everything was reported would take much longer to tell than it took for the events to happen in the first place. Thus historians always abstract. To write history, even the history of the last hour or the last day, we must simplify. We must select. What we select is obviously affected by the values, inclinations, and theories in our minds, whether explicit or inchoate.

Historians are affected by their contemporary concerns. Thucydides was concerned about how Athenians were learning the lessons of the war, blaming Pericles and the democrats for miscalculating. He therefore stressed those aspects of the situation we have described as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Yet while these aspects of the war were important, they are not the whole story. Thucydides did not write much about Athenian relations with Persia, or the decree that cut off Megara's trade, or about Athens raising the amount of tribute that others in the Delian League had to pay. We have no reason to suspect that Thucydides' history was deliberately misleading or biased, but it is an example of how each age tends to rewrite history because the questions brought to the vast panoply of facts tend to change over time.

The need to select does not mean that everything is relative or that history is bunk. Such a conclusion is unwarranted. Good historians and social scientists do their best to ask questions honestly, objectively bringing facts to bear on their topic. But they and their students should be aware that what is selected is by necessity only

THE RISE OF CHINA

Ever since Thucydides' explanation of the Peloponnesian War, historians have known that the rise of a new power has been attended by uncertainty and anxieties. Often, though not always, violent conflict has followed. The rise in the economic and military power of China, the world's most populous country, will be a central question for Asia and for American foreign policy at the beginning of a new century. Explaining why democratic Athens decided to break a treaty that led to war, Thucydides pointed to the power of expectations of inevitable conflict. "The general belief was that whatever happened, war with the Peloponnese was bound to come," he wrote. Belief in the inevitability of conflict with China could have similar self-fulfilling effects.

—The Economist, June 27, 1998¹⁸

part of the story. Always ask what questions the writer was asking as well as whether he or she carefully and objectively ascertained the facts. Beware of biases. Choice is a very important part of history and of writing history. The cure to misunderstanding history is to read more, not less.

ETHICAL QUESTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Given the nature of the security dilemma, some realists believe that moral concerns play no role in international conflicts. However, ethics do play a role in international relations, although not quite the same role as in domestic politics.

Moral arguments have been used since the days of Thucydides. When Corcyra went to Athens to plead for help against Corinth, it used the language of ethics: "First, . . . your assistance will be rendered to a power which, herself inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Second, . . . you will give unforgettable proof of your goodwill and create in us a lasting sense of gratitude."¹⁹ Substitute *Bosnia* for *Corcyra* and *Serbia* for *Corinth*, and those words could be uttered in modern times.

Moral arguments move and constrain people. In that sense, morality is a powerful reality. However, moral arguments can also be used rhetorically as propaganda to disguise less elevated motives, and those with more power are often able to ignore moral considerations. During the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians sailed to the island of Melos to suppress a revolt. In 416 BCE, the Athenian spokesmen told the Melians that they could fight and die or they could surrender. When the Melians protested that they were fighting for their freedom, the Athenians responded that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."²⁰ In essence, the Athenians stated that in a realist world, morality has little place. Might makes right. When Iraq invades Kuwait, or the United States invades Grenada or Panama, or the Indonesians suppress a revolt in East Timor, they all to some degree employ similar logic. But, in the modern world, it is increasingly less acceptable to state one's motives as plainly as Thucydides suggests the Athenians did in Melos. Does this

mean that morality has come to occupy a more prominent place in international relations, or simply that states have become more adept at propaganda? Has international politics changed dramatically, with states more attuned to ethical concerns, or is there a clear continuity between the actions of the Athenians 2,500 years ago and the actions of Iraq or Serbia in the late twentieth century?

Moral arguments are not all equal. Some are more compelling than others. We ask whether they are logical and consistent. For instance, when the activist Phyllis Schlafly argued that nuclear weapons are a good thing because God gave them to the free world, we should wonder why God also gave them to Stalin's Soviet Union and Mao's China.

A basic touchstone for many moral arguments is impartiality—the view that all interests are judged by the same criteria. Your interests deserve the same attention as mine. Within this framework of impartiality, however, there are two different traditions in Western political culture about how to judge moral arguments. One descends from Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth-century German philosopher, the other from British utilitarians of the early nineteenth century such as Jeremy Bentham. As an illustration of the two approaches, imagine walking into a poor village and finding that a military officer is about to shoot three people lined up against the wall. You ask, “Why are you shooting these peasants? They look quite harmless.” The officer says, “Last night somebody in this village shot one of my men. I know somebody in this village is guilty, so I am going to shoot these three to set an example.” You say, “You can't do that! You're going to kill an innocent person. If only one shot was fired, then at least two of these people are innocent, perhaps all three. You just can't do that.” The officer takes a rifle from one of his men and hands it to you saying, “If you shoot one of them for me, I'll let the other two go. You can save two lives if you will shoot one of them. I'm going to teach you that in civil war you can't have these holier-than-thou attitudes.”

What are you going to do? You could try to mow down all the troops in a Rambo-like move, but the officer has a soldier aiming his gun at you. So your choice is to kill one innocent person in order to save two or to drop the gun and have clean hands. The Kantian tradition says that all deliberate killing is wrong, so you should refuse to perpetrate the evil deed. The utilitarian tradition suggests that if you can save two lives, you should do it. Now, suppose that you sympathize with the Kantian perspective; imagine now that the numbers were increased. Suppose there were 100 people against the wall. Or imagine you could save a city full of people from a terrorist's bomb by shooting one possibly innocent person. Should you refuse to save a million people in order to keep your hands and conscience clean? At some point, consequences matter. Moral arguments can be judged in three ways: by the motives or intentions involved, by the means used, and by their consequences or net effects. Although these dimensions are not always easily reconciled, good moral argument tries to take all three into account.

Limits on Ethics in International Relations

Ethics plays less of a role in international politics than in domestic politics for four reasons. One is the weak international consensus on values. There are cultural and religious differences over the justice of some acts. Second, states are not like individuals.

States are abstractions, and although their leaders are individuals, statesmen are judged differently than when they act as individuals. For instance, when picking a roommate, most people want a person who believes “thou shalt not kill.” But the same people might vote against a presidential candidate who said, “Under no circumstances will I ever take an action that will lead to a death.” A president is entrusted by citizens to protect their interests, and under some circumstances this may require the use of force. Presidents who saved their own souls but failed to protect their people would not be good trustees.

In private morality, sacrifice may be the highest proof of a moral action, but should leaders sacrifice their whole people? During the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians told the leaders of the island of Melos that if they resisted, Athens would kill all the men and sell the women and children into slavery. Melos resisted and was destroyed. Should they have come to terms? In 1962, should President Kennedy have run a risk of nuclear war to force the Soviets to remove missiles from Cuba when the United States had similar missiles in Turkey? Different people may answer these questions differently. The point is, when individuals act as leaders of states, their actions are judged somewhat differently.

A third reason ethics plays a lesser role in international politics is the complexity of causation. It is hard enough to know the consequences of actions in domestic affairs, but international relations has another layer of complexity: the interaction of states. That extra dimension makes it harder to predict consequences accurately. A famous example is the 1933 debate among students at the Oxford Union, the debating society of Oxford University. Mindful of the 20 million people killed in World War I, the majority of students voted for a resolution that they would never again fight for king and country. But someone else was listening: Adolf Hitler. He concluded that democracies were soft and that he could press them as hard as he wanted because they would not fight back. In the end, he pressed too far and the result was World War II, a consequence not desired or expected by those students who voted never to fight for king and country. Many later did, and many died.

A more trivial example is the “hamburger argument” of the early 1970s, when people were worried about shortages of food in the world. A number of students in American colleges said, “When we go to the dining hall, refuse to eat meat because a pound of beef equals eight pounds of grain, which could be used to feed poor people around the world.” Many students stopped eating hamburger and felt good about themselves, but they did not help starving people in Africa or Bangladesh one bit. Why not? The grain freed up by not eating hamburgers in America did not reach the starving people in Bangladesh because those starving had no money to buy the grain. The grain was simply a surplus on the American market, which meant American prices went down and farmers produced less. To help peasants in Bangladesh required getting money to them so they could buy some of the excess grain. By launching a campaign against eating hamburger and failing to look at the complexity of the causal chain that would relate their well-intended act to its consequences, the students failed.

Finally, there is the argument that the institutions of international society are particularly weak and that the disjunction between order and justice is greater in international than in domestic politics. Order and justice are both important. In a domestic polity we tend to take order for granted. In fact, sometimes protesters

purposefully disrupt order for the sake of promoting their view of justice. But if there is total disorder, it is very hard to have any justice; witness the bombing, kidnapping, and killing by all sides in Lebanon in the 1980s or in Somalia since the end of the Cold War. Some degree of order is a prior condition for justice. In international politics, the absence of a common legislature, central executive, or strong judiciary makes it much harder to preserve the order that precedes justice.

Three Views of the Role of Morality

At least three different views of ethics exist in international relations: those of the *skeptics*, the *state moralists*, and the *cosmopolitans*. Although there is no logical connection, people who are realists in their descriptive analysis of world politics often tend to be either skeptics or state moralists in their evaluative approach, whereas those who emphasize a liberal analysis tend toward either the state moralist or cosmopolitan moral viewpoints.

Skeptics. The skeptic says that moral categories have no meaning in international relations because no institutions exist to provide order. In addition, there is no sense of community, and therefore no moral rights and duties. For the skeptics, the classic statement about ethics in international politics was the Athenians' response to the Melians' plea for mercy: "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Might makes right. And that, for the skeptics, is all there is to say.

Philosophers often say that *ought* (moral obligation) implies *can* (the capacity to do something). Morality requires choice. If something is impossible, we cannot have an obligation to do it. If international relations are simply the realm of "kill or be killed," then presumably there is no choice, and that would justify the skeptics' position. But international politics consists of more than mere survival. If choices exist in international relations, pretending choices do not exist is merely a disguised form of choice. To think only in terms of narrow national interests is simply smuggling in values without admitting it. The French diplomat who once told me, "What is moral is whatever is good for France," was ducking hard choices about why only French interests should be considered. The leader who says, "I had no choice," often did have a choice, albeit not a pleasant one. If there is some degree of order and of community in international relations—if it is not constantly "kill or be killed"—then there is room for choices. Anarchy means "without government," but it does not necessarily mean chaos or total disorder. There are rudimentary practices and institutions that provide enough order to allow some important choices: balance of power, international law, and international organizations. Each is critical to understanding why the skeptical argument is not sufficient.

Thomas Hobbes argued that to escape from "the state of nature" in which anyone might kill anyone else, individuals give up their freedom to a "leviathan," or government, for protection, because life in the state of nature is nasty, brutish, and short. Why then don't states form a superleviathan? Why isn't there a world government? The reason, Hobbes said, is that insecurity is not so great at the international level as at the individual level. Governments provide some degree of protection

against the brutality of the biggest individuals taking whatever they want, and the balance of power among states provides some degree of order. Even though states are in a hostile posture of potential war, “they still uphold the daily industry of their subjects.” The international state of nature does not create the day-to-day misery that would accompany a state of nature among individuals. In other words, Hobbes believed that the existence of states in a balance of power alleviates the condition of international anarchy enough to allow some degree of order.

Liberals point further to the existence of international law and customs. Even if rudimentary, such rules put a burden of proof on those who break them. Consider the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990. Saddam Hussein claimed that he annexed Kuwait to recover a province stolen from Iraq in colonial times. But because international law forbids crossing borders for such reasons, an overwhelming majority of states viewed his action as a violation of the UN charter. The twelve resolutions passed by the UN Security Council showed clearly that Saddam’s view of the situation ran against international norms. Law and norms did not stop Saddam from invading Kuwait, but they did make it more difficult for him to recruit support, and they contributed to the creation of the coalition that expelled him from Kuwait.

International institutions, even if rudimentary, also provide a degree of order by facilitating and encouraging communication and some degree of reciprocity in bargaining. Given this situation of nearly constant communication, international politics is not always, as the skeptics claim, “kill or be killed.” The energies and attention of leaders are not focused on security and survival all the time. Cooperation (as well as conflict) occurs in large areas of economic, social, and military interaction. And even though cultural differences exist about the notion of justice, moral arguments take place in international politics and principles are enshrined in international law.

Even in the extreme circumstances of war, law and morality may sometimes play a role. *Just war doctrine*, which originated in the early Christian church and became secularized after the seventeenth century, prohibits the killing of innocent civilians. The prohibition on killing innocents starts from the premise “thou shalt not kill.” But if that is a basic moral premise, how is any killing ever justified? Absolute pacifists say that no one should kill anyone else for any reason. Usually this is asserted on Kantian grounds, but some pacifists add a consequentialist argument that “violence only begets more violence.” Sometimes, however, the failure to respond to violence can also beget more violence. For example, it is unlikely that Osama bin Laden would have left the United States alone if President George W. Bush had turned the other cheek after September 11. In contrast to pacifism, the just war tradition combines a concern for the intentions, means, and consequences of actions. It argues that if someone is about to kill you and you refuse to act in self-defense, the result is that evil will prevail. By refusing to defend themselves, the good die. If one is in imminent peril of being killed, it can be moral to kill in self-defense. But we must distinguish between those who can be killed and those who cannot be killed. For example, if a soldier rushes at me with a rifle, I can kill him in self-defense, but the minute the soldier drops the rifle, puts up his hands, and says, “I surrender,” he is a prisoner of war and I have no right to take his life. In fact, this is enshrined in international law, and also in the U.S. military code. An American soldier who shoots an

enemy soldier after he surrenders can be tried for murder in an American court. Some American officers in the Vietnam and Iraq Wars were sent to prison for violating such laws. The prohibition against intentionally killing people who pose no harm also helps explain why terrorism is wrong. Some skeptics argue that “one man’s terrorist is just another man’s freedom fighter.” However, under just war doctrine, you can fight for freedom, but you cannot target innocent civilians. Though they are often violated, some norms exist even under the harshest international circumstances. The rudimentary sense of justice enshrined in an imperfectly obeyed international law belies the skeptics’ argument that no choices exist in a situation of war.

We can therefore reject complete skepticism because some room exists for morality in international politics. Morality is about choice, and meaningful choice varies with the conditions of survival. The greater the threats to survival, the less room for moral choice. At the start of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians argued, “[P]raise is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their position compels them to do.”²¹ Unfortunately, the Athenians lost sight of that wisdom later in their war, but it reminds us that situations with absolutely no choice are rare and that national security and degrees of threat are often ambiguous. Skeptics avoid hard moral choices by pretending otherwise. To sum up in an aphorism: Humans may not live wholly by the word, but neither do they live solely by the sword.

JUST WAR DOCTRINE

Classical just war doctrine grew out of the Roman and Christian traditions. Cicero, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas were key early thinkers. Today just war doctrine has broad appeal. There are many possible formulations, but all have two components: principles of *jus ad bellum*, which specify the conditions under which it is morally permissible to use force; and principles of *jus in bello*, which specify how force may be used morally.

The five standard principles of *jus ad bellum* include (1) just cause, (2) right intention, (3) legitimate authority, (4) last resort, and (5) reasonable chance of success. Over the centuries, interpretations of these principles have changed. Just cause used to be restricted almost entirely to self-defense, for example, but today may include counterintervention or preventing humanitarian catastrophe. Kings and emperors used to enjoy unquestioned legitimate authority, but increasingly world opinion requires the approval of an international body such as the United Nations Security Council.

The three main principles of *jus in bello* are (1) observe the laws of war, (2) maintain proportionality, and (3) observe the principle of noncombatant immunity. The laws of war have also evolved over the centuries and represent a much more stringent set of constraints today than in medieval times. Modern military technology makes it more difficult in some respects to maintain proportionality and protect innocent civilians, since the destructive power of modern weaponry is vastly greater than in the age of the sword and spear, but modern precision-guided munitions and advanced battlefield management systems can compensate for this to some extent.

Many writers and leaders who are realists in their descriptive analysis are also skeptics in their views about values in world politics. But not all realists are complete skeptics. Some recognize that moral obligations exist, but say that order has to come first. Peace is a moral priority, even if it is an unjust peace. The disorder of war makes justice difficult, especially in the nuclear age. The best way to preserve order is to preserve a balance of power among states. Moral crusades disrupt balances of power. For example, if the United States becomes too concerned about spreading democracy or human rights throughout the world, it may create disorder that will actually do more damage than good in the long run.

The realists have a valid argument, up to a point. International order is important, but it is a matter of degrees, and there are trade-offs between justice and order. How much order is necessary before we start worrying about justice? For example, after the 1990 Soviet crackdown in the Baltic republics in which a number of people were killed, some Americans urged a break in relations with the Soviet Union. In their view, Americans should express their values of democracy and human rights in foreign policy, even if that meant instability and the end of arms control talks. Others argued that while concerns for peace and for human rights were important, it was more important to control nuclear weapons and negotiate an arms reduction treaty. In the end, the American government went ahead with the arms negotiations, but linked the provision of economic aid to respect for human rights. Over and over in international politics, the question is not absolute order versus justice, but how to trade off choices in particular situations. The realists have a valid point of view, but they overstate it when they argue that it has to be all order before any justice.

State Moralists. *State moralists* argue that international politics rests on a society of states with certain rules, although those rules are not always perfectly obeyed. The most important rule is state sovereignty, which prohibits states from intervening across borders into each others' jurisdiction. The political scientist Michael Walzer, for example, argues that national boundaries have a moral significance because states represent the pooled rights of individuals who have come together for a common life. Thus respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states is related to respect for individuals. Others argue more simply that respect for sovereignty is the best way to preserve order. "Good fences make good neighbors," in the words of the poet Robert Frost.

In practice, these rules of state behavior are frequently violated. In the last few decades, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, China invaded Vietnam, Tanzania invaded Uganda, Israel invaded Lebanon, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the United States invaded Grenada and Panama, Iraq invaded Iran and Kuwait, the United States and Britain invaded Iraq, and NATO bombed Serbia because of its mistreatment of ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo—to name just a few examples. Determining when it is appropriate to respect another state's sovereignty is a long-standing challenge. In 1979, Americans condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in strong moral terms. The Soviets responded by pointing to the Dominican Republic, where in 1965 the United States sent 25,000 troops to prevent the formation of a communist government. The intention behind the American

intervention in the Dominican Republic, preventing a hostile regime from coming to power in the Caribbean, and the intention of the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, preventing the formation of a hostile government on its border, were quite similar.

To find differences, we have to look further than intentions. In terms of the means used, very few people were killed by the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, and the Americans soon withdrew. In the Afghan case, many people were killed, and the Soviet forces remained for nearly a decade. In the 1990s, some critics compared the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with the American invasion of Panama. In December 1989, the United States sent troops to overthrow the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, and in August 1990, Iraq sent troops into Kuwait to overthrow the emir. Both the United States and Iraq violated the rule of nonintervention. But again there were differences in means and consequences. In Panama, the Americans put into office a government that had been duly elected but that Noriega had not permitted to take power. The Americans did not try to annex Panama. In Kuwait, the Iraqi government tried to annex the country and caused much bloodshed in the process. Such considerations do not mean that the Panama case was all right or all wrong, but as we will see in Chapter 6, problems often arise when applying simple rules of nonintervention and sovereignty.

Cosmopolitans. *Cosmopolitans* such as the political theorist Charles Beitz see international politics not just as a society of states, but as a society of individuals. When we speak about justice, say the cosmopolitans, we should speak about justice for individuals. They argue that realists focus too much on issues of war and peace. Cosmopolitans contend that if realists focused on issues of distributive justice—that

INTERVENTION

Imagine the following scene in Afghanistan in December 1979:

An Afghan communist leader came to power promoting a platform of greater independence from the Soviet Union. This worried Soviet leaders because an independent regime on their border might foment trouble throughout Central Asia (including Soviet Central Asia) and would create a dangerous precedent of a small communist neighbor escaping the Soviet Empire. Imagine the Russian general in charge of the Soviet invasion force confronting the renegade Afghan leader, whom he is about to kill, explaining why he is doing these things against the international rules of sovereignty and nonintervention. "As far as right goes, other countries in our sphere of influence think one has as much of it as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are a border state and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in thwarting the masters of Central Asia."

Thus spoke the Athenians to the leaders of Melos (5.97), with but minor substitutions! Intervention is not a new problem.

is, who gets what—they would notice the interdependence of the global economy. Constant economic intervention across borders can sometimes have life-or-death consequences. For example, it is a life-or-death matter if you are a peasant in the Philippines and your child dies of a curable disease because the local boy who went to medical school is now working in the United States for a much higher salary.

Cosmopolitans argue that national boundaries have no moral standing; they simply defend an inequality that should be abolished if we think in terms of distributive justice. Realists (who include both moral skeptics and some state moralists) reply that the danger in the cosmopolitans' approach is that it may lead to enormous disorder. Taken literally, efforts at radical redistribution of resources are likely to lead to violent conflict, because people do not give up their wealth easily. A more limited cosmopolitan argument rests on the fact that people often have multiple loyalties—to families, friends, neighborhoods, and nations; perhaps to some transnational religious groups; and to the concept of common humanity. Most people are moved by pictures of starving Somali children or Darfur refugees, for some common community exists beyond the national level, albeit a weaker one. We are all humans.

Cosmopolitans remind us of the distributive dimensions to international relations in which morality matters as much in peace as in war. Policies can be designed to assist basic human needs and basic human rights without destroying order. And in cases of gross abuse of human rights, cosmopolitan views have been written into international laws such as the international convention against genocide. As a result, policy makers are more conscious of moral concerns. For example, President Bill Clinton has said that one of his worst mistakes was not to have done more to stop genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and the United States and other countries have supported African peacekeeping troops in efforts to suppress genocidal violence in the Sudanese province of Darfur.

Of the approaches to international morality, the skeptic makes a valid point about order being necessary for justice but misses the trade-offs between order and justice. The state moralist who sees a society of states with rules against intervention illustrates an institutional approach to order but does not provide enough answers regarding when some interventions may be justified. Finally, the cosmopolitan who focuses on a society of individuals has a profound insight about common humanity but runs the risk of fomenting enormous disorder by pursuing massive redistributive policies. Most people develop a hybrid position; labels are less important than the central point that trade-offs exist among these approaches.

Because of the differences between domestic and international politics, morality is harder to apply in international politics. But just because there is a plurality of principles, it does not follow that there are no principles at all. How far should we go in applying morality to international politics? The answer is to be careful, for when moral judgments determine everything, morality can lead to a sense of outrage, and outrage can lead to heightened risk. Prudence can be a virtue, particularly when the alternative is disastrous unintended consequences. After all, there are no moral questions among the dead. But we cannot honestly ignore morality in international politics. Each person must study events and make his or her own decisions about judgments and trade-offs. The enduring logic of international conflict does not remove the

responsibility for moral choices, although it does require an understanding of the special setting that makes those choices difficult.

While the specific moral and security dilemmas of the Peloponnesian War are unique, many of the issues recur over history. As we trace the evolution of international relations, we will see again and again the tension between realism and liberalism, between skeptics and cosmopolitans, between an anarchic system of states and international organizations. We will revisit the Prisoner's Dilemma and continue to grapple with the ethical conundrums of war. We will see how different actors on the world stage have approached the crises of their time and how their goals and instruments vary. As mentioned at the outset, certain variables that characterize international politics today simply did not exist in Thucydides' day: no nuclear weapons; no United Nations; no Internet; no transnational corporations; no cartels. The study of international conflict is an inexact science combining history and theory. In weaving our way through theories and examples, we try to keep in mind both what has changed and what has remained constant so we may better understand our past and our present and better navigate the unknown shoals of the future.

CHRONOLOGY: PELOPONNESIAN WARS

■ 490 BCE	First Persian War
■ 480 BCE	Second Persian War
■ 478 BCE	Spartans abdicate leadership
■ 476 BCE	Formation of Delian League and Athenian Empire
■ 464 BCE	Helot revolt in Sparta
■ 461 BCE	Outbreak of first Peloponnesian War
■ 445 BCE	Thirty-Year Truce
■ 445–434 BCE	Ten years of peace
■ 434 BCE	Epidamnus and Corcyra conflicts
■ 433 BCE	Athens intervenes in Potidaea
■ 432 BCE	Spartan Assembly debates war
■ 431 BCE	Outbreak of second Peloponnesian War
■ 430 BCE	Pericles' Funeral Oration
■ 416 BCE	Melian dialogue
■ 413 BCE	Athens' defeat in Sicily
■ 411 BCE	Oligarchs revolt in Athens
■ 404 BCE	Athens defeated, forced to pull down walls

Exercises

Apply what you learned in this chapter by using the online resources on MyPoliSciKit (www.mypoliscikit.com).



Practice Tests



Flashcards



Videos:

- “China’s Tibet Policy”
- “The Cuban Missile Crisis”



Simulation: “Why Study International Relations?”

Study Questions

1. What role should ethical considerations play in the conduct of international relations? What role *do* they play? Can we speak meaningfully about moral duties to other countries or their populations? What are America’s moral obligations in Iraq? in Afghanistan?
2. How well did the Iraq war satisfy the principles of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*? What about Afghanistan?
3. Is there a difference between moral obligations in the realms of domestic politics and international politics? On the basis of the Melian dialogue, did the Athenians act ethically? Did the Melian elders?
4. What is realism? How does it differ from the liberal view of world politics? What does constructivism add to realism and liberalism?
5. What does Thucydides pinpoint as the main causes of the Peloponnesian War? Which were immediate? Which were underlying?
6. What sort of theory of international relations is implicit in Thucydides’ account of the war?
7. Was the Peloponnesian War inevitable? If so, why and when? If not, how and when might it have been prevented?

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Notes

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2. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. MacPherson (London: Penguin, 1981), p. 186.
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4. Miles Kahler, "Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory After 1945," in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977), p. 38.
5. Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, Debates and Future Directions," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003).
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7. Jacqui True, "Feminism," in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, eds., *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 233.
8. Michael Barnett, "Social Constructivism" in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 260.
9. John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (London: Macmillan, 1936), p. 383.
10. Sales and GDP are different measures, so the comparison is imperfect. Nonetheless, it understates the importance of corporations, since corporate sales are a component of GDP.
11. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 227–228.
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13. 1.78; in *ibid.*, p. 44.
14. 1.36; *ibid.*, p. 24.
15. 1.44; *ibid.*, p. 28.
16. 1.22; *ibid.*, p. 16.
17. Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 354. For an alternative interpretation of the realities of Athenian expansion, see G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 60, 201–203.
18. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "As China Rises, Must Others Bow?" *The Economist*, June 27, 1998, p. 23.
19. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* 1.33, p. 22.
20. 5.89; *ibid.*, p. 352.
21. 1.76; *ibid.*, p. 43.