The traditional “brotherhood” of prime ministers is today increasingly frequently including women. Here Thailand’s prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra is seen at her political party’s headquarters in Bangkok, July 8, 2011.

Rachen Sageamsak/XinHua/Xinhua Press/Corbis
LEARNING OBJECTIVES

- Discuss various roles that are played by the political executive.
- Explain the distinction between presidential and parliamentary executive models.
- Illustrate presidential systems’ bases of power.
- Articulate the role of political parties in presidential systems.
- Trace the development of the parliamentary executive.
- Highlight the changing role of the monarchy.
- Offer an analysis of constitutional monarchy.
- Understand the process of the selection of the chief executive in a parliamentary system.
- Give details about the relationship of power between legislative supremacy and cabinet supremacy.
- Make clear the process of formation of coalition governments.
- Offer a comparison of presidential and parliamentary executive structures: Which is better?
- Describe the potential role of the military in politics.
- Understand the role of Public Administration and the Bureaucracy in politics.

INTRODUCTION: THE EXECUTIVE ROLES

When John Locke wrote that the state of nature lacked “power to back and support” the sentence of a national judiciary, he was speaking of an executive power. There is much difference, however, between the kind of executive power that Locke had in mind and the kind of political executive that we find in most contemporary political systems.

What does an executive do in a political system today? In his classic study of the American presidency, Clinton Rossiter listed ten distinct, identifiable
roles that the president is expected to play in the American political arena, and these roles transfer to the parliamentary system, too:

When we look at this list of duties that the president performs, we must marvel that anyone is able to handle the demands of the office. Indeed, this was one of the major themes of Rossiter’s study. Wouldn’t a political system be more efficiently run if it hired a crew of executives to handle all of these jobs? Actually, the concept of a multiple executive is not new; in a number of different contexts in history the multiple executive has been tried. At the Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, where the American Constitution was created, the idea of a multiple executive was suggested. It was rejected, however, because history had shown that it might tend to (1) cause divisiveness when a difficult decision needed to be made, and (2) obscure responsibility, or culpability, since blame for a bad decision might be difficult to attribute to a single individual.3

In fact, Rossiter’s list of ten roles for the president may be more detailed than is necessary. Political history has shown that we really only need to separate the executive role into two components: a symbolic role, and a political role.4 In the symbolic role, the executive represents the dignity of the state. The executive lays wreaths on tombs, makes national proclamations, and generally serves a ceremonial function. In the political role, the chief executive “manages the national business,” and makes the hard political decisions that need to be made, being the owner of the desk where “the buck stops.”5

There are, generally speaking, four approaches to the executive institution that are found in political systems around the world, two of which we shall examine at this time. We will see in greater detail in the second part of this text that all political systems have their idiosyncratic differences, but at this stage of our study we are concerned with explaining the general models.

One general type of political executive can be referred to as the presidential model of executive, and the other type of political executive can be referred to as the “Westminster” parliamentary-cabinet form of executive. Later in this text we will add discussion of the French parliamentary-cabinet model and the collective executive model (although the model that was developed in the former Soviet Union has become virtually extinct in recent years); these are variations on the two models we shall discuss at this time. As we did with our discussion of legislatures, we will preface our descriptions of executives by saying that what we are about to describe will vary in specific detail from country to country.

1. Chief of State  
2. Chief Executive  
3. Commander-in-Chief  
4. Chief Diplomat  
5. Chief Legislator  
6. Chief of Party  
7. Voice of the People  
8. Protector of Peace  
9. Manager of Prosperity  
10. World Leader
THE PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY EXECUTIVES

The type of political executive that American students know best is the presidential executive. American students are often surprised to learn, however, that the presidential model of executive behavior is in a minority beyond the borders of the United States.

The presidential executive model centralizes both political power and symbolic authority in one individual, the president. The president is the individual presiding at ceremonial functions, and it is the president who symbolizes the nation in the eyes of the rest of the world. The president is the head of state. Foreign diplomats present their credentials to him. (Although a number of countries have had women presidents, we will use the masculine pronoun here.) He presents the State of the Union message to the Congress each year. He throws out the first baseball to open the baseball season.  

Presidential systems do not separate the symbolic and the business functions of the office. Some have suggested that since the American government has the institution of the vice presidency, which has few constitutional duties and the primary significance of which is not in what it is but in what it might become, a good use of the vice president might be to assign to him or her the ceremonial duties of office and leave the president to important decision-making duties. The problem is that vice presidents do not want to spend all of their time at funerals and ceremonies. Moreover, the public does not accept the idea either; the vice president is, after all, the second officer of American government, not the first, and the public wants to see the president.

The strength of the presidency is in its independence. In the American system, the model for presidential systems elsewhere, the chief executive is elected independently from the legislature. Presidential elections in the United States are held every four years, no more frequently and no less frequently. It is the fixed term of the president and the corresponding security in office that contribute in a significant way to the president’s base of power.

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FIGURE 4.1
Presidential Systems’ Bases of Power
As indicated in Figure 4.1, the president is independently elected on the basis of popular election. The American political system has an additional structure between the populace and the president, the electoral college, which officially elects the president. The genesis of the electoral college is based upon the Founders’ distrust of popular will. The Founders felt that by having voters choose electors, who would subsequently cast ballots for the presidency, their concern could be resolved. Recent American political history—including the quite extraordinary presidential election of 2000—has shown the electoral college to be an anachronistic institution, and efforts are regularly undertaken to do away with the institution and to have the president directly elected by the public. Most other presidential systems do not have an electoral college structure, but instead have voters cast their votes directly for the presidential candidates campaigning for office.

The fact that the American public votes in several different electoral contests—one for the president and vice president (literally for electors for the president and vice president), and once for the House of Representatives (all seats in the House of Representatives come up for reelection every two years), and, where a contest is held, once for the Senate (Senate seats have six-year terms and are staggered so that both seats in any given state are not up for election at the same time)—is quite significant for a number of reasons. First, it gives the president an independent power base. Short of the process of impeachment, which history had shown until the term of President Bill Clinton could be instituted only for high crimes and treason and not simply for reasons of political opposition, the president does not depend upon either the legislature or public opinion for continuation of his four-year term. Once he is in office, this individual remains in office until the term is completed. This allows the president to take actions that may be unpopular with both the public and the legislature in the short term, but which the president feels, nonetheless, are the right actions to take.

A second point to note is that this relationship works in the other direction, too. That is, legislators are chosen by the people, not by the president; as long as they keep their constituencies happy they can act independently of the president, and there is virtually nothing that the president can do to them. As indicated, members of the House of Representatives are elected for two-year terms, and although the president may threaten not to campaign for them in the next election (or even may threaten to campaign against them) if they don’t do what he wants, the president cannot directly affect the duration of their time in office. He cannot fire them, as most prime ministers can threaten to do with members of parliament in their political systems. And, their more frequent election allows the public the opportunity to send a message to the government with the more frequent turnover of the House, such as took place in 2010 with the electoral repudiation of some of the policies of President Barack Obama who was elected in 2008.

Senators are elected to six-year terms, and they, in a similar manner, are secure in their office. A president might be angry when a senator from his party fails to support the president’s legislation in the Senate, but there is little the president can do to directly punish a recalcitrant senator, short of threatening to withhold future support.

A third significant point to note is that this structural independence of the branches of government (depicted in Figure 4.1) can have negative consequences.
Because both the executive and legislative branches of government have secure tenure in office, they can frustrate each other, but that is all they can do. The president can veto acts of Congress, but Congress can override the presidential veto. (The president of the United States does not have an “absolute” veto that is impossible to override, although presidents in some other systems do possess such absolute vetoes.) Congress can refuse to pass a legislative request of the president, but the president can often try to accomplish his goals through executive decrees, executive agreements, and similar unilateral executive actions.

It is important to recall that the president is not part of the legislative branch of government, and cannot, literally, take part in the legislative process. Only senators can introduce bills in the Senate, and only representatives can introduce bills in the House. If the president is unable to find a legislative “sponsor” for a bill (something that, realistically, is unimaginable!), he would be unable to introduce new legislation. This situation can deteriorate to a point of immobilism; each actor has enough power to block the other, but not enough to achieve its own objectives, which means that it is possible that nothing will be accomplished. This situation is most evident in the United States when the executive and legislative branches of government are controlled by the two major political parties. When Richard Nixon (a Republican) was president he faced a Senate and House controlled by Democrats; the relationship between the two branches of government was often tense. This was repeated during the term of (Republican) Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. For some of that time, Congress was partly controlled by Democrats (a Republican-controlled Senate and a Democratic-controlled House), and for some of that time it was fully controlled by a Democratic majority in both houses. This situation continued through the presidency of George H. W. Bush. Although Nixon, Reagan, and Bush were able to get the support of some Southern (and other more conservative) Democrats, as a general rule much tension existed between the two branches. The same general situation existed with (Democrat) Bill Clinton facing Republican majorities in both Houses of Congress through most of the 1990’s.

Following the midterm election of 2010, the Democratic control of the White House and both houses of Congress ended, and the Republican party controlled the House of Representatives with a significant majority. This had significant results in terms of President Barack Obama’s ability to press forward with legislation on a strictly partisan basis as he had done during his first two years as president.

Party difference is not a requirement for this kind of tension, however. The four years of Jimmy Carter (a Democratic president with a Democratic Congress) were not terribly productive, either, and often witnessed the same tension, despite the fact that both branches were controlled by Democrats. After his inauguration, Carter proposed an energy program, labeled as “the moral equivalent of war.” By the time the Congress acted, (over two years later), Carter’s original legislative proposals bore little resemblance to the legislation produced by the Congress.

In brief, although the executive and legislative branches of government in a presidential system may pull in tandem, they do not necessarily do so, and the structure of the independently selected presidency and legislative branch does enable the state of immobilism to develop.
THE PARLIAMENTARY EXECUTIVE

The parliamentary executive is more complex than its presidential alternative, if for no other reason than it is a multiple executive. The ceremonial function and the decision-making function are performed by two different individuals, whose titles vary by political system (see Table 4.1), and to whom we can generically refer as the head of state and the chief executive, respectively.

The head of state symbolizes the state and the dignity of the political regime. The head of state receives ambassadors, hosts receptions, and performs many of the ceremonial tasks government requires. Heads of state, generally, are chosen one of three ways. First, in a number of political systems—about a third of all parliamentary systems—the head of state is a hereditary position, one that “belongs” to a royal family. Certainly among the best-known examples of this manner of selection is the British monarchy, with a clearly delineated line of succession.

A second pattern of selection is one in which the head of state is selected by a governmental body, often the legislature. The president of India is elected by the combined membership of the Indian Parliament, the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. A third method of selection has been referred to as “self-selection,” and is characteristic of political systems in which power has been seized, such as the position of Fidel Castro in Cuba, or the now-toppled position of Idi Amin as president-for-life in Uganda.

The chief executive, on the other hand, is the chief of the executive branch of government. The chief executive is a full-time politician, devoting less time to ceremonial duties of office. Generally speaking, the chief executive in a parliamentary regime performs the same executive tasks as the chief executive in a presidential regime, but not the symbolic activities. Both executives coordinate government policy-making. Both executives are assisted by cabinets of individuals heading separate departments or ministries of government. Both executives are responsible for the day-to-day operation of government.

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<th>Executive Titles</th>
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\(^a\) Serving on behalf of the monarch in his or her absence.
In many political systems, the position of chief executive is totally without legal basis, but instead is founded upon years of political custom and tradition—which we have noted can be just as important as written constitutional measures. In other systems the position is legally entrenched and described in detail in constitutional documents. The manner in which the office of the chief executive in parliamentary systems was created is significant in telling us a great deal about both the position of the chief executive and the manner in which that position relates to the position of the head of state.

The Changing Role of the Monarchy
When we discuss the development of parliamentary government, we are, in fact, discussing British political history (just as we are discussing American political history when we speak of the development of the presidential model of government). Although many parliamentary systems today differ from the contemporary British system, the parliamentary system of government as we know it was born in England, and is generally regarded as starting with Robert Walpole as prime minister in 1741. A brief survey of nine centuries of political history may help us to understand and appreciate the role of the monarchy today.

When William, Duke of Normandy, took the English throne in 1066 there existed a political structure called the *witenagemot*, a legislative assembly of sorts, which formally elected him king. William the Conqueror (as he became known) extended and formalized the feudal system during his tenure, and institutionalized the *Curia Regis*, the King’s Court, as a political body. At this time there was no distinction among the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government (John Locke was not to come onto the scene for another 600 years!): All government was the king. The king used the Curia Regis as a source of funds, and in return for members’ financial support he listened to their counsel and advice, although he was clearly not bound to accept it.

In 1215, the group of barons of the realm that had made up the Curia Regis drew up a document that was called the *Magna Carta*, describing what the barons considered to be the proper relationship between the king and themselves. It is important to note that this was not a declaration of new rights and privileges; rather, it was an expression of what the barons asserted to have been the relationship for some time. They argued that the king had been forgetting some of the powers that kings had already given to barons and the public. This “Great Charter” was a significant constitutional document. It expounded upon political obligations of the time: peoples’ obligations to the king, the king’s obligations to the people, and how law and justice should be administered.

During the thirteenth century the financial resources of the barons of the Curia Regis were not sufficient for the needs of government, and the Curia Regis called upon representatives of towns and counties for “aids”—financial help. In exchange for their financial contributions, representatives of the towns and counties were admitted to the Curia Regis alongside the barons,
thus giving the Curia Regis two classes of members: the earlier baronial membership, which became the House of Lords, and its new (and often elected) membership, which became the House of Commons. The term parliament (in French the verb parler means “to speak”) was first used during the thirteenth century to refer to the debating function of these bodies.

Because the king was receiving financial assistance from both groups, he was now obligated to discuss public affairs not only with the baronial nobility, but also with the representatives of the commoners. The public’s representatives had an important weapon in their hands to insure that they were listened to: the right to assent, or refuse to assent, to the king’s proposals for raising and spending money. Parliament, especially the House of Commons, used this power as a condition with the king: its approval of royal financial proposals in exchange for the king’s attention to public grievances. By about the year 1500, the Commons had grown in political strength to the point at which it could introduce proposals on its own to change laws, and could offer amendments to bills that had originated in the House of Lords, the superior house of the legislature.

The seventeenth century saw the legislature’s power grow in relation to the monarch, and it was a period of much stress. King James I, who reigned from 1603 to 1625, was an advocate of the divine right of kings theory, which argued that the monarch derived his power directly from God, not from the people. James had little need for Parliament as an institution, and he argued that any privileges of Parliament were gifts from the King, not rights of Parliament. During James’s twenty-two year reign, Parliament sat for only eight years. On a number of occasions he “dissolved” the House of Commons, declared that they were not “truly” elected, and sent them home—in effect, he fired them. This was the introduction of the monarch’s power to “dissolve” the legislature today.

Charles I succeeded his father, James I, in 1625, and followed his father’s practice of imprisoning members of Parliament (especially, of course, members of the House of Commons) who opposed him. When Charles could not control a Parliament, he dissolved it and called for new elections after a period of time. By 1640, Charles was in need of funds and convened Parliament to authorize new taxes. The Commons refused; Only three week later Charles again dissolved Parliament. This became known as the “Short Parliament.”

Six months later another Parliament assembled; it became known as the “Long Parliament.” The issue upon which the election for the House of Commons had been held was the question of whether the king should rule Parliament, or Parliament should rule the king. Within two years an armed struggle ensued (referred to as the English Civil War, 1642–1648) between supporters of the king and supporters of the Parliament. Eventually the royal army was defeated, and Charles was captured and sentenced to death as “a tyrant, traitor, murderer, and public enemy” following a trial in 1649. The Commons dissolved the monarchy and established a republic, led by Oliver Cromwell. In 1660, the Long Parliament dissolved itself, and the Convention that was elected to take its place restored the Stuart family to the throne; Charles II, the son of Charles I, became king of England.
Through the reigns of Charles II (1660–1685) and his brother James II (1685–1688), the tensions between Parliament and the monarch grew again, and in 1688 James II fled, and parliament held that because he had fled the throne was now empty. Parliament then invited William, Prince of Orange, and grandson of Charles I, to rule, and William and his wife, Mary (who was James’s older daughter), were proclaimed king and queen by Parliament in 1688.

During the reign of William and Mary, the English constitutional system became much more stable; indeed, it laid much of the groundwork for stable constitutional government to come. The British Bill of Rights (1689)—which asserted that taxes could be raised only with the assent of Parliament, guaranteed the people the right to petition the king, limited the use of the army without the consent of Parliament, guaranteed free elections and freedom of speech and debate in Parliament, limited excessive bail, prohibited “cruel and unusual punishment,” and asserted that Parliament ought to meet frequently—became law. Parliament became institutionalized as a significant political actor in the English system of government.

**Constitutional Monarchy**

Over the last three centuries, the relationship between the monarch and the Parliament has evolved to a point that not even William and Mary would recognize it. *De jure*, under law, most powers of the British government (and in a parallel fashion parliamentary governments, generally) are still exercised in the name of the king or queen (or whatever the title of the head of state is in the political system), but today they are invariably exercised “on the advice” of the chief executive.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the king relied more and more on his cabinet, a group of advisors, for guidance. In the early eighteenth century the role of the cabinet was only that of providing advice; the king still could do as he pleased. As ideas of democratic and republican government grew over the next two centuries, the power relationship changed so that the king and queen were now *obligated*, although *not* legally required, to accept the advice of their cabinets. The cabinet by now was primarily chosen from the house of Parliament elected by the public, the House of Commons. Now the cabinet was in reality governing in the name of the king or queen, and without consulting him or her.

Among the most striking characteristics of parliamentary government today is the duality of its executive leadership that we referred to earlier. The monarch is the official (*de jure*) head of state, but the active (*de facto*) head of government is the prime minister. Appointments are made, acts of Parliament or the legislature are proclaimed, and all government is carried on in the name of the monarch, although it is the prime minister and his or her cabinet who make all of the selections for appointments, who author or sponsor legislative proposals, and who make the administrative decisions that keep government running.

The legal bases for the prime minister and cabinet are rare, as we noted earlier, and in many political systems both the prime minister and cabinet are
(legally) constitutionally nonexistent institutions. In the case of Great Britain (and many Commonwealth nations), the legal claim to power of the cabinet is derived from the fact that, ever since the seventeenth century the monarch has had a Privy Council to advise him or her—a kind of present-day cabinet. Today, although the Privy Council is no longer active, cabinet members are first made members of the Privy Council, and then are appointed to the cabinet. The cabinet meets as a “subcommittee” of the (inactive) Privy Council, and acts in the name of the Privy Council, a body that does have constitutional and legal status. Discussing the relationship between the Canadian cabinet and the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, R. MacGregor Dawson noted:

Those appointed to the Privy Council remain members for life, and hence will include not only ministers from the present Cabinet, but also all surviving ministers of past Cabinets as well. The Privy Council would therefore, if active, be a large and politically cumbersome body with members continually at cross-purposes with one another; but it has saved itself from this embarrassment by the simple device of holding no meetings.

The Cabinet, lacking any legal status of its own, masquerades as the Privy Council when it desires to assume formal power; it speaks and acts in the name of the entire Council. 23

The Selection of the Chief Executive

Although the British monarch may have felt free to chose whomever he or she wanted as advisors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such is no longer the case today. The process by which the head of state in a parliamentary political system selects the chief executive is another one of those patterns of behavior that may legally (de jure) be entirely up to the head of state, but practically and politically (de facto) the head of state usually has little or no choice in the matter at all.

In the model found in most parliamentary nations, unlike their presidential counterparts, there is no special election for the chief executive. 24 The chief executive is elected as a member of the legislature, just as all of the other members of the legislature are elected. Elections for the legislature are held on a regular basis, which varies with the political system. In Britain, the term of the House of Commons is limited to five years.

After the elections for legislative seats have taken place (a process that we described earlier), it is the duty of the head of state to “invite” someone to create a Government. (It should be noted at this point that the term Government with a capital G has a specific meaning in this volume: the prime minister and the cabinet; government with a lowercase g refers to the general structures of the political system.) Although the head of state in most systems is technically free to select whomever he or she wants for the Government, in practice and custom (de facto) heads of state are required to invite the leader of the largest political party in the legislature—a recognition of the will of the people—as indicated in Figure 4.2. 25
Once the head of state designates an individual to create a Government, that individual will subsequently advise the head of state as to whom to appoint to the cabinet. After the new Government (the new prime minister and the new cabinet) has been assembled, in most political systems that Government must first receive a vote of confidence from the legislature before it assumes power. The vote of confidence is a vote by a majority of the legislature indicating its confidence in, or support for, the prime minister and his or her cabinet. (Keep in mind that the vote of confidence will typically involve only the lower house of the legislature—the House of Commons in Britain—and will generally not involve the upper house at all.)

In most political systems, if the Government does not receive a vote of confidence—if it receives the support of less than a majority of the legislature in a vote—it cannot take office, and another Government must be designated by the head of state. Britain represents an exception to the general rule that newly designated Governments need votes of confidence. In Britain, and many other Commonwealth nations (the term “Commonwealth” refers to the family of independent nations today that were part of the British Empire), the designation by the head of state assumes legislative confidence (i.e., the head of state wouldn’t make the appointment without making sure of legislative support.
first), and the Government assumes power immediately, without first needing an expression of confidence from the legislature.

The institution of the vote of confidence is an indication of **legislative supremacy** in the political system. That is, the legislature “hires” the chief executive (although the head of state may “nominate” him or her) or invests him or her with power. The chancellor in Germany, as well as the prime minister in Japan or India, to cite just a few examples, assumes power only after receiving a majority vote of support in their respective legislatures.

This legislative power works in the other direction, too. Just as the legislature “hires” the executive, by expressing support in one of its members forming a Government, it can “fire” the executive by expressing a lack of support or confidence in the Government. Whenever the chief executive loses the confidence of the legislature, whenever the legislature passes a resolution of **no confidence** (or, conversely, fails to pass a legislative expression of confidence), the chief executive is, in fact, fired. Even if the legislature expresses a lack of confidence in the chief executive only a week after that person has assumed office, he or she must resign. In some systems this resignation is a legal requirement; elsewhere it is simply a custom that has the force of law.26 In some systems a vote of no confidence is not even required to fire a chief executive: If the Government is defeated on any major piece of legislation, that is considered to be an expression of a lack of confidence in the Government. It should be added that in most parliamentary systems, with their strong tradition of party discipline and the ability of the prime minister to muster a majority, votes of no confidence are very rare. They do, however, happen from time to time, especially if the Government does not control a substantial legislative majority.

When the prime minister resigns, we have a case of the **Government falling**. A Government “falls” when either of two things happens: It loses on a question of confidence or a major piece of legislation, leading the prime minister to resign, or the prime minister resigns for some other reason. The resignation of an individual minister does not cause a Government to fall, but the resignation of the prime minister does cause the Government to fall.27

The prime minister in a parliamentary system, then, does not have the job security of a president in a presidential system. The prime minister is selected by the head of state to be chief executive precisely because he or she is typically the leader of the largest party in the legislature. If this individual’s party controls a majority of the legislative seats, and if the prime minister can maintain that majority through party discipline, this person should be able to remain prime minister for the entire term of the legislature (and perhaps several terms of the legislature since there are usually no term limits in parliamentary government). If, however, the prime minister does not control a majority, or if the prime minister is not able to retain the support of a majority of the legislature, his or her tenure may be brief.

Of course, if there is a party with a majority, the head of state will have to appoint its leader to be prime minister. (Obviously, if the head of state appointed anyone else, the majority party would make sure that the new Government failed to receive a vote of confidence.) If there is no majority party, one of three situations is possible. First, the head of state may appoint someone to
head a **minority government**, one in which the prime minister does not control over 50 percent of the seats in the legislature. Minority governments tend to be short-lived. They usually obtain an initial vote of confidence through a temporary understanding among a number of parties that do not want to have to contest another election right away, and that see a minority government as the least unattractive alternative at the time. These understandings usually break down after a short while and result in a no-confidence vote and the fall of the Government.  

A second alternative to a majority party is for the head of state to appoint someone to form a coalition government. A **coalition government** is one in which two or more non-majority parties pool their legislative seats to form a majority parliamentary bloc. There may well be a formal agreement drawn up among the participants in the coalition, in which they agree to team up and create a majority in the legislature to support a Government. We will further discuss coalition governments shortly.

The third alternative, and one usually not taken right away, is for the head of state to not form any Government, but instead to **dissolve the legislature**—fire the newly elected legislators—and call for new elections in the hope that the next elections will result in one party winning a clear mandate. This usually is not taken as a first resort, but if the head of state appoints a minority government, which falls within a short period of time, it may be clear to him or her that political stability is simply not possible with the legislature constituted in its current form. If such is the case, the head of state may dissolve the legislature and call for new elections by issuing a **writ of dissolution**.

The chief executive, then, is selected by the head of state from the legislature. The chief executive retains his or her position as long as the legislature continues to express support for the Government by approving the proposals of the Government. The concept of party discipline is very important, for it is party discipline that enables the prime minister to control the legislature. There is a circular relationship at work here: The prime minister is selected to be prime minister precisely because he or she is the chosen leader of the largest party in the legislature. This person will remain prime minister as long as he or she can control a majority of the legislature. When a majority cannot be controlled, a motion of no confidence will be passed, and the prime minister will be forced (through either law or custom) to resign.

At this point it is not necessary that new elections be held. The head of state must now reassess the situation and may invite someone else (or perhaps even the same person who last failed) to try to form a new Government and receive an expression of legislative confidence. This process—a Government being designated, receiving a vote of confidence, surviving for a period of time, receiving a vote of no confidence and falling, a new Government being designated, and so on—can go on until the term of the legislature is completed, over and over again, until the Head of State decides that there is no point in trying again. At that point the head of state will issue a writ of dissolution, “dissolving” (firing) the legislature (much as we noted Charles I did in 1640), and will call for new elections. Thus the entire process starts again, as indicated in Figure 4.3.
FIGURE 4.3
The Government-Formation Process: A Flow Chart Presentation
FIGURE 4.4
Government Falling as a Result of Fluctuation in Public Opinion, 2010–2016
It occasionally happens that a chief executive will *cause* his or her own Government to fall, for what we can describe as reasons of *electoral advantage*. Let us suppose that in a hypothetical political system the constitution requires that elections be held at least every five years (as is the case in Great Britain), and elections are held in January of 2011 that result in the Liberal party winning 56 of the 100 seats in the legislature, and the Conservative party winning the remaining 44 seats. The leader of the Liberal party, I. Maginary, becomes prime minister. As time goes by, Maginary’s popularity, and correspondingly the popularity of his Liberal party, fluctuates up and down, depending upon economic factors, world events, and so on.

Prime Minister Maginary knows that if the present Government can keep the majority in the legislature satisfied, the constitution will require that elections be held by January 2016 (five years after the last election). In early 2014, three years into the term of the legislature but almost two years before elections must be held, Maginary’s popularity is at an all-time high, as depicted in Figure 4.4. After some discussion with political advisors, the Maginary Government resigns and asks the head of state to dissolve the legislature and to call for new elections. They do this because they feel that if the elections are held now, they may win control of the legislature by an *even bigger* margin than they did in 2011, and the five-year term of government will start anew. The head of state has no real choice in the matter: Maginary’s Liberal party controls a majority in the legislature, and supports Maginary’s decision to call for early elections. If the head of state were to refuse to dissolve the legislature, and tried to name some other leader (such as the leader of the opposition Conservative party) to form a Government, the Maginary-Liberal group would vote the new Government down by a 56–44 vote. The head of state, then, grants Prime Minister Maginary a dissolution and calls for new elections to be held, typically in eight to ten weeks. During the interim period, the Maginary Government continues in office as the “Acting” Government, and Maginary’s title is “Acting Prime Minister” until the next election is held and a new Prime Minister (likely Maginary) is designated by the head of state.

Although the example just presented is hypothetical, the situation it depicts happens regularly in parliamentary systems. In recent years, dissolutions of this type have taken place in Japan, France, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, and India, among other nations.

**COALITION GOVERNMENTS**

In political systems that have more than two major political parties it regularly is the case that no single party controls a majority in the legislature. (Clearly, in a two-party system we don’t have this problem. Unless there is a tie—which is quite rare—one of the two parties must, by definition, have more than half of the legislative seats.) Where no party has a majority, as was indicated previously, several options are available to the head of state in the creation of a Government. The most commonly utilized option is the creation of a coalition government.
Let us take a hypothetical newly elected legislature to use as an example as we discuss the process of coalition formation. Imagine a 100-seat legislature with five political parties, as described in Table 4.2.

In this instance, the head of state would most likely invite the leader of Party A to form a Government, since Leader A has the largest popular mandate. We should note, however, that in most systems the head of state is not required to invite Leader A; the head of state can invite anyone whom she or he feels has the best chance to form a coalition successfully. Leader A needs to find an additional 18 seats in order to form a majority of 51 to support her Government in the legislature. In this case, Leader A could go to either the leader of Party B, or the leader of Party C, to find a partner. As well, of course, Leader A could go to more than one other party, to try to form an ABC coalition, for example.

Usually, Leader A will have to promise the leaders of other parties involved in the coalition some reward for joining the coalition. In most instances, this reward is a cabinet position (or several cabinet positions). Sometimes the payoff is a promise that a certain piece of legislation that the prospective coalition partner has drafted will be passed as part of the Government’s program. Sometimes both types of payoff are required.

If Leader A can reach an agreement with one or more partners to form a coalition that will control a majority of the seats in the legislature, then Leader A will receive his or her vote of confidence, and the Government can be said to be installed. If, however, Leader A cannot find sufficient coalition partnership within a constitutionally mandated period of time, usually two to three weeks, then Leader A must return her “mandate” to the head of state and inform the head of state of her inability to form a coalition.

At this point, as indicated earlier, the head of state makes a decision. The head of state could dissolve the legislature and call for new elections, with the hope that in another election a party seeking seats in the next legislature might win a majority, or at least a large enough plurality to be able to form a coalition easily; or the head of state could invite some other party leader to try to form a government. In our hypothetical example, the head of state at this point might turn to Leader B to see whether that person could form a coalition.

The process then goes on and on in this fashion. At each occasion that a Government fails to retain the confidence, or support, of a majority in the legislature—that is, a motion of no confidence introduced by the opposition passes,
or a motion of confidence introduced by a Government supporter fails—the head of state must decide whether another leader might be able to succeed. Elections, after all, are expensive, and usually divisive, and one doesn’t want to have a national election every six months.

Coalition majority governments tend to be less stable than single-party majority governments in parliamentary systems. In a single-party majority system, the prime minister must be concerned with party discipline keeping followers in his or her party in line. In a coalition system, the flow of power is more diffuse. The prime minister exercises party discipline over his or her party followers, and counts on the leader(s) of the partner coalition party or parties to do the same. Coalitions usually fail because of differences between party leaders—in our example above, because Leader B has a disagreement with Leader A and pulls the support of Party B out of the AB coalition—not because of a failure of party discipline within either Party A or Party B.32

As might be expected, the complexity of the coalition-formation process is a direct function of the number of political parties in a legislature.33 In the example in Table 4.3, it is clear that Situation I is most simple, Situation II more complex, and Situation III even more complex. The more parties there are, the more possibilities there are for a winning coalition to form; the more

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.3</th>
<th>The Complexity of the Coalition-Formation Process</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation I: Simplest</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Party A</td>
<td>44 seats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party B</td>
<td>42 seats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party C</td>
<td>14 seats</td>
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<td><strong>Situation II: More Complex</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Party A</td>
<td>38 seats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party B</td>
<td>20 seats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party C</td>
<td>17 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party D</td>
<td>15 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party E</td>
<td>10 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation III: Most Complex</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party A</td>
<td>30 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party B</td>
<td>19 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party C</td>
<td>12 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party D</td>
<td>9 seats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party E</td>
<td>8 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party F</td>
<td>8 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party G</td>
<td>7 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party H</td>
<td>7 seats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
partners there are in a coalition, the more possibilities there are for intracoalition conflict to cause a coalition to fall apart.

**PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS: SOME COMPARISONS**

Clearly, there are a number of major and significant differences in structure between the presidential and the parliamentary-cabinet system. A question for us to ask at this time is: What are the *behavioral* implications of the differences between the two systems, and how will the two systems differ in terms of policy output and day-to-day operation? Several significant dimensions of difference are mentioned here.

The first distinction has to do with the idea of **responsible government**. Responsible government in this context does not mean trustworthy, or rational government, but instead refers to the Government’s *ability to deliver* on its promises. Responsible government comes about in parliamentary systems through some of the structural characteristics we have already met. The idea of *party discipline* suggests that legislators will vote (and speak and act) in the manner that their party leader suggests. The selection of the prime minister as leader of the largest party in the legislature and the notion of the *vote of confidence* ensure that the prime minister will always have the support of (and therefore, because of party discipline, be able to control) a majority of the legislature. Consequently, whatever the prime minister wants will have the approval of a majority of the legislature. If the prime minister’s proposals do not receive a parliamentary majority, of course, the prime minister will have to resign.

This means that when the prime minister promises the public that his or her Government will act in a certain way, that person is usually in a position to follow through on that promise. In addition to being the leader of the executive branch of government, the prime minister is also (by definition) the leader of the legislative branch of government, controlling the legislative majority.

Contrast this with the presidential system in which the notion of separation of powers and checks and balances—something that explicitly does *not* apply in a parliamentary system—is so important. One of the central principles of presidential government is that the legislature is free to deny requests of the president. Consequently, although a presidential candidate may run for office on the basis of his or her position on a single issue or a number of issues, in most cases the candidate cannot guarantee delivery of campaign promises. To enact policy, the *legislature* must be convinced that the president’s policy preferences are the right ones.

Which system is “better”? It is hard to say, and the answer depends upon certain value judgments, since each system has its own strengths and weaknesses. On one hand, the parliamentary system does have a real advantage in rapid policy delivery, through the notions of party discipline and cabinet leadership. On the other hand, if *good* policy can be passed quickly, so can *bad*
policy. Many in parliamentary systems bemoan the overwhelming influence of party discipline and corresponding “prime ministerial dictatorship,” however, and some have even suggested that their respective systems consider conversion to the presidential model.34

The corresponding weakness/strength of the presidential system is precisely its slower, more deliberative legislative process. The argument suggested is that whereas it may (and almost always does) take longer to pass policy, groups that are in a minority in an issue area have more opportunity to protect their interests, and the policy that is ultimately passed (if, indeed, a policy is ultimately passed) is more likely to be a good one. Put slightly more cynically, the policy that is ultimately passed is likely to offend as few as possible. On the other hand, a policy decision that is urgently needed may go unanswered for a long period of time while the legislature deliberates and argues with the president.

Another major area of difference between the two systems has to do with stability and tenure of office. In the presidential system, both the president and the legislature have fixed terms of office. They are secure in the knowledge of their fixed terms in these positions, barring extraordinary occurrences (such as impeachment and conviction of the president in the United States, e.g.). This security permits both the president and the legislature to take either an unpopular position or an antagonistic position in relation to the other branch of government if it is believed that such a position is the proper one to take.

The parliamentary system offers no such job security. The chief executive can lose this position at any time, depending upon the mood of the legislature. A chief executive worried about keeping his or her job, then, would be less likely to take a position that is clearly disapproved of by the legislature than would a president, although an individual “out of step” with the legislature would not be likely to be chief executive in a parliamentary system. Moreover, the legislature would be less likely to rebel against executive leadership: Party discipline would tend to force party members to follow the instructions of their leader (and the leader of the majority party, of course, would be the chief executive). If the legislature became too contentious, the chief executive could request a writ of dissolution from the head of state, effectively “firing” the legislature and calling for new elections.

As we indicated earlier, it is easy to see that each of these systems has advantages and disadvantages as far as stability, policy output, protection of minority rights, ability to deliver on campaign promises, responsiveness to public opinion, and so on, are concerned.35 Some of these values are simply opposites of others: Responsiveness to majority public opinion may infringe on minority rights, for example. What is seen as an advantage to one observer may be a distinct disadvantage to another.

Both the presidential and the parliamentary models of executive structure are conducive to democratic government. Both models can be responsive to public opinion, both can provide effective leadership, and both can provide for the general welfare of the political system. The differences between the two types of systems are differences of structure and process, not ideology. As such,
it is difficult to argue that one type of system is, overall, better than the other, they are simply different.

THE MILITARY

The military is another structure that is part of the executive branch of government and that is significant in both the socialization and recruitment processes. It is sometimes regarded as the “elite” in developing nations, and it is also a structure that can be significant on its own in shaping the type and style of political participation that is permitted in the political arena. Although the military is not perceived as a politically significant actor in most stable Western democracies, we should not let a pervasive Western ethnocentrism blind us to the fact that the military, as an institution, is a highly significant political actor in many developing regimes.

One need only look at military or military-supported coups—military takeovers of the government—or attempted coups in recent history—in Thailand (2006), Mauritania (2005), Nepal (2005), the Central African Republic (2003), or Pakistan (1999), to take but a few examples—to see that in many instances political leaders are more concerned with what the military reaction will be to their decisions than they are with what the reactions of their respective legislatures or courts will be. In fact, even in countries such as India or Guatemala, where civilian governments are clearly in control, the armed forces have been shown to exert considerable political influence. Eric Nordlinger has commented:

They are symbols of state sovereignty and the primary defenders against possible external or internal attack against the government. Given their prestige, responsibilities, and the material resources needed to fulfill these responsibilities, all military establishments exercise a significant degree of political influence.

The study of what has been called “praetorianism,” or military coups, has been justified on many counts, including the fact that such events happen frequently; as Chairman Mao said in China, power “grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Among twenty Latin American nations, only two—Costa Rica and Mexico—have not experienced at least one attempted coup since 1945. In one recent study, it was suggested that 57 percent of the Third World states examined had been under military rule for half or more than half of their respective periods of independence. According to one observer, “Between 1945 and 1976, soldiers carried out successful coups in half of the eighteen Asian states,” and, more generally, “it turns out that the military have intervened in approximately two-thirds of the more than one hundred non-Western states since 1945.”

Although coups may be motivated “for public-spirited reasons on behalf of constitution and nation,” research has shown that “almost all coups are at least partly, and usually primarily, inspired by the military’s own interests.”
One result of a military takeover is almost invariably a significant increase in the defense budget of the regime.\textsuperscript{43} Examined more broadly, research shows that “military rule was found to have negative or zero-order correlations with economic development.” Moreover, “‘politicians in uniform’ invariably caused political decay.”\textsuperscript{44}

The issue of civilian control of the military is a very important one, especially so in developing societies in which (civilian) governments may not yet have acquired the same degree of legitimacy and stability that one finds in the older Western democracies. The key issue involved in the maintenance of civilian control involves finding ways to set limits within which military leaders, and all members of the armed forces, “accept the government’s definition of appropriate areas of responsibility.”\textsuperscript{45}

This does not mean in the final analysis that the military is prohibited from lobbying for policies it supports, but it does mean that the military agrees to do this in acceptable ways, and that the military agrees to accept the consequences of the policy-making process. Thus, the military accepts a subordinate role in the political system. Ironically, in military regimes the leaders face the same problems as previous civilian governments did: How to keep their military underlings loyal and prevent an overthrow of the (military) forces in power at the time.\textsuperscript{46}

Remember that the military is a political institution in most countries. The role of the military in a political system is also significantly affected by that country’s political culture, history, and tradition: In some Latin American systems the idea of a military coup, if not desirable, is certainly recognized as a statistical possibility—in fact, a probability—over the course of time.

\textbf{PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE BUREAUCRACY}

Apart from the creation of a cabinet, one of the key functions of the political executive is to administer public policy. In this respect, this volume would be seriously remiss if we did not discuss, albeit briefly, the comparative study of public administration and a comparative analysis of the structure that has come to be called “the bureaucracy.”

Public bureaucracies are perhaps the \textit{most common} political structures in the world today; they exist in all political systems, whether they are democratic or authoritarian, “presidential” or “parliamentary,” “developed” or “underdeveloped.” They are as nearly a universal political structure as one can find: As a specialized structure, “bureaucracy is common to all contemporary nation-states.”\textsuperscript{47}

The term \textit{bureaucracy} itself is something of a problem because it has a number of definitions, some value-free and some quite judgmental. The scholar whose work is most closely associated with the term, and who contributed most to its development, is Max Weber (1864–1920). Weber’s concern was “less with organizational efficiency than with the expansion of bureaucratic power, and with the implications of that expansion for fundamental liberal values.”\textsuperscript{48}
Weber saw “modern officialdom” as having a number of characteristic patterns of behavior:

1. It has “fixed and official jurisdictional areas,” which are “generally ordered by rules or administrative regulations”;
2. The authority to give orders is also limited by rules, and officials have “coercive means” that they may use to enforce those rules;
3. The management of the office “is based upon written documents (‘the files’),” which requires a substantial staff to keep records;
4. Management “presupposes thorough and expert training”; 
5. Office activity requires the full attention of the official;
6. “The management of the office follows general rules.”

Generally, bureaucracies have been studied from several different perspectives. First, they can be studied from an organizational perspective, focusing upon structures, organizational charts, lines of communication, hierarchical organization, its formal rules, and how it operates. Second, bureaucracies can be studied from a behavioral perspective, seeking to understand what bureaucracies do, how they behave, and what behavioral characteristics distinguish bureaucracies from other hierarchically organized structures. A third approach focuses upon how well bureaucracies achieve their goals, and discusses their efficiency, specialization, rational activity, and their role in the framework of democratic government.

Bureaucracies (and here we speak of public bureaucracies, although most of what we say about public bureaucracies applies to private bureaucracies as well) are typically complex systems of personnel, usually organized in a hierarchical fashion. That is, bureaucracies are usually pyramidally shaped, with the number of employees in higher positions being fewer than those in lower positions.

The nature of a bureaucracy is usually that specialized jobs are performed by different divisions of the organization, and the organization is divided into functional categories. Bureaucracies are also well known for having well-institutionalized sets of rules, or procedures, and a relatively rigid set of precedents that govern their behavior.

Bureaucracies often claim to be based upon some kind of merit system, in which one takes an examination to receive a position, or receives a position based upon some perceived objective skills. This is characteristic of more developed nations and is a reaction to practices dating back to the early years of the American Republic. President Andrew Jackson coined the phrase the “spoils system,” referring to a chief executive’s right to appoint public personnel as one of the “spoils” of an electoral victory.

It is often the case in political bureaucracies that some type of civil service system exists that protects the lower-level bureaucrats from political interference in their jobs; if they have been working for several years under the direction of one political party, they do not need to fear that they will lose their jobs should the opposition party gain control of the government. The other
side of this coin, of course, is that a party that is new to government does not have the ability to put an unlimited number of its followers into positions of power when it wins an election. They must compete for positions through the established civil service system that already exists. Parties that have been out of power for a long time often claim that the bureaucracy “represents” the interests of the “old order,” and that it is “resisting” their proposed changes. Often this is actually the case.

Top-level positions in the bureaucracy often are political appointments; there is an expectation that after an election is held all officials at this level will submit their resignations and permit a new cohort of political appointees to direct the administration of policy. Thus in a typical government ministry the minister and the deputy ministers will clearly be political appointments, with the minister being an MP and the deputy ministers being party loyalists, but the director-general (or an official with a similar title) will be a civil servant who remains in office even with a change of administrations.

The function of the bureaucracy is theoretically to administer the policy of the executive and to offer specialized advice to the executive, not to make policy of its own. As we indicated earlier, however, one of the frequent complaints about bureaucracies is that they do, in fact, make policy in an “irresponsible” way—“irresponsible” because nobody elected them. As society has grown increasingly complex, resulting in the gradual expansion of the executive branch of government over the legislative branch of government—something we discussed in Chapter 3—this administration has required more and more personnel, leading to a rapid growth of public bureaucracies. Often the growth of bureaucracy in modern society is decried, but it has been demonstrated to be necessary to administer more and more complicated social policy.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What are the various roles that are played by the political executive?
2. Can you offer a distinction between presidential and parliamentary executive models?
3. What are presidential systems’ bases of power?
4. What is the role of political parties in presidential systems?
5. Trace the development of the parliamentary executive structure and the changing role of the monarchy.
6. How would you explain the concept of constitutional monarchy?
7. Explain the selection of the chief executive in a parliamentary government.
8. What is the relationship of power between legislative supremacy and cabinet supremacy?
9. Explain the establishment of coalition governments.
10. How would you compare presidential and parliamentary executive structures? Which is better?
11. What are the potential roles of the military in politics?
12. What is the role of public administration and the bureaucracy in politics?
KEY TERMS

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<td>government (with lowercase “g”)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>writ of dissolution</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUGGESTED READINGS

Daniela Giannetti and Kenneth Benoit, *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments* (New York: Routledge, 2009). Coalition politics can be extremely complicated, and this volume shows how the number of political parties and the behavior of political parties can make the formation and behavior of coalition governments even more confusing.

Dennis Riley and Bryan Brophy-Baermann, *Bureaucracy and the Policy Process* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). If the bureaucracy is the fourth branch of government (after the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary), this volume is a good introduction to how that branch of government affects the formation and execution of public policy.

Richard Rose, *The Prime Minister in a Shrinking World* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). This is a good study of one prime ministerial government (Britain) and how the office of the prime minister has evolved in that system. Discusses the prime minister’s role in the world today, and how the prime minister’s power has changed over time.


Rebecca Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2009). This is a good introductory study of the role of the military in political systems, and the relations that exist between military governments and civilian governments cross-nationally.

NOTES


5. “The Buck Stops Here” was an unattributed quote on a sign that was kept on the desk of President Harry Truman.


7. The famous quote by John Adams, the first vice president of the United States, is as follows: “I am possessed of two separate powers, the one in esse and the other in posse. I am Vice President. In this I am nothing, but I may be everything.” Rossiter, *The American Presidency*, p. 131. See also Robert Gilbert, *Managing Crisis: Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006).


11. There were crimes involved in his impeachment, but there was substantial debate over whether sexual offenses and covering them up were the “high crimes and misdemeanors” suggested by the Constitution. See Leonard Kaplan and Beverly Moran, *Aftermath: The Clinton Impeachment and the Presidency in the Age of Political Spectacle* (New York: New York University Press, 2001); and *Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial of President William Jefferson Clinton* (Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, 2000).


13. See Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo, *The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008);


20. See, for example, *The Saint Vincent Constitution Order, 1979* establishing a constitution for the new nation of St. Vincent. Sections 50 and 51 outline the Executive Power: Section 50 states that “The executive authority of Saint Vincent is vested in Her Majesty [and] … may be exercised on behalf of Her Majesty by the Governor-General….” Section 51 notes that “(1) There shall be a Prime Minister of Saint Vincent who shall be appointed by the Governor-General. (2) Whenever the Governor-General has occasion to appoint a Prime Minister he shall appoint a Representative who appears to him likely to command the support of the majority of Representatives…. (6) The Governor-General shall remove the Prime Minister from office if a resolution of no confidence in the Government is passed by the House and the Prime Minister does not within three days either resign from his office or advise the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament.” *Saint Vincent Constitution Order, 1979* (Kingstown, Saint Vincent: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 38–39.


22. This argument was expounded at length in his *True Law of Free Monarchies* in 1603.


24. The election in Israel in 1996 created a unique variation on the general parliamentary model after a constitutional change there, one in which the legislature was directly elected by the people (in proportional representation voting), and the prime minister was also directly elected by the people. In addition, following the general parliamentary model, the head of state—in Israel called the President—is elected by the Knesset, the legislature. After two elections with this model, Israel changed its constitution again back to the model it had used prior to 1996 because it found the changes to be more destabilizing than the older system had been. See Gregory Mahler, *Politics and Government in Israel: The Maturation of a Modern State* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011).

26. One system with a legal requirement is Barbados. See the *Barbados Independence Order, 1966*: [Section 66 (1)] “The Office of Prime Minister shall become vacant … [2] If the House of Assembly by a resolution which has received the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members thereof resolves that the appointment of the Prime Minister ought to be revoked . . . .” pp. 62–63.


43. Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal*, p. 3

44. Ibid., p. 205.


53. An example of this might be J. Michael Martinez, *Public Administration Ethics for the 21st Century* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009). See also B. Guy Peters


55. See the discussion by Heady, “Relating Bureaucratic and Political Development” in his *Public Administration*, pp. 409–417.


57. A very good discussion of some of the philosophical dimensions of this problem, and how democratic control can coexist with bureaucracy can be found in the volume edited by David Rosenbloom, Rosemary O’Leary, and Joshua Chanin, *Public Administration and Law* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010).

58. This point is discussed at some length in the study by Peters in his volume *The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative Perspective*. Peters’ second chapter is entitled “The Growth of Government and Administration,” and he discusses the growth of administration not only in the executive branch, but also in the legislature and in other areas of the government.