CHAPTER 4 Conflict, War, and Terrorism

The Wars of the World

Chapter 3 discussed the decreasing number and size of wars in the world (see pp. 63–64). This chapter will focus on the remaining wars, and historical cases, to explain the causes of international conflicts.

Figure 4.1 shows the 13 wars in progress in January 2012. The largest are in Afghanistan and Somalia. All 13 wars are in the global South. All but Colombia and the Philippines are in a zone of active fighting spanning parts of Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East.

In five smaller zones (dotted lines on the map), dozens of wars of recent decades have ended. Some of the countries in these zones still face difficult postwar years with the possibility of sliding back into violence as Yemen did in 2009 after a long cease-fire. But most peace agreements in the world’s postwar zones are holding up.

Types of War

Many different activities are covered by the general term war. Consequently, it is not easy to say how many wars are going on in the world

CHAPTER OUTLINE

- The Wars of the World
- Conflicts of Ideas
- Conflicts of Interest
- Conventional Military Forces
- Terrorism
- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- States and Militaries
FIGURE 4.1 Wars in Progress, January 2011

- Estimated deaths to date over 100,000
- Estimated deaths to date under 100,000
- Zone of active wars
- Zones of transition from wars in recent decades
at the moment. But most lists of wars set some minimum criteria—for instance, a minimum of a thousand battle deaths—to distinguish war from lower-level violence such as violent strikes or riots.

Wars are diverse. Wars tend to arise from different situations and play different sorts of roles in bargaining over conflicts. Starting from the largest wars, we may distinguish the following main categories.

Hegemonic war is a war over control of the entire world order—the rules of the international system as a whole, including the role of world hegemony (see p. 48). This class of wars (with variations in definition and conception) is also known as world war, global war, general war, or systemic war. The last hegemonic war was World War II. This kind of war probably cannot occur any longer without destroying civilization.

Total war is warfare by one state waged to conquer and occupy another. The goal is to reach the capital city and force the surrender of the government, which can then be replaced with one of the victor's choosing. Total war as we know it began with the mass destruction of the Napoleonic Wars, which introduced large-scale conscription and geared the entire French national economy toward the war effort. In total war, with the entire society mobilized for the struggle, the entire society of the enemy is considered a legitimate target.

Limited war includes military actions carried out to gain some objective short of the surrender and occupation of the enemy. For instance, the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 1991 retook the territory of Kuwait but did not go on to Baghdad to topple Saddam Hussein's government. Many border wars have this character: after occupying the land it wants, a state may stop and defend its gains, as Russia did after expelling Georgian troops from disputed Georgian provinces in 2008, for example.

Raids are limited wars that consist of a single action—a bombing run or a quick incursion by land. In 2007, Israeli warplanes bombed a facility in Syria that Israel believed to be a nuclear research facility. Raids fall into the gray area between wars and nonwars because their destruction is limited and they are over quickly. Raiding that is repeated or fuels a cycle of retaliation usually becomes a limited war or what is sometimes called low-intensity conflict.

Civil war refers to war between factions within a state trying to create, or prevent, a new government for the entire state or some territorial part of it. (The aim may be to change the entire system of government, to merely replace the people in it, or to split a region off as a new state.) The U.S. Civil War of the 1860s is a good example of a secessionist civil war. The war in El Salvador in the 1980s is an example of a civil war for control of the entire state (not secessionist). Civil wars often seem to be among the most brutal wars. The 50,000 or more deaths in the civil war in El Salvador, including many from massacres and death squads, were not based on ethnic differences. Of course, many of today's civil wars emerge from ethnic conflicts as well. In Chad, for example, a rebel group composed of rival clans to the president's nearly overthrew the government in 2007. Sustaining a civil war usually requires a source of support for rebels, from neighboring states, diaspora ethnic communities, or revenue from natural resources or illegal drugs.

Guerrilla war, which includes certain kinds of civil wars, is warfare without front lines. Irregular forces operate in the midst of, and often hidden or protected by, civilian
populations. The purpose is not to directly confront an enemy army but rather to harass and punish it so as to gradually limit its operation and effectively liberate territory from its control. Rebels in most civil wars use such methods. U.S. military forces in South Vietnam fought against Vietcong guerrillas in the 1960s and 1970s, with rising frustration. Efforts to combat a guerrilla army—counterinsurgency—are discussed on p. 139. Without a fixed front line, there is much territory that neither side controls; both sides exert military leverage over the same places at the same time. Thus, guerrilla wars hurt civilians, who suffer most when no military force firmly controls a location, opening the door to banditry, personal vendettas, sexual violence, and other such lawless behavior. The situation is doubly painful because conventional armies fighting against guerrillas often cannot distinguish them from civilians and punish both together. In one famous case in South Vietnam, a U.S. officer who had ordered an entire village burned to deny its use as a sanctuary by the Vietcong commented, “We had to destroy the village to save it.” Warfare increasingly is irregular and guerrilla-style; it is less and less often an open conventional clash of large state armies.

In all types of war, the abstractions and theories of IR scholars hardly capture the horrors experienced by those on the scene, both soldiers and civilians. War suspends basic norms of behavior and, especially over time, traumatizes participants and bystanders. Soldiers see their best friends blown apart before their eyes; they must kill and maim their fellow human beings; some experience lifelong psychological traumatic stress as a result. Civilians experience terror, violence, and rape; they lose loved ones and homes; they too often live with trauma afterward. The violence of war does not resemble war movies, but instead creates a nearly psychotic experience of overwhelming confusion, noise, terror, and adrenaline. Soldiers in professional armies train to keep functioning in these conditions—but still have an incredibly difficult job—whereas those in irregular forces and civilian populations caught in civil wars have little hope of coping. The horrors of war are magnified in cases of genocide and massacre, of child soldiers, and of brutal warfare that continues over years.

Scholars and policy makers are paying more attention in recent years to the difficult transitions from war to peace around the world—postwar reconciliation, conflict resolution, transitional governments representing opposing factions, economic reconstruction, and so forth. These efforts often address collective goods problems among the parties, as when Somali clan elders in 2007 agreed that all would be better off by giving up their guns to the new central government but none wanted to go first. After the shooting stops, international
peacekeepers and NGOs focus on Security Sector Reform (SSR) to create professional military and police forces instead of warlord militias. The process of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) deals with the common problem of what to do with irregular forces after civil wars end.

In several countries where long internal wars in the 1990s had led to dehumanization and atrocities—notably in South Africa—new governments used truth commissions to help the society heal and move forward. The commissions’ role was to hear honest testimony from the period, to bring to light what really happened during these wars, and in exchange to offer most of the participants asylum from punishment. Sometimes international NGOs helped facilitate the process. However, human rights groups objected to a settlement in Sierra Leone in 1999 that brought into the government a faction that had routinely cut off civilians’ fingers as a terror tactic. (Hostilities did end, however, in 2001.) Thus, after brutal ethnic conflicts give way to complex political settlements, most governments try to balance the need for justice and truth with the need to keep all groups on board.

Experts have debated how much truth and reconciliation are necessary after long conflicts. Some now argue that in some circumstances, tribunals and government-sponsored panels to investigate past crimes could lead to political instability in transitional states. Other experts disagree, noting that the work of such panels can be essential to building trust, which is important for democracy.

Theories of the Causes of War

The Roman writer Seneca said nearly 2,000 years ago: “Of war men ask the outcome, not the cause.” This is not true of political scientists. They want to know why countries fight.

The term conflict in IR generally refers to armed conflict. Conflict itself is ever present in the international system—the condition against which bargaining takes place. In conflict bargaining, states develop capabilities that give them leverage to obtain more favorable outcomes than they otherwise would achieve. Whether fair or unfair, the ultimate outcome of the bargaining process is a settlement of the particular conflict. Rarely do conflicts lead to violence, however.

The question of when conflict becomes violent can be approached in different ways. Descriptive approaches, favored by historians, tend to focus narrowly on specific, direct causes of the outbreak of war, which vary from one war to another. For example, one could say that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 “caused” World War I. More theoretical approaches, favored by many political scientists, tend to focus on the search for general explanations, applicable to a variety of contexts, about why wars break out. For example, one can see World War I as caused by shifts in the balance of power among European states, with the assassination being only a catalyst.

One way to organize the many theories offered by political scientists to explain why wars begin is to use the levels of analysis concept from Chapter 1. Using this framework reminds us that most important events in IR have multiple causes at different levels of analysis.
The Individual Level  On the individual level of analysis, theories about war center on rationality. One theory, consistent with realism, holds that the use of war and other violent means of leverage in international conflicts is normal and reflects rational decisions of national leaders.

An opposite theory holds that conflicts often escalate to war because of deviations from rationality in the individual decision-making processes of national leaders (see Chapter 3)—information screens, cognitive biases, groupthink, and so forth. A related theory holds that the education and mentality of whole populations of individuals determine whether conflicts become violent. Here, public nationalism or ethnic hatred—or even an innate tendency toward violence in human nature—may pressure leaders to solve conflicts violently.

Neither theory holds up very well. Some wars clearly reflect rational calculations of national leaders, whereas others clearly were mistakes and cannot be considered rational. Certainly some individual leaders seem prone to turn to military force to try to settle conflicts on favorable terms. But a maker of war can become a maker of peace, as did Egypt's Anwar Sadat. Individuals of many cultural backgrounds and religions lead their states into war, as do both male and female leaders.

The Domestic Level  The domestic level of analysis draws attention to the characteristics of states or societies that may make them more or less prone to use violence in resolving conflicts. During the Cold War, Marxists frequently said that the aggressive and greedy capitalist states were prone to use violence in international conflicts, whereas Western leaders claimed that the expansionist, ideological, and totalitarian nature of communist states made them especially prone to using violence. In truth, both types of society fought wars regularly.

Likewise, rich industrialized states and poor agrarian ones both go to war. Anthropologists have found that a wide range of preagricultural hunter-gatherer societies were much more prone to warfare than today's societies. Thus the potential for warfare seems to be universal across cultures, types of society, and time periods—although the importance and frequency of war vary greatly from case to case.

Some argue that domestic political factors shape a state's outlook on war and peace. For example, the democratic peace suggests that democracies almost never fight other democracies (see Chapter 3), although both democracies and authoritarian states fight wars. Others claim that domestic political parties, interest groups, and legislatures play an important role in whether international conflicts become international wars.

Few useful generalizations can tell us which societies are more prone or less prone to war. The same society may change greatly over time. For example, Japan was prone to using violence in international conflicts before World War II, but has been averse to such violence since then. If general principles explain why some societies at some times are more peaceful than others and why they change, political scientists have not yet identified them.

The Interstate Level  Theories at the interstate level explain wars in terms of power relations among major actors in the international system. Power transition theory holds that conflicts generate large wars at times when power is relatively equally distributed.
Conflicts of Ideas

and a rising power is threatening to overtake a declining hegemon (see pp. 48–49). At this level, too, incompatible theories compete. Deterrence is supposed to stop wars by building up power and threatening its use. But the theory of arms races holds that wars are caused, not prevented, by such actions. No general formula has been discovered to tell us in what circumstances each of these principles holds true.

Some political scientists study war from a statistical perspective, analyzing data on types of wars and the circumstances under which they occurred. Current research focuses on the effects of such factors as democracy, government structure, trade, and international organizations in explaining the escalation or settlement of “militarized interstate disputes.”

The Global Level

At the global level of analysis, a number of theories of war have been proposed. Of the several variations on the idea that major warfare in the international system is cyclical, one approach links large wars with long economic waves (also called Kondratieff cycles) in the world economy, of about 50 years’ duration. Another approach links the largest wars with a 100-year cycle based on the creation and decay of world orders (see pp. 48–49). These cycle theories at best can explain only general tendencies toward war in the international system over time.

Thus, on all the levels of analysis, competing theories offer different explanations for why some conflicts become violent and others do not. Political scientists cannot yet confidently predict which of the world’s many international conflicts will lead to war. We can gain insight, however, by studying various types of conflicts to understand better what states fight about.

Conflicts of Ideas

The following sections discuss six types of international conflict: ethnic, religious, ideological, territorial, governmental, and economic. The first three are conflicts over ideas, the last three conflicts over interests.
These six types of conflict are not mutually exclusive, and they overlap considerably in practice. For example, the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine after the 1991 Soviet breakup were complex. Ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, and ethnic Ukrainians in Russia, experienced ethnic conflict. There are religious differences between Ukrainian and Russian forms of Christianity. In addition, the two new states had a territorial dispute over the Crimean peninsula, which Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had transferred to Ukraine in the 1950s. The two states also had economic conflicts over trade and money after the Soviet breakup, which created new borders and currencies. These multiple conflicts did not lead to the use of military force, however. In 2005, the opposition took control of Ukraine’s government (after a flawed election was rerun in response to weeks of mass street protests). Russian president Vladimir Putin, who had campaigned for the incumbent party in Ukraine, protested vigorously but did not seriously consider military force. So the types of conflict discussed here come into play in combination rather than separately.

We will look first at the most difficult types of conflict, in which intangible elements such as ethnic hatred, religious fervor, or ideology come into play—conflicts of ideas. These identity-based sources of international conflict today have been shaped historically by nationalism as the link between identity and internationally recognized statehood. Therefore we will briefly review the development of nationalism before examining the three types of conflicts of ideas.

**Nationalism**

Nationalism—devotion to the interests of one’s own nation over the interests of other states—may be the most important force in world politics in the past two centuries. A nation is a population that shares an identity, usually including a language and culture. But nationality is a difficult concept to define precisely. To some degree, the extension of political control over large territories such as France created the commonality necessary for nationhood—states created nations. At the same time, however, the perceived existence of a nation has often led to the creation of a corresponding state as a people win sovereignty over their own affairs—nations create states.

Around A.D. 1500, countries such as France and Austria began to bring entire nations together into single states. These new nation-states were very large and powerful and they overran smaller neighbors. Over time, they conquered and incorporated many small territorial units. Eventually the idea of nationalism itself became a powerful force and ultimately contributed to the disintegration of large, multinational states such as Austria-Hungary (in World War I), the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.

The principle of self-determination implies that people who identify as a nation should have the right to form a state and exercise sovereignty over their affairs. Self-determination is a widely praised principle in international affairs today (although not historically). But it is generally secondary to the principles of sovereignty (noninterference in other states’ internal affairs) and territorial integrity, with which it frequently conflicts. Self-determination does not give groups the right to change international borders, even those imposed arbitrarily by colonialism, in order to unify a group with a common national identity. Generally, though not always, self-determination has been
achieved by violence. When the borders of (perceived) nations do not match those of states, conflicts almost inevitably arise. Today such conflicts are widespread—in Northern Ireland, Quebec, Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tibet, Sudan, and many other places.

The process of popular mobilization intensified greatly in the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars, when France instituted a universal draft and a centrally run “command” economy. Its motivated citizen armies, composed for the first time of Frenchmen rather than mercenaries, marched longer and faster. People participated in part because they were patriotic. Their nation-state embodied their aspirations, and brought them together in a common national identity.

The United States meanwhile had followed the example of the Netherlands by declaring independence from Britain in 1776. Latin American states gained independence early in the 19th century, and Germany and Italy unified their nations out of multiple political units (through war) later in that century.

Before World War I, socialist workers from different European countries had banded together as workers to fight for workers’ rights. In that war, however, most abandoned such solidarity and instead fought for their own nation; nationalism thus proved a stronger force than socialism. Before World War II, nationalism helped Germany, Italy, and Japan build political orders based on fascism—an extreme authoritarianism girded by national chauvinism. And in World War II it was nationalism and patriotism (not communism) that rallied the Soviet people to sacrifice by the millions to turn back Germany’s invasion.

In the past 50 years, nations by the dozens have gained independence and statehood. Jews worked persistently in the first half of the 20th century to create the state of Israel, and Palestinians aspired in the second half to create a Palestinian state. While multinational states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have fragmented in recent years, ethnic and territorial units such as Ukraine, Slovenia, and East Timor have established themselves as independent nation-states. Others, such as Montenegro and Kurdistan, seek to do so and already run their own affairs. The continuing influence of nationalism in today’s world is evident. It affects several of the main types of conflict that occupy the rest of this chapter.

**Ethnic Conflict**

Ethnic conflict is quite possibly the most important source of conflict in the numerous wars now occurring throughout the world. Ethnic groups are large groups of people who share ancestral, language, cultural, or religious ties and a common identity (individuals identify with the group). Although conflicts between ethnic groups often have material aspects—notably over territory and government control—ethnic conflict itself entails a dislike or hatred that members of one ethnic group systematically feel toward another ethnic group. In this regard, ethnic conflict is based not on tangible causes (what someone does) but on intangible ones (who someone is).

Ethnic groups often form the basis for nationalist sentiments. Not all ethnic groups identify as nations; for instance, within the United States various ethnic groups coexist (sometimes uneasily) with a common national identity as Americans. But in locations
where millions of members of a single ethnic group live as the majority population in their ancestors’ land, they usually think of themselves as a nation. In most such cases they aspire to have their own state with its formal international status and territorial boundaries.

Territorial control is closely tied to the aspirations of ethnic groups for statehood. All states’ borders deviate to some extent (sometimes substantially) from the actual location of ethnic communities. Members of the ethnic group are left outside its state’s borders, and members of other ethnic groups are located within the state’s borders. The resulting situation can be dangerous, with part of an ethnic group controlling a state and another part living as a minority within another state controlled by a rival ethnic group.

Other ethnic groups lack any home state. Kurds share a culture, and many aspire to create a state of Kurdistan. But Kurds live in four states—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria—all of which strongly oppose giving up part of their own territory for a new Kurdish state (see Figure 4.2). Kurds enjoyed autonomy in part of northern Iraq under U.S. protection in the 1990s, and quasi-autonomous status in a post-Saddam Iraq. The Kurds’ success in the 2010 Iraqi elections gave them a strong position to retain this status.

Ethnic conflicts often involve pressures to redraw borders by force. When ethnic populations are minorities in territories controlled by rival ethnic groups, they may even be driven from their land or (in rare cases) systematically exterminated. By driving out the minority ethnic group, a majority group can assemble a more unified, more contiguous, and larger territory for its nation-state, as ethnic Serbs did through “ethnic cleansing” after the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Outside states often worry about the fate of “their people” living as minorities in neighboring states. For instance, Albania is concerned about ethnic Albanians who are

**FIGURE 4.2** Kurdish Areas

Ethnic populations often span international borders. The shaded region shows the approximate area of Kurdish settlements.
the majority population in the Serbian province of Kosovo. But as Kosovo moved toward independence from Serbia, Serbia worried about the minority of ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo. Similar problems have fueled wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between India and Pakistan. The dangerous combination of ethnic conflict and territorial disputes could lead to more wars in the future.

In extreme cases, governments use *genocide*—systematic extermination of ethnic or religious groups in whole or in part—to try to destroy scapegoated groups or political rivals. Under its fanatical policies of racial purity, Nazi Germany exterminated 6 million Jews and millions of others, including homosexuals, Roma, and communists. The mass murders, now known as the Holocaust, along with the sheer scale of war unleashed by Nazi aggression, are considered among the greatest *crimes against humanity* in history. Responsible German officials faced justice in the *Nuremberg Tribunal* after World War II (see p. 252). The pledges of world leaders after that experience to “never again” allow genocide have been found wanting as genocide recurred in the 1990s in Bosnia and Rwanda, and most recently in Darfur, Sudan.

In Rwanda, where the Hutu group is the majority and the Tutsi group the minority, a Hutu-nationalist government in 1994 slaughtered an estimated 800,000 Tutsis (and Hutus opposed to the government) in a matter of weeks. The weak international response to this atrocity reveals how frail are international norms of human rights compared to norms of noninterference in other states’ internal affairs—at least when no strategic interests are at stake. The Hutu ultranationalists quickly lost power when Tutsi rebels defeated the government militarily, but the war spread into Democratic Congo, where the ultranationalists took refuge and where fighting continues 18 years later.

In Sudan, the warring sides (largely northern Muslims versus southern Christians) in a decades-long civil war signed a peace agreement in 2003, ending a war that had killed more than a million people. The agreement called for withdrawing government forces from the south of the country, establishing a power-sharing transitional government and army, and holding a referendum in the rebel areas in six years. These processes led to the successful independence of South Sudan in 2011. But following this peace agreement, rebels in the western Darfur region began to protest their exclusion from the peace agreement. In response, the government helped Arab (Muslim) militias raid black African (also Muslim) Darfur villages, wantonly killing, raping, and burning. In 2004, the government and some of the Darfur rebels reached a tentative peace agreement, and the African Union and United Nations sent in a joint peacekeeping mission in 2007. After years of Sudanese government delays and other frustrations, the force had 23,000 uniformed personnel on the ground by 2011. The international community’s ineffective response to the mass murders in Darfur, like that in Rwanda in 1994, shows the limited reach of international norms in today’s state-based international system.

In cases of both genocide and less extreme scapegoating, ethnic hatreds do not merely bubble up naturally. Rather, politicians provoke and channel hatred to strengthen their own power. Often, in ethnically divided countries, political parties form along ethnic lines and party leaders consolidate their positions in their own populations by exaggerating the dangers from the other side. The existence of a threat from an out-group promotes the cohesion of an in-group, thereby creating a somewhat self-reinforcing process of ethnic division.
Causes of Ethnic Hostility  Why do ethnic groups frequently dislike each other? Often, long-standing historical conflicts exist over specific territories or natural resources, or over one ethnic group’s economic exploitation or political domination of another. They become driven not by tangible grievances (though these may well persist) but by processes described by social psychology. The ethnic group is a kind of extended kinship group—a group of related individuals sharing some ancestors. Even when kinship relations are not very close, a group identity makes a person act as though the other members of the ethnic group were family. Perhaps as technology allows far-flung groups to congregate in cyberspace, there will be less psychological pressure to collect ethnic groups physically in a territorial nation-state.

Ethnocentrism, or in-group bias, is the tendency to see one’s own group in favorable terms and an out-group in unfavorable terms. No minimum criterion of similarity or kin relationship is needed to evoke the group identity process, including in-group bias. In psychological experiments, even trivial differentiations can evoke these processes. If people are assigned to groups based on a known but unimportant characteristic (such as preferring circles to triangles), before long the people in each group show in-group bias and begin to dislike the other group’s members. Just as the reciprocity principle has its negative side (see p. 5), so does the identity principle. The same forces that allow sacrifice for a group identity, as in the European Union, also allow the formation of in-group bias.

In-group biases are stronger when the other group looks different, speaks a different language, or worships in a different way (or all three). All too easily, an out-group can be dehumanized and stripped of all human rights. This dehumanization includes the common use of animal names—“pigs,” “dogs,” and so forth—for members of the out-group. U.S. propaganda in World War II depicted Japanese people as apes. Especially in wartime, dehumanization can be extreme. The restraints on war that have evolved in regular interstate warfare, such as not massacring civilians (see pp. 252–255), are easily discarded in interethnic warfare.

Experience in Western Europe shows that education over time can overcome ethnic animosities between traditionally hostile nations, such as France and Germany. After World War II, these states’ governments rewrote the textbooks for a new generation. Previously, each state’s textbooks had glorified its past deeds, played down its misdeeds, and portrayed its traditional enemies in unflattering terms. In a continent-wide project, new textbooks that gave a more objective and fair rendition were created. By contrast, present-day Japanese textbooks that gloss over Japan’s crimes in World War II continue to inflame relations with both China and Korea.

Ethnic groups are only one point along a spectrum of kinship relations—from nuclear families through extended families, villages, provinces, and nations, up to the entire human race. Loyalties fall at different points along the spectrum. It is unclear why people identify most strongly at one level of group identity. In Somalia, loyalties are to clans; in Serbia, they are to the ethnic group; in the United States and elsewhere, multiethnic countries command people’s primary loyalty. States reinforce their citizens’ identification with the state through flags, anthems, pledges of allegiance, and so forth. Perhaps someday people will shift loyalties further, developing a global identity as humans first and members of states and ethnic groups second.
**POLICY PERSPECTIVES**

**President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf**

**PROBLEM** How do you prevent civil war while retaining control of your government?

**BACKGROUND** Imagine you are the president of Liberia. Your election in the spring of 2006 as the first woman president in Africa was hailed as a breakthrough for Liberia. The election ended decades of political violence that devastated your own country as well your neighbors Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone. The violence ended when former Liberian president Charles Taylor went into exile in Nigeria. Tens of thousands of people lost their lives or were subject to human rights abuses, including torture and mutilation, in the wars begun under Taylor’s rule.

Recently, however, there is optimism within your country and from the international community. Rebel groups have remained quiet, and Charles Taylor was arrested in 2006 and faces trial in a war crimes tribunal. Economic aid has begun to stream into your country to assist in development. Your country is resource rich and has the potential to become a middle-income country owing to its vast natural agricultural and mineral resources. And you won the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize for helping end the war.

**DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS** Tremendous challenges, however, lie ahead. Economically, your country is underdeveloped, with years of civil war leading to increases in corruption and economic stagnation. Many of the powerful economic actors in your country benefit from the corruption and graft, which you have pledged to end. Unemployment is very high, with hundreds of thousands of young men unemployed. Until recently, roving bands of fighters controlled pockets of territory. Armed police have occasionally returned to the streets to restore order, and in late 2008, a mass breakout from the country’s only maximum security prison allowed over 100 criminals to escape.

**SCENARIO** Now imagine that a group that was involved in the civil war begins to reopen the war. The group has taken refuge in Sierra Leone and now begins to make cross-border raids against your country. Although Sierra Leone does not support the group, its government has limited resources to devote to the issue.

One option is to negotiate directly with the group. Negotiations could lead to peace, but might require power sharing in your government, which could derail your attempts to lessen corruption.

Another option is to use military force against the rebels. But international donors would discourage you from endangering the fragile peace in Liberia, with the implicit threat of an aid cutoff if you are perceived to be too hard-line. In addition, the reemergence of a civil war would make your proposed democratic and economic reforms more difficult to implement. Your military is not well trained and you are very uncertain about the possibility of success against the rebels. A strong military response to the rebels, however, could discourage future aggression and establish that you are a tough leader.

**CHOOSE YOUR POLICY** How do you handle this new threat from the rebels? Do you adopt a hard-line policy against them in hopes of defeating them? Or do you attempt reconciliation in hopes of minimizing the prospect of further bloodshed, but at the price of bringing your enemies into the government and thus undermining some of your goals?
Religious Conflict

One reason ethnic conflicts often transcend material grievances is that they find expression as religious conflicts. Because religion is the core of a community’s value system in much of the world, people whose religious practices differ are easily disdained and treated as unworthy or even inhuman. When overlaid on ethnic and territorial conflicts, religion often surfaces as the central and most visible division between groups. For instance, most people in Azerbaijan are Muslims; most Armenians are Christians.

Nothing inherent in religion mandates conflicts—in many places members of different religious groups coexist peacefully. But religious differences hold the potential to make existing conflicts more intractable, because religions involve core values, which are held as absolute truth. This is increasingly true as fundamentalist movements have gained strength in recent decades. (The reasons for fundamentalism are disputed, but it is clearly a global-level phenomenon.) Members of these movements organize their lives and communities around their religious beliefs; many are willing to sacrifice, kill, and die for those beliefs. Fundamentalist movements have become larger and more powerful in recent decades in Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and other religions. Such movements challenge the values and practices of secular political organizations—those created apart from religious establishments.

Among the secular practices threatened by fundamentalist movements include the rules of the international system, which treat states as formally equal and sovereign whether they are “believers” or “infidels.” As transnational belief systems, religions often are taken as a higher law than state laws and international treaties. This runs counter to the norms of the international system and to the assumptions of realism.

Islamist Movements  Currently, violent conflicts are being fought in the name of all the world’s major religions. But special attention is due to conflicts involving Islamic groups and states. Islamist actors are active participants in 9 of the world’s 13 wars in progress (see p. 108). In addition, the U.S. “war on terror” is directed against a network of Islamic terror groups. However, most Islamist movements are not violent.

Islam, the religion practiced by Muslims, is broad and diverse. Its divergent populations include Sunni Muslims (the majority), Shi’ite Muslims (concentrated in Iran, southern Iraq, southern Lebanon, and Bahrain), and many smaller branches and sects. Most countries with mainly Muslim populations belong to the Islamic Conference, an IGO. The world’s predominantly Islamic countries stretch from Nigeria to Indonesia, centered historically in the Middle East (see Figure 4.3) but with the largest populations in South and Southeast Asia. Many international conflicts around this zone involve Muslims on one side and non-Muslims on the other, as a result of geographical and historical circumstances including colonialism and oil.

Islamist groups advocate basing government and society on Islamic law. These groups vary greatly in the means they employ to pursue this goal. Most are nonviolent—charities and political parties. Some are violent—militias and terrorist networks. In Jordan, Islamic parties won the largest bloc of seats in Parliament without violence. In the 1990s Islamic parties gained ground in Turkey—a secular state in which the
If Islamist movements seek changes primarily in domestic policies, why do they matter for IR? Islamist politics may lead to different foreign policies, but the more important answer is that some Islamist movements have become a transnational force shaping world order and global North-South relations in important ways.

In several countries, Islamists reject Western-oriented secular states in favor of governments more explicitly oriented to Islamic values. These movements reflect
long-standing anti-Western sentiment in these countries—against the old European colonizers who were Christian—and are in some ways nationalist movements expressed through religious channels. In some Middle Eastern countries with authoritarian governments, religious institutions (mosques) have been the only available avenue for political opposition. Religion has therefore become a means to express opposition to the status quo in politics and culture.

Public opinion in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries shows some misconceptions and differences in opinion (see Figure 4.4). Support for Islamist radicals varies greatly among countries, from a majority in Jordan down to 14 percent and 13 percent in Turkey and Morocco, respectively. A 2005 poll recalls “mirror image” perceptions (see p. 82). In five Western industrialized countries, 40–80 percent thought Muslims were

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**FIGURE 4.4** Public Opinion in Muslim and Non-Muslim Countries, 2005

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>How often is suicide bombing or violence against civilians justified in order to defend Islam?</th>
<th>Percent responding often or sometimes in 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non-Muslims think Muslims are:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fanatical</th>
<th>Not respectful of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Muslims think non-Muslims are:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fanatical</th>
<th>Not respectful of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey.
“fanatical” and 60–80 percent thought Muslims did not respect women. But in three of five Muslim countries, more than 60 percent thought non-Muslims were “fanatical” and in four of those five countries, a majority thought non-Muslims did not respect women.

The more radical Islamist movements not only threaten some existing governments—especially those tied to the West—but also undermine traditional norms of state sovereignty. They reject Western political conceptions of the state (based on individual autonomy) in favor of a more traditional Islamic orientation based on community. Some aspire to create a single political state encompassing most of the Middle East, as existed in the caliphate of A.D. 600–1200. Such a development would create a profound challenge to the present international system—particularly to its current status quo powers—and would therefore be opposed at every turn by the world’s most powerful states.

Islamists in Middle Eastern countries, like revolutionaries elsewhere, derive their main base of strength from championing the cause of the poor masses against rich elites. Like other revolutionaries throughout the global South, Islamist movements in countries such as Turkey, Egypt, and Lebanon draw their base of support from poor slums, where the Islamists sometimes provide basic services unmet by the government.

In a public opinion poll in 2006 in Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, a plurality of respondents identified primarily as Muslims, more than identified primarily as citizens of their states or as Arabs. But in Lebanon and the UAE, the pattern was reversed, with large majorities identifying primarily as citizens of their states. Islamist movements tap into the public’s identification with issues that may not materially affect them but affect their identities as Muslims, across national borders—especially the Arab-Israeli conflict. The public in Muslim countries also cared about wars in the 1990s in Bosnia, Azerbaijan, and Chechnya, where Christian armed forces attacked Muslim civilians. Islamists see all these conflicts as part of a broad regional (or even global) struggle of Islam against Western, Christian imperialism—a struggle dating back to the Crusades almost a thousand years ago. From the perspective of some outsiders, the religious conflicts boiling and simmering at the edges of the Islamic world look like an expansionist threat to be contained. The view from within looks more like being surrounded and repressed.

The 2003 Iraq War greatly inflamed anti-American feeling and helped radicalize politics across the Muslim world, especially in Arab countries that saw the U.S. invasion as a humiliation to Arab dignity. However, the presidency of Barack Hussein Obama, whose middle name reflects Muslim family roots in Kenya, has already increased America’s favorability ratings in Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt. Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech on America’s relations with Muslim states, calling for a “new beginning,” was also an attempt to build Muslims’ trust of America.

**Armed Islamist Groups** Anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in predominantly Islamic countries have accelerated the growth of violent Islamist groups as well. Although they are in the minority, they have disproportionate effects on IR and receive the most public attention.

Armed Islamist groups vary tremendously, and in some cases violently disagree with each other (see Table 4.1). In particular, divisions between the Sunni and Shi’ite wings of Islam have led to violence, especially in and around Iraq—a Shi’ite-majority country ruled by Sunnis under Saddam Hussein. Iraq’s war against Shi’ite Iran killed a...
### TABLE 4.1 Major Armed Islamist Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Branch of Islam</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Shi’ite</td>
<td>Only Islamic revolution to successfully control a state (since 1979); held off secular Iraq in 1980s war; now attempting to build nuclear weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Shi’ite</td>
<td>Fought well against Israeli army in 2006 war. Previously claimed credit for driving Israel from southern Lebanon in 2000. Popular even with Sunnis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahdi Army</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Shi’ite</td>
<td>Clashed with U.S. forces in Iraq; major faction in Iraqi government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Insurgent forces inflicted many casualties on U.S. forces in Iraq. Foreign fighters also active in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Palestine (Gaza)</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Forces have killed hundreds of Israeli civilians and fought a war against Israel in 2008. Won Palestinian elections in 2006. Controls Gaza Strip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al Shabab</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Controls part of the country. Has allied itself with al Qaeda. Weakened in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Forces have fought for independence of certain regions in the Muslim-populated southern Philippine islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al Qaeda</td>
<td>World (Pakistan?)</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>9/11 attacks and European bombings. Weakened by deaths of top leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Controlled Afghanistan and gave sanctuary to al Qaeda until ousted after 9/11. Regrouped in remote Pakistan and staged many attacks since 2006.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Islamist guerrilla fighters/terrorists are also active in Chechnya (Russia), Kashmir (India), Central Asia, Indonesia, and Europe.

million people, and Saddam's repression of a Shi'ite uprising after the 1991 Gulf War killed tens of thousands at the least. Under the U.S. occupation of Iraq since 2003, Shi'ite parties took power and Shi'ite militias exacted revenge, while some Sunnis waged a relentless and brutal insurgency. In 2006, after the bombing of a revered Shi'ite mosque in Iraq, a wave of sectarian violence killed tens of thousands of Iraqis. In the subsequent years, violence among rival factions in Iraq increased and then lessened, but the long-term relationship of Iraqi Sunnis and Shi’ites remains unsettled.

In the worldwide picture as well, armed Islamist groups divide into Sunni and Shi’ite wings that do not cooperate much. On the Shi’ite side, the most important groups are Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Mahdi Army in Iraq (and other Shi’ite
Conflicts of Ideas

militias there), and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. These groups are all relatively successful—in Iran the religious leadership controls the state, and in Lebanon, Hezbollah controls territory and holds seats in the national legislature.

In Iran, a popular uprising in 1979 overthrew the U.S.-backed shah and installed an Islamic government in which the top religious leaders (ayatollahs) can overturn the laws passed by the parliament. The rejection of international norms by some Islamists was dramatically illustrated when Iran refused to protect U.S. diplomats and the U.S. embassy in Iran (see “Laws of Diplomacy” on pp. 246–247). Defying the UN Security Council, Iran is currently developing nuclear technology that could produce nuclear weapons within about five years. In 2009, however, divisions emerged in Iran over a disputed presidential election. Moderate political elements accused Islamic extremists of hijacking the elections and the country, while hurting Iran's relations with the West.

Iran strongly supports—with money, arms, and training—the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. Hezbollah runs hundreds of schools, hospitals, and other charities, but is also included on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. Hezbollah claimed that its attacks induced Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000. Then in 2006, Hezbollah showed itself to be a competent military force, putting up a stiff fight in a brief but destructive war with Israel. Hezbollah's success in “standing up to Israel” won it popular support throughout the Arab world, even among Sunnis. But it raised old divisions within Lebanon, leading to more political instability there. Hezbollah took a leading role in Lebanon's government in 2011, despite a UN tribunal's indictment of its members for the 2005 assassination of Lebanon's prime minister.

Iran also supports Shi'ite militias in southern Iraq, but they operate independently. (Although both Iranians and southern Iraqis are Shi'ites, the first are Persians and the latter Arabs.) Two of the largest such militias are the virulently anti-American Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which is less anti-American. The Mahdi Army's influence has diminished since the Iraqi government fought for and won military control of the main southern Iraqi city and the U.S. army cleared Mahdi fighters from Baghdad.

On the Sunni side, the major radical Islamist groups adhere to some version of Wahhabism, a fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law with roots in Saudi Arabia. The most important center of this fundamentalist movement currently is in Afghanistan and the next-door tribal areas of western Pakistan.

An Islamic government was established in Afghanistan in 1992 after a civil war (and following a decade of ill-fated Soviet occupation). Rival Islamic factions then continued the war with even greater intensity for several years. By 1997, a faction called Taliban had taken control of most of Afghanistan and imposed an extreme interpretation of Islamic law. With beatings and executions, the regime forced women to wear head-to-toe coverings, girls to stay out of school, and men to grow beards, among other repressive policies.

The incendiary mixture in Afghanistan in the 1990s—unending war, grinding poverty, Islamic fundamentalism, and an ideologically driven government—allowed Afghanistan to become a base for worldwide terrorist operations, culminating in the September 11, 2001, attacks. In response, the United States exerted its power to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and disrupt the al Qaeda terrorist network headquartered there. Despite U.S. successes in the 2001 war, the Taliban continues daily
attacks on NATO forces. Attacks on civilians also continue in Afghanistan.

The defeat of fundamentalists in Afghanistan in 2001 put pressure on its much larger next-door neighbor, nuclear-armed Pakistan, whose military ruler tried, after 2001, to smother Islamic extremists and hold together a stable, relatively secular government. Radically anti-American Islamists have gained control of Pakistan’s autonomous “tribal areas” bordering Afghanistan, using them to launch attacks on Afghanistan, on Pakistan’s cities, and in late 2008 on Mumbai, India. Pro-democracy forces in Pakistan ousted the military ruler and installed an elected government in 2008, though not until after the movement’s leader, Benazir Bhutto, had been assassinated.

The war in Afghanistan has strained relations between Pakistan and the United States and its NATO allies. American officials have accused some Pakistani officials of aiding anti-NATO Islamist forces. In 2010, a leak of over 90,000 documents on the Internet further strained Pakistani-American relations as many of those documents revealed frustrations among U.S. commanders at the cooperation between Taliban forces and some members of the Pakistani intelligence agency. These strains worsened in 2011 when U.S. forces found and killed Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani city.

Al Qaeda is an international group—more a network or movement than a central organization in recent years—that recruits fighters from various countries, possibly trains them in other countries, and perhaps sends them on missions to fight in foreign conflicts (such as Afghanistan in the 1980s or Iraq today).

Elsewhere in Asia, Islamic extremist groups connected with al Qaeda continue to operate. In 2002 terrorists killed hundreds—mostly Australians—in a nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia. In 2003, al Qaeda and related groups carried out terror bombings worldwide—in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Iraq, and

In some Muslim-populated countries, Islam is a political rallying point—especially in authoritarian countries in which the mosque is a rare permitted gathering point. Islamist politicians are developing new models of government, mixing democracy and Islamic tradition, especially in the countries most affected by the Arab Spring protests, which frequently peaked after Friday prayers. Here, Egyptians pray during a Friday protest against the authoritarian president early in 2011.
Turkey. In 2004, they bombed trains in Madrid, killing hundreds and apparently tipping an election against the pro-American Spanish government—and thus inducing Spain to pull its troops out of Iraq. In 2005, their followers—Muslims who had grown up in Britain—bombed the London subway and bus system. In 2008, armed attackers from Pakistan stormed hotels and public places in Mumbai, India, and killed about 150 people, mostly in random shootings. The attack heightened tensions between India and Pakistan, but cooler heads prevailed and the nuclear-armed rivals did not move toward war.

In Saudi Arabia—home to the world’s largest oil reserves, Islam’s holiest sites, and the roots of Wahhabism—al Qaeda has long sought to overthrow the monarchy, which stays in power through a combination of repression, cooptation, and oil-funded economic development. In 1979, Islamist militants briefly seized control of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and in 2003 al Qaeda suicide bombers attacked several residential compounds in the kingdom.

In Palestine, the radical Islamist faction Hamas is another important Sunni Islamist militia, not closely connected with al Qaeda or Taliban. Centered in the Gaza Strip, Hamas sent suicide bombers that killed hundreds of Israelis after 2000, then won free parliamentary elections in 2006 because it was seen as less corrupt than the dominant secular Fatah party. However, the Palestinian presidency remains in Fatah control, and rival security organizations have occasionally fought street battles. Today, Palestine remains divided, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas controlling the Gaza Strip, which Israel heavily attacked in early 2009.

Sudan’s civil war between the mainly Muslim north (government-run) and the mainly Christian and animist south dragged on for two decades and killed millions. A 2005 peace agreement ended the war, and led ultimately to South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

Somalia has become the most recent location for Sunni Islamist activists. One important group in Somalia is known as al Shabab. It was formed from the remains of the conservative Islamic Courts Union, which was ousted from power by an invasion by Ethiopia in 2006. Al Shabab began in southern Somalia as a small, independent Islamist group, but seized control of large parts of Somalia and claims ties to al Qaeda. The group claimed credit for deadly bombings in Uganda during the 2010 World Cup finals. The African Union maintains a 6,000-strong force in Somalia, and in 2011 it managed to push al Shabab out of the capital. A terrible famine, caused by drought and war, gripped the Shabab-held areas of the country and forced refugees into Kenya. In late 2011, Kenya sent military forces into southern Somalia to attack al Shabab, trying to create a more stable border and open up famine areas to international assistance.

The predominantly Sunni Muslim republic of Chechnya, a Russian province, tried to split away from Russia in the early 1990s after the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1994–1995, Russia sent in a huge military force that destroyed the Chechen capital but faced fierce resistance from Chechen nationalist guerrillas and withdrew in defeat. In 1999–2000, another destructive Russian campaign won power in the province. But Chechen guerrillas continued to fight and in 2004, hundreds of children died after
Chechen terrorists took over a school and held them hostage. In 2005, Russian forces killed the Chechen separatist leader they held responsible, and the war in Chechnya has now all but ended.

Overall, conflicts involving Islamist movements are more complex than simply religious conflicts; they concern power, economic relations, ethnic chauvinism, and historical empires as well.

**Ideological Conflict**

To a large extent, ideology, like religion, symbolizes and intensifies conflicts between groups and states more than it causes them. But ideologies have a somewhat weaker hold on core values and absolute truth than religions do.

For realists, ideological differences among states do not matter much, because all members of the international system pursue their national interests in the context of relatively fluid alliances. Over the long run, even countries that experience revolutions based on strong ideologies tend to lose their ideological fervor—be it Iran's Islamic fundamentalism in 1979, China's Maoist communism in 1949, Russia's Leninist communism in 1917, or even U.S. democracy in 1776. In each case, the revolutionaries expected that their assumption of power would dramatically alter their state's foreign policy, because in each case their ideology had profound international implications. Yet within a few decades, each of these revolutionary governments turned to the pursuit of national interests above ideological ones.

Sometimes even self-proclaimed ideological struggles are not really ideological. In Angola in the 1980s, the United States backed a rebel army called UNITA against a Soviet-aligned government—supposedly a struggle of democracy against Marxism. In truth, the ideological differences were quite arbitrary. The government mouthed Marxist rhetoric to get the Soviet Union to give it aid (a policy it reversed as soon as
Soviet aid dried up). The rebels who used democratic rhetoric to get U.S. support had earlier received Chinese support and mouthed Maoist rhetoric. This conflict, which finally ended in 2002, really had nothing to do with ideology. It was a power struggle between two armed, ethnically based factions fighting to control Angola’s oil, diamonds, and other wealth.

In the short term, revolutions do change international relations—they make wars more likely—but not because of ideology. Rather, the sudden change of governments can alter alliances and change the balance of power. With calculations of power being revised by all parties, it is easy to miscalculate or to exaggerate threats on both sides. But revolutions are seldom exported to other states.

**Conflicts of Interest**

If conflicts of ideas can be intractable because of psychological and emotional factors, conflicts about material interests are somewhat easier to settle based on the reciprocity principle. In theory, given enough positive leverage—a payment in some form—any state should agree to another state’s terms on a disputed issue.

**Territorial Disputes**

Among the international conflicts that concern tangible “goods,” those about territory have special importance because of the territorial nature of the state (see pp. 41–43). Conflicts over control of territory are really of two varieties: territorial disputes (about where borders are drawn) and conflicts over control of entire states within existing borders (discussed next under “Control of Governments”). Consider first differences over where borders between two states should be drawn—that is, who controls a disputed piece of land. Because states value home territory with an almost fanatical devotion, border disputes tend to be among the most intractable in IR. States seldom yield territory in exchange for money or any other positive reward. Nor do states quickly forget territory that they lose involuntarily. For example, in 2002, Bolivian public opinion opposed a gas export pipeline through Chile to the sea because Chile had seized the coastline from Bolivia in 1879. The goal of regaining territory lost to another state is called *irredentism*. This form of nationalism often leads directly to serious interstate conflicts.

Because of their association with the integrity of states, territories are valued far beyond any inherent economic or strategic value they hold. For example, after Israel and Egypt made peace in 1978, it took them a decade to settle a border dispute at Taba, a tiny plot of beachfront on which Israeli developers had built a hotel just across the old border. The two states finally submitted the issue for binding arbitration, and Egypt ended up in possession. For Egypt, regaining every inch of territory was a matter of national honor and a symbol of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The value states place on home territory seems undiminished despite the apparent reduction in the inherent value of territory as technology has developed. Historically, territory was the basis of economic production—agriculture and the extraction of raw materials. Winning wars meant gaining territory, which meant increasing wealth.
Today, however, much more wealth derives from trade and technology than from agriculture. The costs of most territorial disputes appear to outweigh any economic benefits that the territory in question could provide. Exceptions exist, however, such as the capture of diamond-mining areas in several African countries by rebels who use the diamond revenues to finance war. (In 2002, 40 states created a program of UN certification for legitimate diamonds, trying to keep the “conflict diamonds” off the international market.)

**Secession** Efforts by a province or region to secede from an existing state are a special type of conflict over borders—not the borders of two existing states but the efforts to draw international borders around a new state. Dozens of secession movements exist around the world, of varying sizes and political effectiveness, but they succeed in seceding only rarely. The existing state almost always tries to hold on to the area in question. For example, in the 1990s, the predominantly Albanian population of the Serbian province of Kosovo fought a war to secede from Serbia. NATO intervention, including sustained bombing of Serbia (not approved by the UN), led to the withdrawal of Serbia’s army from Kosovo and its replacement with European and American peacekeeping troops who have been there ever since. Most of the Kosovo population wants to secede and become an internationally recognized state, but Serbians argue that Kosovo is historically and presently under Serbian sovereignty. While the UN and the great powers negotiated over the future of Kosovo, with Russia insisting there be no promise of independence, Kosovars took matters into their own hands. In 2008, Kosovo declared independence without UN approval. Several countries, including the United States and the largest EU states, recognized Kosovo’s independence, angering Serbia, Russia, and China. In 2011, South Sudan successfully gained independence with UN membership and the support of Sudan.

Wars of secession can be large and deadly, and they can easily spill over international borders or draw in other countries. This spillover is particularly likely if members of an ethnic or a religious group span two sides of a border, constituting the majority group in one state and a majority in a nearby region of another state, but a minority in the other state as a whole. In the Kosovo case, Albanian Muslims are the majority in Albania and in Kosovo but the minority in Serbia. The same pattern occurs in Bosnia-Serbia, Moldova-Russia, and India-Pakistan. In some cases, secessionists want to merge their territories with the neighboring state, which amounts to redrawing the international border. International norms frown on such an outcome.

The strong international norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity treat secession movements as domestic problems of little concern to other states. The general principle seems to be this: “We existing states all have our own domestic problems and disaffected groups or regions, so we must stick together behind sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Thus, for instance, Russia and China opposed the secession of Kosovo from Serbia because of its implications for Chechnya and Taiwan, respectively.

This principle does have limits, however. In August of 2008, after fighting broke out between the Georgian military and the Georgian province of South Ossetia, Russia intervened militarily on behalf of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, resulting in a brief war...
between Russia and Georgia. Russia then recognized both Georgian provinces as independent, a move denounced by the United States and the EU and not accepted by the UN.

Messy border problems can result when multinational states break up into pieces. In such cases, borders that had been internal become international; because these borders are new, they may be more vulnerable to challenge. In the former Yugoslavia, ethnic groups had intermingled and intermarried, leaving mixed populations in most of the Yugoslav republics. When Yugoslavia broke up in 1991–1992, several republics declared their independence as separate states. Two of these, Croatia and Bosnia, contained minority populations of ethnic Serbs. Serbia seized effective control of significant areas of Croatia and Bosnia that contained Serbian communities or linked such populations geographically. Non-Serbian populations in these areas were driven out or massacred—euphemistically called “ethnic cleansing.” Then, when Croatia reconquered most of its territory in 1995, Serbian populations fled. Ethnic nationalism, whipped up by opportunistic politicians, proved stronger than multiethnic tolerance in both Serbia and Croatia.

The breakup of a state need not lead to violence, however. Serbia split peacefully from Montenegro (a former Yugoslav republic) in 2006. Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in a cooperative manner. And the breakup of the Soviet Union mostly did not lead to violent territorial disputes between republics even when ethnic groups spanned new international borders (such as Ukraine-Russia).

The norm against forceful redrawing of borders does not apply to cases of decolonization. Only the territorial integrity of existing, recognized states is protected by international norms. Colonies and other territorial possessions historically had value only as property to be won, lost, sold, or traded in political deals and wars. The transfer of Hong Kong from British to Chinese control in 1997 illustrates how colonial territory is
dispensable (Britain’s perspective) while home territory is nearly sacred (China’s perspective). From neither perspective do the views of the inhabitants carry much weight.

Increasingly, autonomy for a region has become a realistic compromise between secession and full control by a central government. In 2005, spurred partly by the devastating tsunami a year earlier, separatists in Aceh province, Indonesia, disbanded, giving up independence and instead participating in regional elections in 2006. The Indonesian government withdrew its 24,000 troops from Aceh and offered the province limited self-rule along with 70 percent of the oil, gas, and mineral wealth earned there.

Interstate Borders  Border disputes between existing states are taken more seriously by the international community, but are less common than secessionist conflicts. Because of the norm of territorial integrity, few important border conflicts remain among long-established states. At one time, huge chunks of territory passed between states at the stroke of a pen. Since the end of World War II, however, only a minuscule amount of territory has changed hands between established states through force (this does not apply to the formation of new states and the fragmenting of old ones).

Furthermore, when territorial disputes do occur between established states, they can be settled peacefully. In 2006, Nigeria withdrew its troops from the potentially oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula, which it ceded to Cameroon’s sovereignty. The resolution of the dispute, dating from colonial times, followed more than a decade of painstaking progress through the World Court, the personal mediation of the UN secretary-general when Nigeria initially rejected the Court’s decision, and the promise of outside powers to monitor implementation of the agreement. Why would Nigeria—a country with nine times Cameroon’s population, more than triple its GDP, and a much stronger military—voluntarily cede territory? Doing so would seem to run counter to the predictions of realism in particular and the dominance principle in general. Liberal theories would do better at explaining this outcome: Nigeria acted in its own self-interest, because turning the dispute over to the World Court and bringing in the UN to assist with implementation brought the kind of stability needed for foreign investment to develop the area’s resources, primarily oil.

Lingering Disputes  Today, the few remaining interstate border disputes generate important international conflicts. Among the most difficult are the borders of Israel, which have never been firmly defined and recognized by its neighbors. The 1948 cease-fire lines resulting from Israel’s war of independence expanded in the 1967 war, then contracted again on the Egyptian border after the Camp David peace treaty of 1978. The remaining territories occupied in 1967—the West Bank near Jordan, the Gaza Strip near Egypt, and the Golan Heights of Syria—are central to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Another serious border dispute is in the Kashmir area where India, Pakistan, and China intersect. The Indian-held part of Kashmir is predominantly inhabited by Muslims, a group that is the majority in Pakistan but a minority in India. A Line of Control divides the disputed province. Pakistan accuses India of oppressing Kashmiris and thwarting an international agreement to decide Kashmir’s future by a popular
Conflicts of Interest

referendum. India accuses Pakistan of aiding and infiltrating Islamic radicals who carry out attacks in Indian-occupied Kashmir. The two countries went to war twice before over the issue, and nearly did so again in 2002—but this time with both sides holding dozens of nuclear-armed missiles that some experts estimated would kill more than 10 million people in an India-Pakistan war. Perhaps chastened by this experience, the two countries improved relations in 2003 and 2004, maintaining a cease-fire that stopped the incessant low-level fighting along the Line of Control, though not the fighting between Indian authorities and insurgents. In 2004, India agreed to begin a slow withdrawal of troops, and in 2005 a major earthquake helped relations, as relief efforts need coordination. In 2008, Indian-administered elections were held, and despite separatists’ calls for a boycott, turnout was high.

Many of the world’s other remaining interstate territorial disputes—and often the most serious ones—concern the control of small islands, which often provide strategic advantages, natural resources (such as offshore oil), or fishing rights. International law now gives an island’s owner fishing and mineral rights in surrounding seas for 200 miles in each direction. Six countries claim the tiny Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (see Figure 4.5). In 2002, they agreed to avoid confrontations over the islands, and they

FIGURE 4.5 Disputed Islands

The Spratly Islands exemplify contemporary conflicts over territory and natural resources around islands. All or part of the Spratlys are claimed by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
remain calm. Japan and China also dispute tiny islands, as do Japan and South Korea, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, Spain and Morocco, Argentina and Britain, and Russia and Japan. In 2005, Japan and China argued over whether Okinotori—an uninhabited coral reef with two tiny protrusions smaller than a house—was an “island” (with surrounding economic rights) or just a “rock.”

**Territorial Waters** States treat territorial waters near their shores as part of their national territory. Definitions of such waters are not universally agreed upon, but norms have developed in recent years, especially since the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (see p. 318). Waters within three miles of shore have traditionally been recognized as territorial, but there are disputes about how far out national sovereignty extends and for what purposes. UNCLOS generally allows a 12-mile limit for shipping and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) covering fishing and mineral rights (but allowing for free navigation). The EEZs together cover a third of the world’s oceans. In 2010, Russia and Norway agreed to divide portions of the Arctic Ocean into EEZs for the purposes of oil and gas extraction, ending a 40-year dispute between those states.

Because of the EEZs, sovereignty over a single tiny island can now bring with it rights to as much as 100,000 square miles of surrounding ocean. But these zones overlap greatly, and shorelines do not run in straight lines; numerous questions of interpretation thus arise about how to delineate territorial and economic waters. In the Sea of Okhotsk, Russia’s EEZ includes all but a small “doughnut hole” of international waters in the middle. Non-Russian boats have fished intensively in the “hole,” which depletes fish stocks in Russia’s EEZ.

**Airspace** The airspace above a state is considered the territory of the state. To fly over a state’s territory, an airplane must have that state’s permission. For example, in a 1986 raid on Libya, U.S. bombers based in Britain had to fly a long detour over the Atlantic Ocean because France (between Britain and Libya) would not let U.S. planes use its airspace.
Outer space, by contrast, is considered international territory like the oceans. International law does not define exactly where airspace ends and outer space begins. However, orbiting satellites fly higher than airplanes, move very fast, and cannot easily change direction to avoid overflying a country. And very few states can shoot down satellites. Because satellites have become useful to all the great powers as intelligence-gathering tools, and because all satellites are extremely vulnerable to attack, a norm of demilitarization of outer space has developed. No state has ever attacked the satellite of another.

Control of Governments

Despite the many minor border disputes that continue to plague the world, most struggles to control territory do not involve changing borders or fighting over islands. Rather, they are conflicts over which governments will control entire states within their existing borders.

In theory, states do not interfere in each other’s governance, because of the norm of sovereignty. In practice, however, states often have strong interests in other states’ governments and try to influence who holds power in those states. Conflicts over governments take many forms, some mild and some severe, some deeply entwined with third parties, and some more or less bilateral. Sometimes a state merely exerts subtle influences on another state’s elections; at other times, a state supports rebel elements seeking to overthrow the second state’s government.

Occasionally, one state invades another in order to change its government. The Soviet Union did this in Czechoslovakia in 1968; the United States did not do so in Iraq in 1991 but did in 2003. The international community frowns on such overt violations of national sovereignty.

Economic Conflict

Economic competition is the most pervasive form of conflict in international relations because economic transactions are pervasive. Every sale made and every deal reached across international borders entails a resolution of conflicting interests. Costa Rica wants the price of coffee, which it exports, to go up; Canada, which imports coffee, wants it to go down. In a global capitalist market, all economic exchanges involve some conflict of interest.

However, such economic transactions also contain a strong element of mutual economic gain in addition to the element of conflicting interests (see Chapters 3 and 5). These mutual gains provide the most useful leverage in bargaining over economic exchanges: states and companies enter into economic transactions because they profit from doing so. The use of violence would usually diminish such profit by more than could be gained as a result of the use of violence. Thus, economic conflicts do not usually lead to military force and war.

Another kind of economic conflict that affects international security concerns military industry—the capacity to produce military equipment, especially high-technology weapons such as fighter aircraft or missiles. There is a world trade in such items, but
national governments try (not always successfully) to control such production—to try to ensure that national interests take priority over those of manufacturers and that the state is militarily self-sufficient in case of war. Economic competition (over who profits from such sales) is interwoven with security concerns (over who gets access to the weapons). In 2009, proponents of a bailout for the U.S. automobile industry argued that the industry could provide vital production capacity in time of war, as it had during World War II. The transfer of knowledge about high-tech weaponry and military technologies to potentially hostile states is a related concern.

Economic competition also becomes a security issue when it concerns trade in strategic materials needed for military purposes, such as special minerals or alloys for aircraft production and uranium for atomic weapons. Few countries are self-sufficient in these materials; the United States imports about half the strategic materials it uses. Nearly every country must import at least some strategic materials for its economy to function.

**Drug Trafficking** As a form of illegal trade across international borders, drug trafficking is smuggling, which deprives states of revenue and violates states’ legal control of their borders. But smuggling in general is an economic issue rather than a security one (see p. 180). Unlike other smuggled goods, however, drugs are treated as a security threat because of their effect on national (and military) morale and efficiency. Drug trafficking also has become linked with security concerns because military forces participate regularly in operations against the heavily armed drug traffickers.

The U.S. government is trying to prevent cocaine cartels based in Colombia from supplying cocaine to U.S. cities. Such cocaine derives mostly from coca plants grown by peasants in mountainous areas of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia itself. For poor peasants, the cocaine trade may be their only access to a decent income. More importantly for international security, rebel armies in two of the world’s 13 active wars—Afghanistan and Colombia—fund their operations primarily through control of the trade in illicit drugs. Afghanistan, the central front in the West’s struggle against Islamist extremism (specifically the Taliban), supplies most of the raw material for heroin in the world.

In Latin America, the long history of U.S. military intervention makes state cooperation with U.S. military forces a sensitive political issue. In 1989, U.S. forces invaded Panama; arrested its leader, dictator Manuel Noriega; and convicted him in U.S. courts of complicity in drug trafficking through Panama.

All six types of conflict discussed in this chapter can be pursued through peaceful or violent means. The rest of this chapter examines how states and armed nonstate groups use capabilities of violence to pursue their goals in international conflicts.

**Conventional Military Forces**

A state leader in a conflict can apply various kinds of leverage to influence an outcome (see Figure 4.6). One set of levers represents nonviolent means of influencing other states, such as foreign aid, economic sanctions, and personal diplomacy (less tangible means are the use of norms, morality, and other ideas). A second set of levers—the subject of the rest of this chapter—involves violent actions. They set armies marching or missiles flying.
Great powers continue to dominate the makeup of world military forces. Table 4.2 summarizes the most important forces of the great powers. Together, they account for about two-thirds of world military spending, a third of the world’s soldiers, a third of the weapons, 99 percent of nuclear weapons, and 85 percent of arms exports. (The table also indicates the sizable military forces maintained by Germany and Japan despite their nontraditional roles in international security since World War II.)

Military capabilities divide into three types: conventional forces, irregular forces (terrorism, militias), and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons). Conventional forces are most important—they are active in all 13 wars currently in progress.

**Land Forces: Controlling Territory**

Whatever their ultimate causes and objectives, most wars involve a struggle to control territory. Territory holds a central place in warfare because of its importance in the international system, and vice versa. Borders define where a state’s own military forces and rival states’ military forces are free to move. Armies are adapted to take, hold, or defend territory. Military forces with armed foot soldiers can occupy a territory militarily. Although inhabitants may make the soldiers’ lives unhappy through violent or nonviolent resistance, generally only another organized military force can displace occupiers.

Foot soldiers are called the infantry. They use assault rifles and other light weapons (such as mines and machine guns) as well as heavy artillery of various types. Artillery is
TABLE 4.2  Estimated Great Power Military Capabilities, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military Expenditures* (Billions of US $)</th>
<th>Active Duty Soldiers* (Millions)</th>
<th>Heavy Weapons*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>Carriers/ Warships/ Submarines</td>
<td>Combat Airplanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate %</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximate % of world total:

Problematic data: Russian and Chinese military expenditure estimates vary. Many Chinese aircraft and Russian tanks are old and of limited military use. U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads include deployed strategic weapons (2,500 U.S., 4,800 Russian) with the remainder held in reserve or retired (awaiting destruction).

Data on soldiers exclude reserves. Tanks include only main battle tanks. Carriers include only supercarriers. Warships are major surface combat ships over 3,000 tons. Nuclear warheads include both strategic and tactical weapons. Arms exports are for orders placed 2008.

extremely destructive and not very discriminating: it usually causes the most damage and casualties in wars. Armor refers to tanks and armored vehicles. In open terrain, such as desert, mechanized ground forces typically combine armor, artillery, and infantry. In close terrain, such as jungles and cities, however, foot soldiers are more important.

Counterinsurgency has received growing attention in recent years because of Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is central to all 13 wars currently in progress worldwide. Counterinsurgency warfare often includes programs to try to “win the hearts and minds” of populations so that they stop sheltering the guerrillas.

In some ways, because counterinsurgency warfare is as much about political gains as military strategy, it is the most complex type of warfare. While battling armed factions of an insurgency, a government must essentially conduct a public relations campaign to persuade the population to abandon the movement and provide public services (such as education and welfare programs) to show its responsiveness to the population. In addition, a government must be strong militarily, but cannot be too brutal in the application of force, lest more of the population begin to support the guerrillas.

U.S. military forces have conducted counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan for several years. The campaigns have included the use of lethal military force, payments to key tribal leaders to support American efforts, assisting the formation of local government, and training new police and military forces to combat the insurgency. These types of activities place tremendous stress on militaries, which are usually trained only to fight wars, not undertake rebuilding distant governments.

Counterinsurgency campaigns are costly and labor-intensive. For example, the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual suggests that 20 troops should be deployed for every 1,000 citizens to be protected from insurgents. Few states can afford such campaigns for long periods of time. Indeed, even including allied forces, the U.S. never reached such a ratio of troops-to-population in Iraq or Afghanistan. Such a ratio would require 580,000 troops for Afghanistan, compared with the 100,000 actually deployed there in 2010.

A common tool of guerrillas, insurgents, and the governments fighting them are land mines, which are simple, small, and cheap containers of explosives with a trigger activated by contact or sensor. These mines were a particular focus of public attention in the 1990s because in places such as Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Bosnia, they were used extensively by irregular military forces that never disarmed them. Long after such a war ends, land mines continue to maim and kill civilians who try to reestablish their lives in former war zones. Public opinion and NGOs have pressured governments to restrict the future use of land mines. A treaty to ban land mines was signed by more than 100 countries at a 1997 conference organized by Canada. Russia and Japan signed on shortly afterward, but not China or the United States (which said mines would be needed to slow any North Korean invasion of South Korea). By 2009, more than 44 million land mines had been destroyed under the treaty, with 86 countries eliminating their stockpiles.

Naval Forces: Controlling the Seas

Navies are adapted primarily to control passage through the seas and to attack land near coastlines. Controlling the seas in wartime allows states to move their own goods and military forces by sea while preventing enemies from doing so.
Recently, navies of the Western powers began facing a new mission, responding to the rapid growth of piracy in two of the world’s vital shipping lanes—the waters off Somalia south of the Suez Canal, and the Straits of Malacca in Indonesia connecting the Indian Ocean with East Asia. The Somali pirates, taking advantage of near-anarchy in that country, established safe havens onshore and ventured out to capture dozens of ships, holding the vessels, cargoes, and crews for ransom (see Figure 4.7). Shipping companies generally paid up, first hundreds of thousands and eventually millions of dollars per ship, rather than lose valuable goods and people. In the fall of 2008, the pirates pushed the limits by capturing first a Ukrainian freighter loaded with tanks and weapons and then a huge Saudi oil tanker with $100 million of oil. The pirates’ methods are simple but effective. Racing to ships in very small, fast boats, and armed with automatic rifles and grenade launchers, they toss up grappling hooks, climb the sides, and subdue the crew, typically within about five minutes. Western navies have organized patrols in the area to deter piracy, but with limited success because of the huge stretches of sea in which the pirates could operate (more than a million square miles) and the tens of thousands of commercial ships passing through it each year. The problem illustrates a main challenge facing navies, namely the sheer size of the

**FIGURE 4.7** Pirate Attacks Near Somalia, January to September 2008

Source: UNOSAT map, October 2, 2008.
oceans and the inability of ships to be everywhere, even in the relative confines of major shipping lanes.

Aircraft carriers—mobile platforms for attack aircraft—are instruments of power projection that can attack virtually any state in the world. Merely sending an aircraft carrier sailing to the vicinity of an international conflict implies a threat to use force. For example, in 1996 the United States dispatched two carriers to the Taiwan area when Chinese war games there threatened to escalate. In 2001, however, during a tense standoff when a U.S. reconnaissance airplane crash-landed in China, the United States pointedly refrained from sending aircraft carriers, signaling an intent to settle the conflict diplomatically. Aircraft carriers are extremely expensive and typically require 20 to 25 supporting ships for protection and supply. Only the United States currently operates large carriers, known as supercarriers. Currently, the United States maintains 11 supercarriers, costing more than $5 billion each and $250 million a year to operate. Eight other countries (France, India, Russia, Spain, Brazil, Italy, Thailand, and the United Kingdom) maintain smaller carriers that use helicopters or small airplanes.

Surface ships, which account for the majority of warships, rely increasingly on guided missiles and are in turn vulnerable to attack by missiles (fired from ships, planes, submarines, or land). Because the ranges of small missiles now reach from dozens to hundreds of miles, naval warfare emphasizes detection at great distances without being detected oneself—a cat-and-mouse game of radar surveillance and electronic countermeasures.

**Air Forces: Controlling the Skies**

Air forces serve several purposes—strategic bombing of land or sea targets; “close air support” (battlefield bombing); interception of other aircraft; reconnaissance; and airlift of supplies, weapons, and troops. Missiles—whether fired from air, land, or sea—are increasingly important. In the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the U.S.-made portable Stinger missiles used by guerrillas took a heavy toll on the Soviet air force. In 2003, the threat from shoulder-fired missiles kept the Baghdad airport closed to commercial air traffic for more than a year.
Traditionally, and still to some extent, aerial bombing resembles artillery shelling in that it causes great destruction with little discrimination. This has changed somewhat as smart bombs improve accuracy. Laser-guided bombs follow a sensor pointed at the target from the air or ground. Other bombs use GPS navigation (see p. 143) to hit targets through clouds, smoke, or sandstorms. Most of the bombing in the 1991 Gulf War was high-altitude saturation bombing using dumb bombs. But in the 2003 Iraq War, the massive air campaign early in the war entirely used smart bombs, hitting far more targets with fewer bombs.

The increasing sophistication of electronic equipment and the high-performance requirements of attack aircraft make air forces expensive—totally out of reach for some states. Thus, rich states have huge advantages over poor ones in air warfare. Despite the expense, air superiority is often the key to the success of ground operations, especially in open terrain. The U.S. bombings of Iraq (1991 and 2003), Serbia (1999), and Afghanistan (2001) demonstrated a new effectiveness of air power, applied not against the morale of enemy populations (as in World War II), but directly at battlefield positions. The U.S. ability to decimate distant military forces while taking only very light casualties is historically unprecedented. The 2003 attack on Iraq demonstrated the usefulness of air power, but also its limits. A massive precision bombing raid on Baghdad a few days into the war destroyed hundreds of targets of value to Saddam Hussein’s government. It was designed to “shock and awe” enemy commanders into giving up. However, U.S. forces still had to slug it out on the ground to get to Baghdad. Clearly this war could not have been won from the air. As ground soldiers have pointed out, “Nobody ever surrendered to an airplane.”

Air forces are a likely area for attention in any future U.S.-China arms race. China has spent large sums in the past ten years rejuvenating its aging air force capabilities. The United States continues to invest heavily in its own air force, creating new technologies to stay ahead of Chinese advances. And while air power may be less useful in small-scale warfare, states continue to build their air forces in the event of more large-scale conflicts.

**Coordinating Forces: Logistics and Intelligence**

All military operations rely heavily on logistical support such as food, fuel, and ordnance (weapons and ammunition). Military logistics is a huge operation, and in most armed forces the majority of soldiers are not combat troops. Global reach capabilities combine long-distance logistical support with various power-projection forces. These capabilities allow a great power to project military power to distant corners of the world and to maintain a military presence in most of the world’s regions simultaneously. Only the United States today fully possesses such a capability—with worldwide military alliances, air and naval bases, troops stationed overseas, and aircraft carriers.

Space forces are military forces designed to attack in or from outer space. Ballistic missiles, which travel through space briefly, are not generally included in this category. Only the United States and Russia have substantial military capabilities in space. China put an astronaut in orbit in 2003 and successfully launched a lunar orbiter in
2007, but it has fewer space capabilities overall. The development of space weapons has been constrained by the technical challenges and expenses of space operations, and by norms against militarizing space.

The far more common uses of space by the military are for command and coordination purposes. Satellites are used extensively for military purposes. Satellites perform military surveillance and mapping, communications, weather assessment, and early warning of ballistic missile launches. Satellites also provide navigational information to military forces—army units, ships, planes, and even guided missiles in flight. Locations are calculated to within about 50 feet by small receivers, which pick up beacons transmitted from a network of 18 U.S. satellites known as a Global Positioning System (GPS). Handheld receivers are available commercially, so the military forces of other countries can free-ride on these satellite navigation beacons. Poorer states can buy satellite photos on the commercial market—including high-resolution pictures that Russia sells for hard currency. In fact, access to such information has diffused to the point that the terrorists who attacked Mumbai, India, in 2008 planned their attack using satellite images available through Google Earth, and coordinated it in real time from Pakistan using satellite phones. In the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon, Hezbollah forces used GPS jammers to complicate Israeli air support and targeting operations. But generally, in outer space great powers have the advantage over smaller or poorer states.

Intelligence gathering also relies on various other means such as electronic monitoring of telephone lines and other communications, reports from embassies, and information in the open press. The U.S. military operates a massive intelligence-gathering operation, especially for information relevant to battlefield deployments and other tactical matters. Satellite intelligence is supplemented by monitoring a very high volume of electronic communications, such as radio and telephone conversations. Terrorists in remote Afghanistan had to use couriers because the U.S. military could monitor their electronic communications.

The largest U.S. military intelligence agency is the National Security Agency (NSA), whose mission is encoding U.S. communications and breaking the codes of foreign communications. The NSA employs more mathematics Ph.D.s than anyone else in the world, is the second largest electricity consumer in the state of Maryland, has a budget larger than the CIA's, and is believed to have the most powerful computer facility in the world. The various intelligence operations taken together are very large and are growing in importance as the information revolution proceeds and as the war on terrorism makes their mission more central.

## Evolving Technologies

Technological developments have changed the nature of military force in several ways. First, the resort to force in international conflicts now has more profound costs and consequences. Great powers in particular can no longer use force to settle disputes among themselves without risking massive destruction and economic ruin. Also, military engagements now occur across greater standoff distances between opposing forces. Missiles of all types are accelerating this trend. These technological advances undermine the
Conflict, War, and Terrorism

The territorial basis of war and of the state itself. The state once had a hard shell of militarily protected borders, but today borders offer far less protection. Recent years have seen the increased use of unmanned drone aircraft, including drones armed with missiles, in U.S. military efforts in Pakistan, Yemen, and Libya.

In recent decades, the technological revolution in electronics has profoundly affected military forces, especially their command and control. Electronic warfare (now broadened to information warfare) refers to the uses of the electromagnetic spectrum (radio waves, radar, infrared, etc.) in war—employing electromagnetic signals for one’s own benefit while denying their use to an enemy. Electromagnetic signals are used for sensing beyond the normal visual range through radar, infrared, and imaging equipment to see in darkness, through fog, or at great distances. These and other technologies have illuminated the battlefield so that forces cannot be easily hidden. Electronic countermeasures try to counteract enemy electronic systems. Stealth technology uses special radar-absorbent materials and unusual shapes in the design of aircraft, missiles, and ships to scatter enemy radar. However, stealth is extremely expensive (the B-2 stealth bomber costs about $2 billion and is prone to technical problems.

Strategies for cyberwar—disrupting enemy computer networks to degrade command and control, or even hacking into bank accounts electronically—were developed by NATO during the 1999 Kosovo war. Though mostly not implemented, these strategies will probably figure in future wars. Some experts fear that terrorist attacks also could target computer networks, including the Internet.

Cyberattacks are an issue of growing importance in international relations. U.S. officials have accused Chinese hackers of thousands of attacks on Department of Defense computers. In 2010, China announced a military unit dedicated to the investigation and prevention of cyberattacks on its own computer systems. Also in 2010, the UN announced an agreement among 15 states (including Russia, China, and the United States) to begin negotiations on an international treaty concerning Internet security. Although the U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet computer worm targeted Iran’s
nuclear program in 2010, the United States decided against using cyberattacks to disable Libya's air defenses in 2011, out of fear of the precedent such an action could set.

**Terrorism**

The U.S. State Department lists 45 foreign terrorist organizations as of 2010. Some are motivated by religion (for example, al Qaeda) but others by class ideology (for example, Shining Path in Peru) or by ethnic conflict and nationalism (for example, Basque Fatherland and Liberty). Earlier in this chapter (pp. 123–128) we discussed conflicts involving armed Islamist militias and terrorist networks. Here we discuss terrorism itself as a tactic. Since September 2001, governments and citizens have paid much more attention to terrorism than before. But terrorism itself is not new.

*Terrorism* refers to political violence that targets civilians deliberately and indiscriminately. Beyond this basic definition, other criteria can be applied, but the definitions become politically motivated: one person’s freedom fighter is another’s terrorist. More than guerrilla warfare, terrorism is a shadowy world of faceless enemies and irregular tactics marked by extreme brutality.

Traditionally, the purpose of terrorism is to demoralize a civilian population in order to use its discontent as leverage on national governments or other parties to a conflict. Related to this is the aim of creating drama in order to gain media attention for a cause. Terrorism is seldom mindless; rather, it is usually a calculated use of violence as leverage. However, motives and means of terrorism vary widely, having in common only that some actor is using violence to influence other actors.

Thus, the primary effect of terrorism is psychological. In part the effectiveness of terrorism in capturing attention is due to the dramatic nature of the incidents, especially as shown on television news. Terrorism also gains attention because of the randomness of victims. Although only a few dozen people may be injured by a bomb left in a market, millions of people realize “it could have been me,” because they, too, shop in markets. Attacks on airplanes augment this fear because many people already fear flying. Terrorism thus amplifies a small amount of power by its psychological effect on large populations; this is why it is usually a tool of the weak. However, al Qaeda’s attacks follow a somewhat different pattern, planned less to create fear than simply to kill as many Americans and their allies as possible—and ultimately to touch off apocalyptic violence that al Qaeda followers believe will bring about God’s intervention. The psychological effect is aimed at Muslim populations worldwide rather than at Americans.

In the shockingly destructive attack on the World Trade Center, tangible damage was far greater than in previous terrorist attacks—reaching into thousands of lives and tens of billions of dollars. The psychological impact was even stronger than the physical damage—changing the U.S. political and cultural landscape instantly. And the same terrorist network was trying to obtain nuclear weapons (see pp. 149–150) with which to kill not thousands but hundreds of thousands of Americans.
The classic cases of terrorism—from the 1970s to the 2001 attacks—are those in which a nonstate actor uses attacks against civilians by secret nonuniformed forces, operating across international borders, as a leverage against state actors. Radical political factions or separatist groups hijack or blow up airplanes or plant bombs in cafés, clubs, or other crowded places. For example, Chechen radicals seized a school in Beslan, a small city in the Caucasus region in 2004. For three days, they held nearly 1,200 children, parents, and teachers without food or water. When Russian troops stormed the school, more than 300 people died, including 172 children. Such tactics create spectacular incidents that draw attention to the terrorists’ cause. Often terrorism is used by radical factions of movements that have not been able to get attention or develop other effective means of leverage. It is often a tactic of desperation, and it almost always reflects weakness in the power position of the attacker.

Yet, the persistence of terrorism is in some ways puzzling because the tactic has a mixed record of success. Suicide bombers were arguably effective at convincing the United States to leave Lebanon in 1983, but the Chechen terrorists’ 2004 school attack marked their end as a serious force in Chechnya. The Palestinians did not win a state through terrorism. Al Qaeda affiliates in Iraq so alienated the Sunni tribes that had sheltered them that the tribes turned against them. In addition, even large numbers of suicide bombers have yet to be effective at gaining a state for the Tamils in Sri Lanka or providing leverage for Hamas or Islamic Jihad against Israel. Clearly, terrorist activities do not reliably achieve political ends.

Terrorists are more willing than states are to violate the norms of the international system because, unlike states, they do not have a stake in that system. Conversely, when a political group gains some power or legitimacy, its use of terrorism usually diminishes.

Some research has attempted to systematically analyze when particular types of terrorism, such as suicide bombings, are effective at achieving the goals of terrorist organizations. According to one study, suicide bombings, rather than an irrational use of violence by terrorist groups, seem to follow strategic patterns (see Figure 4.8). In particular, they occur most frequently against democracies rather than autocracies, presumably because the attacks are thought to strongly influence public opinion. Still, this same study concludes that this terror tactic has not been particularly successful at achieving significant goals.

States themselves carry out acts designed to terrorize their own populations or those of other states, but scholars tend to avoid the label “terrorism” for such acts,
preferring to call them repression or war. In fact, no violent act taken during a civil or international war—by or toward a warring party—can necessarily fit neatly into the category of terrorism. The narrowest definition of terrorism would exclude acts either by or against uniformed military forces rather than civilians. This definition would exclude the killing of 243 U.S. Marines by a car bomb in Lebanon in 1983, and the 2001 attack on the Pentagon, because they were directed at military targets. It would also exclude the bombing of German cities in World War II although the purpose was to terrorize civilians. But in today’s world of undeclared war, guerrilla war, civil war, and ethnic violence, a large gray zone surrounds clear cases of terrorism. Disagreements about whether terrorism included Palestinian attacks on Israel, and Pakistani attacks in Kashmir, scuttled efforts to pass a UN treaty on terrorism in late 2001.

State-sponsored terrorism refers to the use of terrorist groups by states—usually under control of the state’s intelligence agency—to achieve political aims. In 1988, a bomb scattered pieces of Pan Am flight 103 over the Scottish countryside. Combing
the fields for debris, investigators found fragments of a tape recorder with a sophisticated plastic explosive bomb. The U.S. and British governments identified the Libyan intelligence agents responsible and, in 1992, backed by the UN Security Council, they demanded that Libya turn over the two agents for trial. When Libya refused, the UN imposed economic sanctions. In 1999, Libya turned over the suspects for trial—two received life in prison while a third was acquitted—and the UN suspended its sanctions. In 2003, Libya formally took responsibility for the bombing, struck a multibillion-dollar compensation deal with victims' families, and regained a normal place in the international community.

As of 2011, the United States accuses four states of supporting international terrorism—Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba. All have been on the list for more than a decade. The U.S. government has barred U.S. companies from doing business in those states. However, these kinds of unilateral U.S. sanctions are of limited effect. Cuba can do business with Canada, as can Iran with Russia. North Korea was removed from the list in 2008 in exchange for halting its nuclear weapons program.

**Counterterrorism** Just as the methods used by terrorists have become more diverse over the past decades, so have the policies implemented to prevent terrorist incidents. Debates over how to best prevent terrorist attacks are often heated since there are also debates about why individuals engage in terrorist attacks in the first place.

Policies to combat terrorism can be placed along a spectrum involving more or less force in confronting terrorism and terrorist organizations. On the nonviolent end of the spectrum are calls for economic development. Advocates of these programs point out that in very poor states, people will be especially vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist organizations. With no bright future ahead of them and little opportunities to better themselves, people will naturally lose hope, become angry, and undertake seemingly irrational acts since they feel they have nothing to lose. And although there is little direct evidence that factors like poverty correlate directly with terrorist activities, it is clear that very poor states with weak central governments have served as recruiting grounds for international terrorist organizations.

In the middle of the spectrum are policing activities. These involve efforts by domestic police, usually in cooperation with other countries' police forces, to apprehend or kill terrorists while breaking up terrorist organizations. In one famous example of effective counterterrorist policing, the government of Peru, using an elite investigative team of the national police force, arrested the leader of the Shining Path movement, which at one point controlled over 20,000 well-armed militia members and had assassinated several Peruvian political leaders. The police arrested the movement's leader after staking out a dance studio (which he lived above) and digging through trash from the studio to find clues. After his capture, the Shining Path movement largely collapsed.

At the other end of the counterterrorism spectrum is organized military conflict. States may undertake small- or large-scale conflicts to counter terrorist organizations. In 1998, the United States launched cruise missile strikes against a plant in Sudan believed to be producing chemical weapons for al Qaeda, but turned out to be making infant formula. In addition, the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan was a response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States.
Of course, nearly every state that undertakes counterterrorism policies uses some combination of these methods. In the United States, for example, foreign aid is often justified in terms of assisting development and economic growth to decrease the possibility that the poor and uneducated can be easily drafted into terrorist organizations. The FBI and local law enforcement cooperate with many international partners to track and detain suspected terrorists, while U.S. soldiers assist other states with training and weapons in their fight against terrorists. Finally, the war in Afghanistan was a large war undertaken against the Taliban government that had protected al Qaeda.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Weapons of mass destruction comprise three general types: nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. They are distinguished from conventional weapons by their enormous potential lethality, given their small size and modest costs, and by their relative lack of discrimination in whom they kill. When deployed on ballistic missiles, they can be fired from the home territory of one state and wreak great destruction on the home territory of another state. Until now this has never happened. But the mere threat of such an action undermines the territorial integrity and security of states in the international system. Of central concern today are the potentials for proliferation—the possession of weapons of mass destruction by more and more states and nonstate actors.

Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons are, in sheer explosive power, the most destructive weapons available to states. A single weapon the size of a refrigerator can destroy a city. Defending against nuclear weapons is extremely difficult at best. To understand the potentials for nuclear proliferation, one has to know something about how nuclear weapons work. There are two types. Fission weapons (atomic bombs or A-bombs) are simpler and less expensive than fusion weapons (also called thermonuclear bombs, hydrogen bombs, or H-bombs).

When a fission weapon explodes, one type of atom (element) is split into new types with less total mass. The lost mass is transformed into energy according to Albert Einstein’s famous formula, \( E = mc^2 \), which shows that a little bit of mass is equivalent to a great deal of energy. In fact, the fission bomb that destroyed Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945 converted to energy roughly the amount of mass in a penny.

The two elements that can be split in this way, uranium-235 (U-235) and plutonium, are known as fissionable material. Fission weapons work by taking subcritical masses of the fissionable material—amounts not dense enough to start a chain reaction—and compressing them into a critical mass, which explodes. In the simplest design, one piece of uranium is propelled down a tube (by conventional explosives) into another piece of uranium. A more efficient but technically demanding design arranges high explosives precisely around a hollow sphere of plutonium so as to implode the sphere and create a critical mass.

Although these designs require sophisticated engineering, they are well within the capabilities of many states and some private groups. The obstacle is obtaining
fissile material. Only 10 to 100 pounds or less are required for each bomb, but even these small amounts are not easily obtained. U-235, which can be used in the simplest bomb designs, is especially difficult to make. Extracting the fissile U-235, referred to as enriching the uranium up to weapons grade (or high grade), is slow, expensive, and technically complex—a major obstacle to proliferation. But North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya all built infrastructure to do so in recent years. North Korea promised to end its uranium program and dismantle its nuclear complex (after testing a plutonium bomb in 2006). It made progress in this direction in 2007–2008, albeit behind schedule. But Iran defied several UN Security Council demands to stop enriching uranium in 2006–2010, insisting on its sovereign right to enrich uranium for what it calls “peaceful purposes.”

Plutonium is more easily produced, from low-grade uranium in nuclear power reactors. But a plutonium bomb is more difficult to build than a uranium one—another obstacle to proliferation. Plutonium is also used in commercial breeder reactors, which Japan and other countries have built recently—another source of fissile material.

Fusion weapons are extremely expensive and technically demanding; they are for only the richest, largest, most technologically capable states. Here, two small atoms (variants of hydrogen) fuse together into a larger atom, releasing energy. This reaction occurs only at very high temperatures (the sun “burns” hydrogen through fusion). Weapons designers use fission weapons to create these high energies and trigger an explosive fusion reaction. The explosive power of fusion weapons can reach hundreds of times that of fission nuclear weapons. In the post–Cold War era, such megabombs have become irrelevant, since they are too powerful for any actor to use productively and too difficult for terrorists or small states to build.

**Ballistic Missiles and Other Delivery Systems**

Delivery systems for getting nuclear weapons to their targets—much more than the weapons themselves—are the basis of states’ nuclear arsenals and strategies (discussed shortly). Inasmuch as nuclear warheads can be made quite small—weighing a few hundred pounds or even less—they are adaptable to a wide variety of delivery systems.

During the Cold War, nuclear delivery systems were divided into two categories. Strategic weapons could hit an enemy’s homeland. Tactical nuclear weapons were designed for battlefield use. Both superpowers integrated tactical nuclear weapons into their conventional air, sea, and land forces using a variety of delivery systems—gravity bombs, artillery shells, short-range missiles, land mines, depth charges, and so forth.

However, the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads integrated into superpower conventional forces posed dangers such as theft or accident. Their actual use would have entailed grave risks of escalation to strategic nuclear war, putting home cities at risk. Thus, both superpowers phased out tactical nuclear weapons almost entirely when the Cold War ended.

The main strategic delivery vehicles are **ballistic missiles**; unlike airplanes, they are extremely difficult to defend against. Ballistic missiles carry a warhead up along a trajectory—typically out of the atmosphere, at least 50 miles high—before descending. In addition, some missiles fire from fixed sites (silos), whereas others are mobile, firing
from railroads or large trailer trucks (making them hard to target). The longest-range missiles are **intercontinental ballistic missiles** (ICBMs), with ranges of more than 5,000 miles.

Of special interest today are short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), with ranges under 1,000 miles. In regional conflicts, the long range of more powerful missiles may not be necessary. The largest cities of Syria and Israel are only 133 miles from each other; the capital cities of Iraq and Iran are less than 500 miles apart, as are those of India and Pakistan (see Figure 4.9). All of these states are among the 33 that own ballistic missiles. Short-range and some medium-range ballistic missiles are cheap enough to be bought or made by small middle-income states.

**FIGURE 4.9** Expanding Ranges of Indian and Pakistani Missiles, 1998–2003

Many short-range ballistic missiles are highly inaccurate but still very difficult to defend against. With conventional warheads, they have more psychological than military utility (demoralizing an enemy population). With nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads, however, these missiles could be deadlier. The cruise missile is a small winged missile that can navigate across thousands of miles of previously mapped terrain to reach a target. Cruise missiles can be launched from ships, submarines, airplanes, or land.

The proliferation of ballistic missiles has been difficult to control. Through the Missile Technology Control Regime, industrialized states try to limit the flow of missile-relevant technology to states in the global South, but with limited success. Short- and medium-range missiles (with ranges up to about 2,000 miles) apparently are being developed by Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, North Korea, and possibly Argentina and Brazil. In 2008, Iran alarmed the West by testing a missile that could reach Israel, Egypt, and parts of Europe.

Small states or terrorists that may acquire nuclear weapons in the future could deliver them through innovative means. Because nuclear weapons are small, one could be smuggled into a target state by car, by boat, or in diplomatic pouches. Since 2001, the United States has begun a Container Security Initiative aimed at preventing weapons of mass destruction from reaching U.S. shores in seaborne shipping containers. But doing so without impeding the prosperity-inducing flow of international trade is a daunting challenge—nearly 8 million shipping containers pass through U.S. ports every year.

**Chemical and Biological Weapons**

A chemical weapon releases chemicals that disable and kill people. The chemicals vary from lethal ones such as nerve gas to merely irritating ones such as tear gas. Different chemicals interfere with the nervous system, blood, breathing, or other body functions. Some can be absorbed through the skin; others must be inhaled. Some persist in the target area long after their use; others disperse quickly.

It is possible to defend against most chemical weapons by dressing troops in protective clothing and gas masks and following elaborate procedures to decontaminate equipment. But protective suits are hot, and antichemical measures reduce the efficiency of armies. Civilians are much less likely to have protection against chemicals than are military forces. Chemical weapons are by nature indiscriminate about whom they kill. Several times, chemical weapons have been deliberately used against civilians (notably by the Iraqi government against Iraqi Kurds in the 1980s).

Use of chemical weapons in war has been rare. Mustard gas, which produces skin blisters and lung damage, was widely used in World War I. After the horrors of that war, the use of chemical weapons was banned in the 1925 Geneva protocol, which is still in effect today. In World War II, both sides were armed with chemical weapons but neither used them, for fear of retaliation (the same was true in the Gulf War). Since then (with possibly a few unclear exceptions), only Iraq has violated the treaty—against Iran in the 1980s. Unfortunately, Iraq's actions not only breached a psychological barrier against using chemical weapons, but showed such weapons to be cheap and effective against human waves of attackers without protective gear. This stimulated
dozens more poor states to begin acquiring chemical weapons.

Chemical weapons are a cheap way for states to gain weapons of mass destruction. Production of chemical weapons can use similar processes and facilities as for pesticides, pharmaceuticals, and other civilian products, which makes it difficult to find chemical weapons facilities in suspect countries, or to deny those states access to the needed chemicals and equipment.

The 1925 treaty did not ban the production or possession of chemical weapons, only their use, and several dozen states built stockpiles of them. The United States and the Soviet Union maintained large arsenals of chemical weapons during the Cold War but have reduced them greatly in the past decade. The 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention to ban the production and possession of chemical weapons has been signed by all the great powers and nearly all other states, with a few exceptions including Egypt, Syria, and North Korea. The new treaty includes strict verification provisions and the threat of sanctions against violators including (an important extension) those who are nonparticipants in the treaty. From 1997 to 2010, the treaty organization oversaw the elimination of more than half of the world’s chemical weapons (over 40,000 metric tons).

Biological weapons resemble chemical ones, but use deadly microorganisms or biologically derived toxins. Some use viruses or bacteria that cause fatal diseases, such as smallpox, bubonic plague, and anthrax. Others cause nonfatal, but incapacitating, diseases or diseases that kill livestock. Theoretically, a single weapon could spark an epidemic in an entire population, but this would pose too great a danger, so less contagious microorganisms are preferred.

Biological weapons have virtually never been used in war (Japan tried some on a few Chinese villages in World War II). Their potential strikes many political leaders as a Pandora’s box that could let loose uncontrollable forces if opened. Thus, the development, production, and possession of biological weapons are banned by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, signed by more than 100 countries including the great powers. The superpowers destroyed their stocks of biological weapons and had to
restrict their biological weapons complexes to defensive research rather than the development of weapons. However, because the treaty makes no provision for inspection and because biological weapons programs are, like chemical ones, relatively easy to hide, several states remain under suspicion of having biological weapons. UN inspections of Iraq in the mid-1990s uncovered an active biological weapons program. Evidence surfaced after the collapse of the Soviet Union that a secret biological weapons program had been under way there as well. Today, the United States and perhaps a dozen other countries maintain biological weapons research (not banned by the treaty). Researchers try to ascertain the military implications of advances in biotechnology.

**Proliferation**

Proliferation is the spread of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and chemical or biological weapons—into the hands of more actors. The implications of proliferation for international relations are difficult to predict but clearly profound. Ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction remove the territorial protection offered by state borders and make each state vulnerable to others. Some realists, who believe in rationality, reason that in a world where the use of military force could lead to mutual annihilation, there would be fewer wars—just as during the arms race of the Cold War, the superpowers did not blow each other up. Other IR scholars who put less faith in the rationality of state leaders are much more alarmed by proliferation. They fear that with more and more nuclear (or chemical/biological) actors, miscalculation or accident—or fanatical terrorism—could lead to disaster.

The leaders of the great powers tend to side with the second group. They have tried to restrict weapons of mass destruction to the great powers. Proliferation erodes the great powers’ advantage relative to middle powers. There is also a widespread fear that these weapons may fall into the hands of terrorists or other nonstate actors who would be immune from threats of retaliation (with no territory or cities to defend). Evidence captured during the 2001 war in Afghanistan showed that al Qaeda was trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction and would be willing to use them. Lax security at the vast, far-flung former Soviet nuclear complex increased fears that fissionable materials could reach terrorists.

Nuclear proliferation could occur simply by a state or nonstate actor’s buying (or stealing) one or more nuclear weapons or the components to build one. The means to prevent this include covert intelligence, tight security measures, and safeguards to prevent a stolen weapon from being used. In 2007, two teams of armed assailants broke into the South African nuclear facility where atomic bombs had once been designed and produced. After reaching the control room and shooting one guard, they were repelled, leaving a mystery along with doubts about the security of such nuclear facilities. As political unrest occurs in nuclear states, notably Pakistan, thoughts often turn toward the safety of nuclear weapons.

A stronger form of nuclear proliferation is the development by states of nuclear complexes to produce their own nuclear weapons on an ongoing basis. Here, larger numbers of weapons are involved and strong potentials exist for arms races in regional conflicts and rivalries. The relevant regional conflicts are those between Israel and the Arab states, Iran and its neighbors, India and Pakistan, the two Koreas, and possibly Taiwan and China.
India and Pakistan each have dozens of nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. North Korea tested bombs in 2006 and 2009, but is negotiating to end its program. In addition, South Africa reported in 1993 that it had built several nuclear weapons but then dismantled them in the 1980s (before white minority rule ended).

Israel has never officially admitted it has nuclear weapons but is widely believed to have a hundred or more. Israel wants these capabilities to convince Arab leaders that military conquest of Israel is impossible. In 2007, Israeli warplanes destroyed a site in Syria thought to be a nuclear reactor of North Korean design. Syria quickly cleared all traces of the building after the attack.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 created a framework for controlling the spread of nuclear materials and expertise. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN agency based in Vienna, is charged with inspecting the nuclear power industry in member states to prevent secret military diversions of nuclear materials. However, a number of potential nuclear states (such as Israel) have not signed the NPT, and even states that have signed may sneak around its provisions by keeping some facilities secret (as Iraq and Iran did). In 2006, a deal between the United States and India to share nuclear technology led many states to question the NPT, because those benefits were supposedly reserved for signatories only. Nonetheless, the deal received final U.S. and Indian approval in 2008.

North Korea withdrew from the IAEA in 1993, then bargained with Western leaders to get economic assistance, including safer reactors, in exchange for freezing its nuclear program. North Korea's leader died months later, but the compromise held up. In 1999 North Korea allowed inspection of a disputed underground complex and agreed to suspend missile tests, in exchange for aid and partial lifting of U.S. trade sanctions. Then, in 2002, the United States confronted North Korea with evidence of a secret uranium enrichment program, which the North Koreans then admitted. North Korea then pulled out of the agreement and out of the IAEA, restarted its nuclear reactor, and apparently turned its existing plutonium into a half-dozen bombs within months, one of which was tested in
Chapter 4 Conflict, War, and Terrorism

2006. North Korea again agreed to give up its program in 2008, yet after another nuclear test in 2009, it began processing nuclear material again.

Iran denies, but appears to be, working to develop nuclear weapons. Since 2003, Iran first agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment program and allow surprise IAEA inspections, then restarted enrichment, suspended it again, and restarted it again. In 2005, U.S.-backed efforts by Europe to offer Iran economic incentives to dismantle its program faltered. In 2006–2008, the UN Security Council condemned Iran’s actions and imposed mild sanctions. Iran insisted on its right to enrich uranium for what it called peaceful purposes. In 2009, talks began between Iran and the United States over its nuclear program, but made little progress.

Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control

The term nuclear strategy refers to decisions about how many nuclear weapons to deploy, what delivery systems to put them on, and what policies to adopt regarding their possible use. The main reason for possessing nuclear weapons is to deter another state from a nuclear or conventional attack by threatening ruinous retaliation. Under mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side can prevent the other from destroying it. The acronym implies that the strategy, though “rational,” is actually insane (mad) because it could destroy both sides.

Defense has played little role in nuclear strategy to date because no effective defense against missile attack exists. However, the United States is spending billions of dollars a year to try to develop defenses that could shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. The program is called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars.”

In 2004, the United States began deploying both a prototype missile intercept system based in Alaska and a destroyer in the Sea of Japan that could try to shoot down a North Korean missile in its boost phase. It also moved to put in place—against strong Chinese opposition—a missile-defense collaboration in Asia that would include Japan, Australia, possibly India, and Taiwan. Four Japanese destroyers are to join the U.S. one, and Patriot missiles based in Japan would try to shoot down incoming missiles. But North Korea has more than 600 ballistic missiles capable of hitting Japan.

As of 2011 the United States is deploying a multilayer system with 24 ground-based interceptor missiles in Alaska and California (directed toward the North Korean threat), 21 ship-based interceptors, about 500 Patriot missiles for short-range ballistic missile threats, and a series of radars and control centers. It had begun testing an airplane-based laser system, and had agreed with Poland and the Czech Republic to build missile defenses in those countries, along the potential flight path of missiles fired from Iran. Russian objections to this plan were the subject of negotiations, and in 2009, the Obama administration reversed these plans, opting for a sea-based system to guard against any Iranian threat, with a radar system based in Turkey.

During the Cold War, the superpowers’ nuclear forces grew and technologies developed. These evolving force structures were codified by a series of arms control agreements. Arms control is an effort by two or more states to regulate by formal agreement their acquisition of weapons, using the reciprocity principle to solve the collective goods problem of expensive arms races that ultimately benefit neither side (see p. 5). Arms control is broader than just nuclear weapons—for instance, after World War I the
great powers negotiated limits on sizes of navies—but in the Cold War, nuclear weapons were the main focus of arms control. Arms control agreements typically require long, formal negotiations with many technical discussions, culminating in a treaty. Some arms control treaties are multilateral, but during the Cold War most were bilateral (U.S.-Soviet). Some stay in effect indefinitely; others have a limited term.

Several treaties in the 1970s locked in the superpowers’ basic parity in nuclear capabilities under MAD. The U.S. arsenal peaked in the 1960s at more than 30,000 warheads; the Soviet arsenal peaked in the 1980s at more than 40,000. More recent arms control agreements substantially reduced nuclear forces after the end of the Cold War. Under the 2002 U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, each side was to reduce deployed warheads from about 6,000 to 2,200. In March 2010, the sides signed a treaty (referred to as New START), which will further lower the number of warheads to 1,550 and also creates additional verification mechanisms. Overall the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are down to one-third of their peak levels and dropping, and the majority of remaining warheads are not deployed. The reciprocity principle that helped fuel the arms race also enables its step-by-step reversal.

China, France, and Britain each have several hundred weapons—France’s and Britain’s mostly on submarine-launched missiles and China’s mostly on long-range bombers and intermediate-range missiles.

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to halt all nuclear test explosions was signed in 1996 after decades of stalemate. It aims to impede the development of new types of nuclear weapons. However, the treaty does not take effect until signed and ratified by all 44 states believed capable of building at least a crude nuclear weapon. India did not sign the CTBT and defied it in 1998 with five nuclear tests. Pakistan followed suit with its own tests. The U.S. Senate voted in 1999 against ratifying the CTBT. Russia ratified it in 2000. Although no nuclear tests occurred worldwide in 1999–2005, North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 dealt more setbacks to the CTBT.

Efforts to control conventional arms trade through arms control treaties have had little success. In the early 1990s, the five permanent members of the Security Council, which account for most weapons sales to the Middle East, tried to negotiate limits on the supply of weapons to that region. But no participant wanted to give up its own lucrative arms sales to the region, which each naturally saw as justified (again, showing the difficulty of overcoming collective goods problems).

All the weapons of mass destruction are relatively difficult and expensive to build, yet provide only specialized capabilities that are rarely if ever actually used. This is why most states that could technically acquire them have decided not to do so. Such cost-benefit thinking also applies more broadly to states’ decisions about the acquisition of all kinds of military forces.

**States and Militaries**

Given the range of military capabilities available to states (at various costs), how many and what types should state leaders choose to acquire? This question confronts all states but they answer it in different ways.
Military Economics

States vary widely in military spending, from Costa Rica, with virtually no military spending at all, to North Korea, which devotes 20 percent or more of all economic activity to military purposes. If military budgets are too low, states may be unprepared to meet a security threat. But if leaders set military budgets too high, they will overburden the national economy in the long run.

World military spending is about 2 percent of the total goods and services in the world economy—about $1.2 trillion every year, or roughly $1 million every 30 seconds. Most is spent by a few big states, nearly half by the United States alone. World military spending is a vast flow of money that could, if redirected to other purposes, change the world profoundly and improve major world problems. Of course, “the world” does not spend this money or choose how to direct it; states do. World military spending decreased by about one-third overall in the 1990s, although it slowly began to increase again after 1998 and has jumped back up by one-quarter since 2001.

Arms imports by states of the global South make up more than half of all arms sales. In recent years, about half of the South’s arms imports have been in the Middle East, where oil exports create a ready source of funding, but in 2004 India and China took a larger share. Worldwide, the top arms exporter is the United States and the top four—the United States, Russia, France, and Britain—together account for the vast majority of international arms sales. In the immediate post–Cold War era, global arms sales fell, but have since climbed back to near–Cold War levels.

Activists have called attention to the sales of small arms, especially assault rifles, to unstable conflict zones where irregular armies commit brutalities. In 2001, 140 states agreed to a voluntary pact to curb small-arms sales to conflict zones. The United States, by far the largest exporter of small arms, blocked proposals to restrict sales of military weapons to rebel movements and to civilians. In the fall of 2009, the UN General Assembly voted nearly unanimously to begin work on an Arms Trade Treaty in hopes of completing work by 2012.

Control of Military Forces

Although militaries are instruments of state power, in many states the military forces themselves control the government. These military governments are mostly in the global South, where the military may be the only large modern institution in a country.
A coup d’état is the seizure of political power by domestic military forces—a change of political power outside the state’s constitutional order. In 2009, military leaders took power in Honduras, deposing its president. Coup leaders move quickly to seize centers of power—official state buildings as well as television stations and transmitters—before other units of the military can put down the coup attempt or unleash a civil war. Civilian politicians in power and uncooperative military officers are arrested or killed. The coup leaders try to create a sense of inevitability around the change in government while claiming their actions will bring long-term stability.

Civil-Military Relations  Beyond overcoming chaos and complexity, state leaders sometimes must confront challenges from within their own military ranks as well. Many states, especially democratic states, adhere to a principle of civilian supremacy. This is the idea that civilian leaders (who are either elected or appointed) are at the top of the chain of command. Civilians, not military officers, decide when and where the military fights. The officers, by contrast, are supposed to control how the military fights.

This division of labor between civilians and militaries inevitably leads to tensions. The interaction of civilian with military leaders—called civil-military relations—is an important factor in how states use force. Military leaders may undermine the authority of civilian leaders in carrying out foreign policies, or they may even threaten civilian supremacy if certain actions are taken in international conflicts. Military officers also want autonomy of decision once force is committed, in order to avoid the problems created in the Vietnam War when President Johnson sat in the White House situation room daily picking targets for bombing raids. Worse yet, in NATO’s 1999 bombing of Serbia, specific targets had to be approved by politicians in multiple countries. In 2010, the commanding American general in Afghanistan lost his job after publically questioning President Obama’s Afghanistan policies.

Even outside of the context of ongoing warfare, differences between civilian and military leaders can lead to tensions. Opinion surveys consistently show that U.S. military officers, on average, maintain different opinions than civilians on issues such as the use of force as a tool of leverage. Scholars have begun to study why this gap between civilians and the military has developed and its implications for American foreign policy.

Similar tensions exist in other democracies. In Turkey, tensions have grown between the Islamic government and its military. Historically, Turkey’s military has intervened numerous times to take control from elected leaders when military officers felt the government was threatening the secular nature of Turkey. Recently, however, the civilian government has been aggressive at arresting officers who they believe may be plotting a coup. These actions have led to a fragile situation in that country. In the 2011 Arab Spring, the Egyptian military refused to fire on protesters, whereas Syrian forces did use lethal fire.

Overall, states face complex choices regarding the configuration of their military forces. Yet, despite the threat of conflict or war and the importance of security concerns, trade, money, and business are playing more and more powerful roles in international relations. In the next chapter we move to a discussion of the politics of international economic activities, the world monetary system, and the role of private companies as nonstate actors in the world economy.
CHAPTER REVIEW

SUMMARY

- Wars vary greatly in size and character, from guerrilla wars and raids to hegemonic war for leadership of the international system. Currently 12 wars are in progress, mostly small to intermediate size, all pitting a regular state army against local rebels or militias.
- Many theories have been offered as general explanations of the causes of war, but political scientists cannot reliably predict the outbreak of war.
- Ethnic conflicts, especially when linked with territorial disputes, are very difficult to resolve because of psychological biases.
- Fundamentalist religious movements pose a broad challenge to the rules of the international system in general and to state sovereignty in particular.
- Territorial disputes are among the most serious international conflicts because states place great value on territorial integrity. With a few exceptions, however, almost all the world’s borders are now firmly fixed and internationally recognized.
- Military spending tends to stimulate economic growth in the short term but reduce growth over the long term. In the 1990s, military forces and expenditures of the great powers—especially Russia—were reduced and restructured. Since then, U.S. defense spending has risen back to Cold War–era levels.
- Control of territory is fundamental to state sovereignty and is accomplished primarily with ground forces.
- A “revolution in military affairs” uses new information technologies to enhance the power of small units.
- The 2001 attacks on the United States differed from earlier terrorism both in their scale of destruction and in the long reach of the global al Qaeda terrorist network.
- The production of nuclear weapons is technically within the means of many states and some nonstate actors, but the necessary fissionable material (uranium-235 or plutonium) is very difficult to obtain. Most industrialized states, and many poor ones, have refrained voluntarily from acquiring nuclear weapons.
■ Slowing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the global South is a central concern of the great powers.

■ The United States is testing systems to defend against ballistic missile attack, although none has yet proven feasible, and withdrew from the ABM Treaty with Russia to pursue this program.

■ The United States and Russia have arsenals of thousands of nuclear weapons; China, Britain, and France have hundreds; Israel, India, and Pakistan each have scores.

■ North Korea apparently has a half-dozen nuclear weapons and tested two in 2006 and 2009. Iran appears to be moving forward to develop them. Iran’s case was referred to the UN Security Council in 2006.

**KEY TERMS**

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CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS

1. How many of the six types of international conflict discussed in this chapter can you connect with the phenomenon of nationalism discussed on pp. 114–115? What are the connections in each case?

2. The rise of fundamentalism among the world’s major religions challenges traditional notions of state sovereignty. How might this trend strengthen, or weaken, the United Nations and other attempts to create supranational authority (which also challenge state sovereignty)?

3. Most of the great powers are reconfiguring their military forces in the post–Cold War era. What kinds of capabilities do you think your own country needs in this period? Why?